There are differences between the experience of the Afghan Mujahideen, as well as the Taliban movement, and that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This is especially true in terms of the geographical distance and the nature of the environment between Egypt and Afghanistan, as well as in terms of time span. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood boasts a history of more than eighty years, while the Mujahideen and the Taliban only lasted a limited number of years. Yet the result is the same: failure to manage the state followed by removal from power. The Mujahideen became divided and fought against one another, while the Taliban defied the Americans and led them to invade Afghanistan, topple them and establish the government they wanted. As for the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members considered their rule of Egypt to represent a gift from God, it is a different matter, and its fate will be a different one as well. Indeed, it is only natural for the group to be preoccupied with its own future, and for the international organization – as well as its branches in different countries around the world, its supporters and the other groups and organizations that orbit around it – to discuss the fate that awaits the original group in Egypt, after it failed to manage the affairs of power for a year, entered into a struggle against the new government as well as Egyptian society, and lost the sympathy of broad segments of the Egyptian population on which it had long relied to obtain votes in elections, gain support for its social and economic activities, and gather participants for its marches, protests and demonstrations. The Brotherhood so far does not seem to have an alternative plan to that which it has followed since Morsi was toppled and deposed, neither in terms of domestic nor foreign affairs. Nor does it seem to have alternatives in terms of its methods and mechanisms, neither regarding the issue of its protests and marches, despite the fact that people have stopped joining them, nor the issue of the violence practiced by other Jihadist groups, who do not hide the fact that they are taking revenge for the fact that Morsi was deposed and the Brotherhood excluded from the political scene. And it is only natural for voices to rise from within the Brotherhood, criticizing Morsi's methods of governance or the policies of the Guidance Bureau, such as in the article written by leading Brotherhood figure Hamza Zawbaa in the Freedom and Justice Newspaper two days ago. Yet this is something that falls under the framework of role distribution. What matters is that the Muslim Brotherhood has reached the conviction that Morsi will not be reinstated. Yet the fall of the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood and the removal of Morsi, as well as the lack of influence of the protests organized by members and supporters of the group and their diminishing number of participants, does not mean that the Brotherhood is finished in Egypt. This is not just because it has reserves of leaders, cadres, followers, supporters and backers abroad, whether from among rulers and governments or institutions and parties. It is also because a movement with a history such as that of the Muslim Brotherhood does not usually meet with a sudden death, but can rather become infected with a virus or bacteria that causes it to suffer a chronic illness it battles for many more long years until it is healed and recovers, or loses the fight and dies a slow death. Another reason is that the group's organizational structure may be affected or damaged by security measures that would involve hunting down, harassing and besieging its members, but its ideas, convictions and beliefs remain and will be passed on to future generations, especially among families and members of the Brotherhood who have been brought up on the principle of obeying without question. Thus, waning reactions to Morsi's removal, the dispersal of the protests in the Rabia Al-Adawiyya and Al-Nahda squares, and the arrest of the group's leaders and cadres cannot be interpreted to mean the death of the Muslim Brotherhood, or even that its leadership has lost control over its base or that the movement of the street will subside in the coming phase, after the group and its members have been exhausted in the different provinces. Limited, or let us say meager, protests will continue to take place for a while, held in neighborhoods far from the centers of cities, as will marches in narrow streets and neighborhoods, and will not vanish with the passing of time. What matters for the Brotherhood now is to send messages to its branches abroad, its allies inside the country and its backers in the West and in the East, signifying that the group is still there, and that excluding it from any political solution to the Egyptian crisis is out of the question. Furthermore, bringing about the failure of the new government – whether the current government or the one that will be formed in the future following presidential and legislative elections – is considered to represent a strategic goal for the Muslim Brotherhood. This is not just out of motives of vengeance, but also more importantly in order to convince the group's popular base that Morsi did not fail because he was incompetent, but rather because resolving Egypt's problems lies beyond the abilities of any president or of any group! Follow up on the Muslim Brotherhood's reactions to the steps being taken to draft the constitution, or even to the terrorist attacks in the Sinai, or to the attack against the Interior Minister. Examine its promotion of rumors about the situation of banks, illegal drugs and the prices of gasoline and diesel fuel, or the behavior of its activists on social media websites. You will find that the group and its members have accepted to go through the ordeal, and have in fact become fully engrossed in it, believing that being oppressed might not just attract sympathy, but also ensure that their brothers and sisters in the group will become preoccupied with surviving the ordeal, instead of looking into their mistakes and trying to correct them, or even turning against the group's leaders and holding them to account. Afghanistan's Mujahideen are nearly finished, and so is the Taliban movement, save for some scarce activity and weak presence. As for the Muslim Brotherhood, it will be going through this ordeal for years, and will not emerge from it until it changes from within.
