One of the main reasons for the failure of the experience of Islamist rule in Egypt and for the Muslim Brotherhood's current crisis, after Doctor Mohamed Morsi was deposed and removed from the office of president, is this ambiguity in the political discourse and contradiction between theory and practice, and words and deeds. This has made the entire movement commit blatant mistakes it had not been aware of or sensitive to. Most astonishing, in fact, was the surprise it would express whenever such mistakes were pointed out or objected to. Leave aside the issue of the "Brotherhoodization" of the state, as opposed to Morsi's talk of being the president of all Egyptians, or that of the Muslim Brotherhood's alliance with radical Islamists in the Sinai, despite its repeated assertions of rejecting violence and opposing terrorism. And leave aside the fact that the Brotherhood besieged those who opposed it, excluded all other forces, and fought every state institution that confronted its rush to impose the influence of the group and its allies on Egypt's social fabric, not to mention the national dialogue sessions that Morsi used to call for, in which he would engage in dialogue with his allies, considering them to represent the opposition. Indeed, it is enough to examine the issue of "the Islamic project", which Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, resort to talking about whenever they find someone opposing, criticizing or attacking their methods of governance, while they fail to mention it in other stances in which they assert their civil nature and their rejection of theocracy. What is meant here of course is an Islamist project for governance, not Islam as a religion in which millions of people believe, people who are not affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood or any other Islamist movement. Indeed, the fact of the matter is that the specifics of such a project, whether for Islamist political parties that were founded after the January 25 Revolution or for the Muslim Brotherhood itself, have so far remained unclear and are usually discussed in very general terms, depending on situations in which Islamists think that using the expression "the Islamic project" will be sufficient to silence others, out of fear that they might be accused of apostasy. The issue is then one of interaction, not of worship as prescribed by the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet. And even in terms of interaction, many have noted that the Muslim Brotherhood's methods of governance had not been consistent with Islamic conduct in the first place. Most surprising, or even shocking, is the fact that such a project did not appear throughout the year of the Brotherhood's rule, despite being abundantly talked about and promoted. Moreover, Morsi, his political party, and the group he is affiliated to did not talk about such a project before or after the presidential elections, but only when they committed mistakes that harmed state and society. Once ousted from power, they began to accuse those who opposed them of being against "the Islamic project", when it had in fact appeared throughout the year of Morsi's rule that "the Islamic project" was merely "the Muslim Brotherhood's project". As a matter of fact, with the exception of Article 219 of the constitution drafted by the Constitutive Assembly that had been dominated by Islamists, aspects of the Islamization of society remained a matter of individual, and often haphazard, behavior on the part of some Salafists, especially in cities and villages far from the capital. This has in fact always consisted of behavior outside the bounds of the law, with instances such as killing a young man for merely sitting with his fiancée or applying the Islamic Sharia sentence for highway robbery on some thieves or outlaws in certain slums or remote villages. There were also sessions of threats and intimidation on Islamist satellite television channels, attacks by preachers from the Muslim Brotherhood or from among its supporters against members of the opposition under the cover of religion, objections to certain films and television series, and accusations of apostasy directed at actors and singers! Officially, and throughout the period of the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, no specific Islamic project could be identified. Morsi, his government, his Shura Council and his Guidance Bureau did not appear to have taken measures or even paved the way towards banning bank interest rates, closing down nightclubs, making the hijab (headscarf) or niqab (face-veil) compulsory for women, or turning the system of government from a republican one to one ruled by the Supreme Guide and the formal bodies orbiting around him. "The Islamic project" remained an undefined goal, without specific clauses or articles of law or of a constitution. Thus the contradiction appeared between overt and covert, and between discourse, talk and speeches on the one hand, and behavior on the other. We are not here to discuss the implementation of decisions or policies that angered secularists and were approved by Islamists, such as Morsi's letter to Shimon Peres for example. Nor do we believe that "the Islamic project" is the same as the renaissance project, which the Muslim Brotherhood talked about before the presidential electoral campaign, with Morsi mentioning that it was like a bird that does not lay eggs. Yet the search will remain ongoing for the clauses of such a project, and whether it goes beyond the issue of the goals of the international organization in the world, whether it means that the Muslim Brotherhood or the Islamists should rule, full stop, or whether it allows the Islamist ruler, his family and his tribe to commit any mistakes without anyone holding them to account. It is true that Morsi's predicament is that he ruled Egypt as if he were running the Muslim Brotherhood, and dealt with Egyptians as if they were his "brethren" in the group, who should listen to him and obey him without discussion or objections. Yet the rising frequency of accusations leveled at those who support his removal for being against the Islamic project indicates that the issue is more complicated than that for the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters. Indeed, the latter are insensitive to the vast rift that exists between them and the rest of the masses of the Egyptian people, between Morsi's pledges before coming to power and the practices he engaged in, between talk of the peaceful nature of protests and scenes of killing, or between the fact that pictures of our late fellow journalist Al-Husseini Abu Deif were raised at the Muslim Brotherhood's recent protests and the fact that Morsi and a number of his fellow Brotherhood members were referred to the Criminal Court on charges of killing Al-Husseini Abu Deif!
