When the second Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Hudaybi, wrote his book "Preachers Not Judges", at a time when Brotherhood members were being imprisoned in the jails of the Nasser era, hunted down or exiled from Egypt, he sought to show that the function of a preacher – considering that the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood was originally a society of preachers – was to preach Islam, not to pass judgment on people, on the basis of the fact that passing judgment is the function of judges, not preachers. It was later said that the book had brought together studies in Islamic jurisprudence in which a substantial number of prominent figures of the Muslim Brotherhood had taken part, which were compiled in the book under Hudaybi's name in order to stress the Brotherhood's commitment to its contents. Hudaybi, along with a team of Brotherhood leaders, had sought to resolve the situation reached by the Muslim Brotherhood after it had become stigmatized with violence, whether in terms of making use of it or calling for it, and to deny and elude the accusations of terrorism leveled at the group. He had also sought to respond to Sayyid Qutb's book "Milestones", which included takfiri ideas (accusing others of apostasy) and judgment against those who disagreed with the Muslim Brotherhood's approach. The book "Preachers Not Judges" was considered at the time tantamount to an apology for the acts of violence and killing carried out by the group's Secret Apparatus before and after the July 1952 Revolution, and one that accurately defined the basic rules of Islamic jurisprudence which members of the Brotherhood should use in their view of people and commit to in calling for faith in God, challenging ideas with clear arguments, correcting and removing flawed arguments, and choosing positive debate. Yet the Muslim Brotherhood after a year of ruling Egypt is in need of much more than a book, and in fact the issue goes well beyond books in the first place. It is true that the statements of what remains of the Brotherhood's leaders outside of prison or of the group's activists on social media websites keep reiterating the same talk about the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful methods, denying that it would make use of violence and claiming that the instances of burning churches, attacking police stations and prisons, killing people and protesting had been the work of the opposing side – i.e. the army, the police and the ‘baltagiya' (hired thugs). It is also true that the Al-Jazeera Live Egypt channel broadcasts all day long segments of a speech by the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie in which he calls for "peaceful methods". Yet the Muslim Brotherhood's predicament this time is that it has clashed with more than those in power, that a broad segment of the Egyptian population has become opposed to the Brotherhood, and that the evidence that refutes its talk of peaceful methods is not made up merely of loose talk or investigation reports, but rather of widely broadcasted video footage or stances which Egyptians experienced themselves or suffered from and paid the price for. In the 1950s and 60s, the Muslim Brotherhood did not enjoy the support of major powers as it does today, with the support it receives from the Americans and Europeans. It was also not openly and frankly backed by any countries, as is the case today with its alliance with Qatar, nor were there television channels promoting it or inciting against those who oppose it, as is the case with Al-Jazeera, Al-Hiwar or Al-Quds. Yet the difference is that the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s had been realistic in its analysis of the situation, which allowed it to come back again, even if years later. It apologized for or distanced itself from its past mistakes in words and deeds, and in fact always called on its members to refrain from entering into clashes with those in power, even if other groups and organizations got implicated in acts of terrorism while raising the banner of Islam. And indeed the years that followed did not witness deeds by members of the Brotherhood that would fall within the framework of making use of violence or calling for it. The Muslim Brotherhood today is a different matter. The appearance of Muslim Brotherhood leader Doctor Mohamed Beltagy in this form and in this way, after everything that has happened, only reflects the insistence of Brotherhood leaders on moving forward down the road they have chosen for themselves. And while he was rejecting violence in the video, accusing the army and talking about the coup, he was, in terms of form, imitating Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Osama Bin Laden. Meanwhile, the content of his discourse seemed as if directed only at members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who could see him as a hero or a mujahid, and expect him, in view of the fact that he remains a free man and has not been imprisoned, to save them from the ordeal which the Brotherhood has been going through! Regardless of Beltagy's discourse, which did not depart from that of his Supreme Guide and his other "brethren", calling on Egyptians to take to the streets, oppose the "coup" and reinstate the "legitimate president", the mere fact of having resorted to such a method is evidence to the fact that the main problem in Egypt is connected to the identity of the state in the future, and does not merely consist of a disagreement or a struggle for power between a religious group or faction and the army or other political forces. Perhaps this was the reason behind the rapid clash that occurred between the Muslim Brotherhood and societal forces, or as the Brotherhood has dubbed them, the "Deep State". And instead of the Muslim Brotherhood trying to build bridges of trust with society and to cross this deep gulf over a long period of time, it wagered and lost – swam against the current and drowned. And after the failure of their experience in power, its members have returned to consider themselves judges, not preachers!
