Washington's decision to allow the Minurso delegation in the Sahara to monitor the Human Rights situation in the Tindouf province and camps angered Morocco. However, what is more dangerous than this anger is the fact that crisis which spiraled out of control is between the United States and a country that was previously considered a strategic ally in the North African region. There had been features of a détente in the issue of the Sahara, in light of a more global vision to discuss a regional settlement, through the normalization of the Moroccan-Algerian relations and the reactivation of the Maghreb Union. However, the confidence crisis came to cast some suspicious shadows on the exerted efforts. Indeed, Morocco is categorically rejecting the expansion of the Minurso jurisdictions, which could imply a return to square one. However, the interesting part lies in the fact that Rabat's rejection does not revoke the concern in Human Rights, since this concern is part of the global commitments. Instead, it considers that the UN may employ mechanisms from outside the international delegation in order to play this part. The race to save face will probably not be confined to the literal content of this decision in itself, regardless of whether the latter is eventually passed, revoked, or revisited. There is rather a tendency at revisiting the Moroccan-American relations. This is probably the reason behind the delay of the Moroccan-American maneuvers that were to take place on the Atlantic coast in the northern Saharan governorates. In fact, the decision is seen as one that affects the very basis of the military treaty signed between Washington and Rabat in the early 1980s, since it allowed the American forces to use the Moroccan bases and to obtain gas supplies “in the event that the Gulf area is subjected to any threats." In light of the present developments, it seems that Rabat and Washington are not about to let go of their mutual conflicts. However, even if the Sahara conflict is being discussed in the framework of the United Nations, no necessary progress can possibly be achieved without the direct involvement of the Americans. The appointment of the two American envoys, James Baker and Christopher Ross, is another proof to the usual American involvement in solving conflicts on its' own. The relations between Washington and Rabat are going through an important test, regardless of whether the present misunderstanding between the two capitals is just a passing cloud or a plot aimed at aggravating the situation. The Democratic and Republican Congressmen were once pressuring the American Administration to support Morocco, America's traditional ally. Now however, Rabat's friends are exerting pressure in order to restore the bilateral relations to their previous state. Here lies the importance of the tours of the Moroccan envoys to capitals like Moscow and Britain, with the aim of finding new friends. The parties concerned with the developments of the Sahara file know that this was one of the most important reasons behind Morocco's signing of the “deal" of the century with the former Soviet Union to provide phosphate and derivatives supplies. This deal was completed while the alliance between Rabat and Washington was maintained, since there are no contraindications to having several partnerships and positions. The most difficult crises actually allowed Rabat to break Paris' monopolization over the foreign trade, which was later on re-distributed between Spain, Italy, and Portugal. Regardless of its expected outcomes, the present crisis will lead to a new form of openness. The Moroccans are hoping that the American Administration will make a distinction between the political solution plan and the monitoring of the Human Rights, by reverting to mechanisms other than those of the international delegation. The reason is that the Moroccans also fear that the American suggestion might have some hidden connotations. However, this is not yet the end.
