The withdrawal of some Moroccan opposition factions from the dialogue committees in the judiciary and civil society sectors, as well as the accentuation of the concept of equality between men and women indicate that a potential political crisis might be pointing in the horizon. Indeed, the withdrawal represents a deep blow to the constitutional clause indicating that the opposition is a partner in deciding on the main directions. While this situation is embarrassing for the Abdelilah Benkirane cabinet, it comes to meet the rise of the confrontational tone by some prominent unions, to the extent of calling for the organization of a protest march in Rabat by the end of the present month. Clearly, the target of the facets of the ongoing battle lies in the fact that it joins between the usage of constitutional institutions and the street movement at the same time, without reaching the extent of a definitive estrangement, as long as the cabinet cannot ban marches organized by the union and deemed peaceful. Meanwhile, all what the reformative dialogue committees will be doing might merely consist of recording the reservations of the withdrawing parties. Perhaps it is better for the opposition to seize the right opportunity when the suggested reforms are raised in front the parliament, in order to present the opposition's point of view, no matter how harsh or justified it is. The cabinet is no longer confronting a street with blurry features as is the case for the so-called Arab Spring's revolutions. The conflict is now guided by both the opposition and the pro-government forces on the sides of the democratic game. This concern has probably pushed the Benkirane cabinet to delay the discussion of the clearing system's reform, i.e. the revisiting of the state's subsidies to the basic consumables, in order to avoid any angry reactions and a subsequent loss of control. The latest partial elections indicated that the power of the majority parties in the political street has remained unaffected. This means that the elections remain an important factor in determining the power balances in the face of the opposition's plan to weaken the government, regardless of whether the present cabinet was to proceed to the end of its term or whether early elections will be conducted to overcome the present impasse. The most controversial aspect of the Moroccan experience does not consist of toppling the cabinet if the crisis were to reach a dead end, but rather the events that will follow after this means of action is consumed. The opposition's Socialist Union has alluded several times to the possibility of withdrawing the vote of confidence. The Union knows that, without the support of one or more partner from the ruling coalition, it will be hard to topple the executive body. This explains the Union's overt friendliness towards its former strategic ally, the Independence Party, and the voices that rose from within the Progression and Socialism Party and that criticized the former Communist Party for supporting the Islamic Justice and Development party in power. Until recently, the moderate Islamists in Morocco believed that the power monopolization by their peers in the countries of the Arab Spring, namely Egypt and Tunisia, as well as the decline of the Libyan experience, constitute a gain for them. Today, just like their opponents, they are concerned about the potential failure of the Islamists' experience in power. The wave of the Arab Spring represented an incentive for the Islamic movements in the country. Similarly, the limited experience of the Islamists pushed the opposition factions to go too far in trying to hinder the government. The difference is that the conflict in Morocco is being managed according to political mechanisms under the realm of the state of the institutions and the conviction that the power balances that were in place prior to the November 2011 elections are still the same. The advantage of the Islamic cabinet is that it decreased the pressure of the flared up Street and induced a return to competing through the elections. However, the opponents took advantage of this cabinet's mistakes, mainly when it comes to the major social matters, saying that the cabinet kept the reforms as mere headlines for matters that it failed to accomplish. The opposition and the pro-government forces are critical of one another. The cabinet also believes that it has inherited a heavy economic and social legacy, which is hard to address in two years or more. On the other hand, the opposition believes that the new constitution granted the cabinet many jurisdictions that broke down all the restrictions. Thus, the cabinet is now able to lauch a real movement of reform, based on a clear constitutional reference. In the same context, one can understand the reason why the government is hesitant in conducting some major reforms, such as revisiting the state's commitment in offering subsidies for the consumables. Indeed, the government wants to see the opposition take part in this thorny task. However, the withdrawal of some opposition factions from the dialogue committees means that they do not wish to share the responsibility of such decisions. The majority decided to abide again by its charter, in order to contain any possible unrest or divisions. However, the charter of the majority cannot overcome the governmental agenda or replace a political program. Furthermore, there is always a need for a debate over this matter, in order to shield the experience against any possible derailment. Morocco: A Political Crisis Pointing in the Horizon Mohammad Al-Ashab Al-Hayat 24-03-13 The withdrawal of some Moroccan opposition factions from the dialogue committees in the judiciary and civil society sectors, as well as the accentuation of the concept of equality between men and women indicate that a potential political crisis might be pointing in the horizon. Indeed, the withdrawal represents a deep blow to the constitutional clause indicating that the opposition is a partner in deciding on the main directions. While this situation is embarrassing for the Abdelilah Benkirane cabinet, it comes to meet the rise of the confrontational tone by some prominent unions, to the extent of calling for the organization of a protest march in Rabat by the end of the present month. Clearly, the target of the facets of the ongoing battle lies in the fact that it joins between the usage of constitutional institutions and the street movement at the same time, without reaching the extent of a definitive estrangement, as long as the cabinet cannot ban marches organized by the union and deemed peaceful. Meanwhile, all what the reformative dialogue committees will be doing might merely consist of recording the reservations of the withdrawing parties. Perhaps it is better for the opposition to seize the right opportunity when the suggested reforms are raised in front the parliament, in order to present the opposition's point of view, no matter how harsh or justified it is. The cabinet is no longer confronting a street with blurry features as is the case for the so-called Arab Spring's revolutions. The conflict is now guided by both the opposition and the pro-government forces on the sides of the democratic game. This concern has probably pushed the Benkirane cabinet to delay the discussion of the clearing system's reform, i.e. the revisiting of the state's subsidies to the basic consumables, in order to avoid any angry reactions and a subsequent loss of control. The latest partial elections indicated that the power of the majority parties in the political street has remained unaffected. This means that the elections remain an important factor in determining the power balances in the face of the opposition's plan to weaken the government, regardless of whether the present cabinet was to proceed to the end of its term or whether early elections will be conducted to overcome the present impasse. The most controversial aspect of the Moroccan experience does not consist of toppling the cabinet if the crisis were to reach a dead end, but rather the events that will follow after this means of action is consumed. The opposition's Socialist Union has alluded several times to the possibility of withdrawing the vote of confidence. The Union knows that, without the support of one or more partner from the ruling coalition, it will be hard to topple the executive body. This explains the Union's overt friendliness towards its former strategic ally, the Independence Party, and the voices that rose from within the Progression and Socialism Party and that criticized the former Communist Party for supporting the Islamic Justice and Development party in power. Until recently, the moderate Islamists in Morocco believed that the power monopolization by their peers in the countries of the Arab Spring, namely Egypt and Tunisia, as well as the decline of the Libyan experience, constitute a gain for them. Today, just like their opponents, they are concerned about the potential failure of the Islamists' experience in power. The wave of the Arab Spring represented an incentive for the Islamic movements in the country. Similarly, the limited experience of the Islamists pushed the opposition factions to go too far in trying to hinder the government. The difference is that the conflict in Morocco is being managed according to political mechanisms under the realm of the state of the institutions and the conviction that the power balances that were in place prior to the November 2011 elections are still the same. The advantage of the Islamic cabinet is that it decreased the pressure of the flared up Street and induced a return to competing through the elections. However, the opponents took advantage of this cabinet's mistakes, mainly when it comes to the major social matters, saying that the cabinet kept the reforms as mere headlines for matters that it failed to accomplish. The opposition and the pro-government forces are critical of one another. The cabinet also believes that it has inherited a heavy economic and social legacy, which is hard to address in two years or more. On the other hand, the opposition believes that the new constitution granted the cabinet many jurisdictions that broke down all the restrictions. Thus, the cabinet is now able to lauch a real movement of reform, based on a clear constitutional reference. In the same context, one can understand the reason why the government is hesitant in conducting some major reforms, such as revisiting the state's commitment in offering subsidies for the consumables. Indeed, the government wants to see the opposition take part in this thorny task. However, the withdrawal of some opposition factions from the dialogue committees means that they do not wish to share the responsibility of such decisions. The majority decided to abide again by its charter, in order to contain any possible unrest or divisions. However, the charter of the majority cannot overcome the governmental agenda or replace a political program. Furthermore, there is always a need for a debate over this matter, in order to shield the experience against any possible derailment.
