The opposition is no longer the only party that is criticizing the Moroccan government since it has been joined by the Independence Party, the most important partner in the governmental coalition. Abdelilah Benkirane must now understand the backdrop of the arrows that are being shot at his cabinet from every direction. These arrows could have been tolerated if they came from the part of those who oppose the Islamic cabinet; however, they become quite bitter when shot by the partners of Benkirane. Indeed, Benkirane and his partners are walking together in the same direction but with different calculations. There is nothing strange there. Indeed, the Secretary General of the Independence Party who demolished the fortress built by his predecessor, Abbas al-Fassi, is now demolishing the bridges that Al-Fassi had also built during the cabinet formation consultations. Unionist Hamid Shobat's allusions to the need for a ministerial amendment and to revise the cabinet structure indicate that he aspires for a full control over his party's march. He wants to do so both on the level of his alliances within and outside the cabinet; and also by pleasing the supporters who elected him at the head of the oldest party in the country. The memorandum sent by the Independence Party to Benkirane, which called for a ministerial amendment, could have aimed at re-arranging the party's affairs or it could have been a pretext aimed at uncovering the shady areas of the present cabinet arrangement. In both cases, this memorandum serves the politics of pressuring a political experience that is barely one year old, whereby the cabinet suffers under the blows of the Street, whose expectations were higher than the cabinet's ability to keep its large pledges; and also the shock caused by the victory of the Justice and Development. The cabinet must deal with the criticism of its governmental partners in a different manner, because ignoring this criticism might lead to the weakening of the majority. This means that the prime minister must respond to their demands even if these demands go beyond the needed level to induce harmony and solidarity. Even if the Independent party is a bit too rigid, the prime minister may use its honesty in order to ponder the possible outcomes should the country reach a dead end. One can now understand the reason why Benkirane was keen on including the opposition Socialist Union in his cabinet. He probably smelled the fire before it even broke. He tried hard to attract the Independence party's traditional ally to the cabinet in order to facilitate its choice in the event of any potential differences. One can now expect the negative effect of the socialists' return to the opposition side if not on the level of the escalation of the opposition with the cabinet, then at least on the level of attracting the partners to the opposition arena, which has the capacity of containing the rebel voices from within and outside the cabinet. There is most probably an ongoing endeavor aimed at snatching the victory that the Moroccan Islamists had achieved during the past elections through the same democratic mechanisms. The present unrest among the different components of the governmental alliance cannot go on for too long without finding consensual solutions. Overlooking the discrepancies that are about to spiral out of control will lead to the failure of the experience. Clearly, the struggle opposing the political adversaries hasn't been settled by taking stands with the government or the opposition. The struggle is ongoing under different forms. The Independence party could have realized that the present battle is now open to all possibilities and that it must naturally remain loyal to its partners at the previous cabinets since 1998. Or, on the contrary, the Independence party might be aspiring for consolidating its present experience and resisting the storms. This could be the reason why the party wanted to be honest about the gaps. Perhaps the mistake made by the cabinet and its leaders is that they allowed for internal criticism although the prime minister had toned down the importance of these differences on several instances. However, now that the dialogue between the different components of the governmental coalition has reached the extent of sending symbolic memos, this means that the differences are no longer contained. One must also note that the selection of the timing could have been affected by the electoral backdrops. The cabinet must now confront the internal opposition voices in addition to the voices of its adversaries from the opposition. Pondering the first year of the experience along with its difficulties and violations is better than to proceed on the wrong path, especially that the memorandum of the Independence party does not call for revisiting the joint commitments. Rather, it calls for demarcating them by activating the performance of the parliamentary and governmental majority and by coming up with a treaty that should act as a new contract to be accepted by all the partners. If this is not achieved, then the worst legitimate scenario could take place: that of breaking away from this coalition of conflicting parties.
