A cabinet crisis at the beginning is better than to wait for an end of the term of Abdelilah Benkirane, the Islamic Moroccan PM, in power, and launch the accountability process. When the Al-Istiqlal party threatened to leave the cabinet, it did cause an embarrassment for the prime minister and all the coalition's partners. In the same way, Al-Istiqlal's position also forced the young cabinet to practice self-criticism especially that the most vocal opposition voices rose from within, rather than outside, the coalition. The formula that will be adopted to settle the differences within the cabinet will most likely consist of reducing the estrangement and opening a clean slate in the relationship between the elements of the present coalition. However, regardless of its nature, this formula will undoubtedly call for compromises that the cabinet could have avoided had it abided by the methods of listening and dialogue. Obviously, those who are unable to listen to the voices rising from within the cabinet will be unable to hear the screams coming from the outside. Following the 2011 parliamentary elections, the Justice and Development party entered a phase of ecstasy and thus lost the need to share the decision making process with the others. The party's excuse for this kind of behavior could be that all its opponents actually wanted its head. In fact, the party's massive victory pushed its political partners to compete with it and to hinder its efforts for reform. The crisis called for a lot of self-restraint, but the debate around it took other dimensions including the constitutional debate on using this clause, or that to deal with the emergent situation. Al-Istiqlal went as far as to request a royal arbitration, based on the fact that the head of the state is responsible for defending the constitution and monitoring the work of the institutions. The Justice and Development party responded by indicating that the prime minister has the constitutional jurisdictions to decide on the sacking of ministers. The debate actually consisted of different political interpretations to serve the cause of the conflicting governmental parties. This crisis - that casted some dark shadows on the cabinet's constitutional situation - actually called for a neutral referee. However, the Al-Istiqlal party members were smarter, as they announced their withdrawal from the cabinet, while their ministers actually remained. They ignored the prime minister, because they had major differences with him, thus leaving the door open to all possibilities. The Al-Istiqlal chose to remain in the cabinet until the royal arbitration is issued. Meanwhile, the rest of the opposition factions could have seized this golden opportunity. However, most of them took a stand in support of Al-Istiqlal by declaring that they do not wish to replace Al-Istiqlal's ministers. This increased the pressure against the Justice and Development party in selecting possible alternatives to secure a parliamentary majority. However, all of this does not mean that all the different positions will remain unchanged. Most likely, the Benkirane cabinet will be concluding its term. In case a dead end is reached, Benkirane's only choice will be to call for municipal elections, the date of which is yet to be determined. In addition, holding early elections is risky and the officials of the ruling Islamic party are voicing out their desire to proceed with their battle, regardless of whether they are in power or in the opposition. This means that they are ready to return to square one. Yet, the Moroccan Islamists who were brought to the front by the winds of the Arab spring realize that the local and regional givens have changed and that the countries that saw a stormy movement are now living through some uneasy interim phases. Indeed, the Islamists are now talking about reform within a stable framework while they had called for a war against corruption and tyranny during the phase of the elections. Their opponents believe that the Islamists are not confident when it comes to the economic and social files, even though it is hard for any cabinet team to achieve a major breakthrough in light of the present economic crisis. With each party mobilizing its supporters to stand in the face of any suggestion to overcome the crisis, it will be hard for Al-Istiqlal and the Justice and Development party to proceed with the reconciliation as if nothing happened. Indeed, the crisis caused dismantlement within the cabinet. The Popular Movement and the Progress and Socialism party are now in a difficult position: If they support Al-Istiqlal, the cabinet will collapse; and if they support the Justice and development party, they will have to suffer the same fate, i.e. the withdrawal of the vote of confidence if the battle were to progress. However, Al-Istiqlal party – which has always been known for its long experience and expertise – does not wish to fire the last bullet against the cabinet, despite the encouraging fact that the opposition parties are not gasping behind the ministerial portfolios. Indeed, Al-Istiqlal has actually maintained a thin thread connecting it to both the cabinet and the opposition sides. The party probably wishes to avoid being labeled as part of the anti-reform lobbies as per the Islamic party's description. The main winner in this inter-parties debate that escalated into a political crisis is the arbitration decision, which will be able to pump new blood in the arteries of the executive authority or to just let the different parties take responsibility for the different crises. Although this is not a constitutional crisis, the constitutional solution is the most likely one; but one cannot make the same mistake twice.
