President Hafez Al-Assad set down a constitution that made the head of state the sole decision-maker, putting an end to the political role played by any other figure within the state, and stripping the three branches of government, legislative, executive and judiciary, of all their powers. Since then, the country has not known any figure in a position of responsibility, save for those chosen by the President and drawing legitimacy for their presence from him. Those would be chosen on the basis of intelligence reports drawn up by certain officers, who would have been given the right by the President to assess those working in the public sector. Thus would be chosen those loyal to the officers who drew up the reports, turning such officers into an integral part of the President's decision-making process. While security services thoroughly stamped out any voice opposed to or critical of the regime's policies, and the President excluded from positions of responsibility any officials whose absolute loyalty suffered even the slightest degree of doubt, the relationship between the regime and the people began to weaken and decay, to the point of completely breaking off. And with the exception of the festivals organized by security services for referendums and elections, the regime felt no need to communicate with the people, who in the eyes of the ruler and of intelligence officers had become forced to offer obedience and loyalty. Political decisions thus began to be taken behind closed doors, without any concerns of justifying them to the people. Contributing to this phenomenon was the fact that unchallenged decision-making rested steadily with late President Hafez Al-Assad in the last two decades of his rule. His illness also contributed to this, as it prevented the President from personally assuming the task, by speaking directly to the people, of searching for this troubled and severed relationship. Under current President Bashar Al-Assad, the regime worked to have the ruler assume the task of communicating with the people, excluding any other means or any other figure from the regime that might have rivaled him in this position. The President thus began to make speeches, which he sought to make appropriate for explaining certain decisions. It is true that some ministers, the Foreign Minister and the Information Minister in particular, did make televised appearances, but the results of those were closer to comedy, in view of the fact that they were forced to restrict themselves to the limits dictated by security services rather than by political necessity. As for the President's speeches, their effects were no better than those of his ministers' media appearances. Indeed, in addition to their professorial and condescending style, which at its core prevents the listener from interacting with it, they included the reiteration of the same ideas and justifications, especially in terms of denial and being disconnected from reality. This was to such an extent that these speeches ended up having the opposite effects of the goals intended for them, which confirms the continued state of disconnect between the Syrian regime and its people – one which the current catastrophe has turned into mutual repulsion. There was thus no one left in the regime who could take the forefront of its media campaign, or restore what had been lost with the Syrian people, and with Arab peoples in general. And just as it considers its power on the ground to reside in the continued supply of weapons from Iran and Russia, and its political power to also reside in the support it continues to receive from Moscow and Tehran, it has seemingly come to consider that its media campaign requires foreign support as well. Televised appearances by Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah thus began to perform an essential function, namely that of speaking in the Syrian regime's name, waging campaigns against those who oppose it, and clarifying the policies which the ruler in Damascus failed to explain. Nasrallah became no longer a mere political ally, one connected to the regime by a strategic relationship, or even merely one grateful of Syria's decades-long support for Hezbollah and its goals. Rather, he became a necessity for the regime in Damascus as it struggled with its own publicity campaign. Just like what Nasrallah stated in his latest speech about the unity of media and combat, he has brought together the fact that he is an essential instrument of Syrian publicity at the Arab level, and the combat waged by his party's members on Syrian soil. And just as the weakness of the regime on the field has required direct military intervention by Iran and Hezbollah, so does its weakness at mobilization require for Nasrallah to personally take charge of its publicity campaign, being known for his skills as a public speaker and for his ability to disguise facts and stances and devise justifications. Yet it is difficult for a lawyer and a publicity expert, no matter how successful, to save a failing regime that had been disconnected from its people before it even took on the task of killing them, displacing them and destroying their culture.
