Let us for a moment overlook the sight of Syrians scattered in neighboring countries, queuing for blankets and canned goods. Let us put aside the sight of Syrians scattered inside their countries, chased by death at the doors of the bakeries, or missiles and detonating barrels in basements or even caves. Let us forget for a second the sight of brutal practices by the regime's gunmen, and some obscurantist acts by foreign fighters. Let us just ask a simple question: Who is winning in Syria? Observers acknowledge that the Syrian regime has shown fierce and exceptional resistance against the rebels' attempt to topple it, whether peacefully or using violence. The same cannot be said of the other regimes, which were exposed to, and then toppled by, the so-called Arab spring. This is not at all surprising. We have at hand a different kind of regime that has, over more than four decades, built a strong party–military–security edifice while profoundly relying on a deep-seated sectarian allegiance that the regimes overthrown by the Arab Spring did not have. Observers also say that defections have not affected the backbone of the military-security establishment, sparing it from deadly large-scale collapse. Yet this does not invalidate the fact that the military–security establishment, which hitherto exerted control over the entire territory of the state, has now shrunken and only controls a small part of the latter. The ability of this edifice to wreak large-scale devastation on those regions it lost control of does not at all mean that it is capable of recovering them. One could also say that the Syrian army has suffered irreparable damage, especially after deploying its arsenal within Syria, and proving that it is in permanent need of Iranian and Russian reinforcements to carry on the battle. Therefore, the fact that the army managed to restore control over a town or a road cannot be taken as a serious success, as nothing indicates that it has the ability to settle the battle and turn back the clock on the situation in Syria. The Baath Party's condition, meanwhile, leaves no room for interpretations and analyses. This party, which once monopolized leadership of the state and society, has been all but routed. To be sure, it was the regime itself that took the initiative to refer the party to retirement, under the reforms it announced. While the Iraqi Baath can claim it was toppled through foreign intervention, the Syrian Baath does not have the same excuse. The opposition can say that it has made enormous sacrifices and achieved gains on the ground, but the facts also indicate that it is not capable of settling the conflict in its favor either. As for the successes of the Nusra Front, those are costly to the opposition as well. For one thing, the first mission of the army after regime change, if that happens, will be to undo the successes of al-Nusra and all other marauders. Meanwhile, one today reads that Russia has succeeded in restoring some of its standing and imposed itself as an obligatory crossing towards a solution. But despite the importance of the Russian role, at the UN Security Council and beyond, the facts indicate that Iran is the primary player in Syria, not Russia. Furthermore, there is no possibility in Syria for any solution that would guarantee for Moscow a similar situation like the one that existed before the eruption of the Syrian uprising. One may also read that Iran has prevented the fall of the Syrian regime, and that there can be no solution without its consent. But the facts also suggest that it would be impossible for Iran to have a comfortable situation in Syria after a solution, or something similar to what it enjoys with the current regime. This means that the maximum it can do now is to limit its losses, or have the illusion of doing so. But if we take into account the fact that the Iranian role in supporting the Syrian regime has practically fueled the Sunni-Shia conflict in the region, then we can say that Iran is not winning. What can be said about Iran can also be said about Hezbollah in Lebanon, despite the differences between the two cases. Hezbollah might be able to play a prominent role in preventing or delaying the collapse of the regime in Syria, but only in return for a price paid by Lebanon. Indeed, the latter has become strongly involved in the Shia-Sunni fault line in recent months, which passes through Syria. A lofty price is also being paid by Hezbollah itself, at the expense of its reputation and relations with the Sunni communities in Lebanon and Syria. Almost the same thing applies to Iraq and the stance of the Nouri al-Maliki government there. As for neighboring countries in the immediate vicinity and faraway ones, they are being pulled apart by their simultaneous desire to topple the regime and their concern regarding its alternatives. The United States, for its part, cannot be said to be winning in Syria. The Syrian tragedy has exposed the limits of the U.S. role under Barack Obama. It has revealed that Obama's America is fatigued, injured and hesitant, albeit it may be given credit for seeking to avoid reckless policies. We can say that we are in the midst of what looks like a regional civil war, a protracted and devastating one indeed. For this reason, we can speak of limited, or fragile, and uncertain gains. The chances for a negotiated solution are extremely meager, and altering the balance of power requires a flood of military aid and rivers of blood. One thing is certain, however: The Syria we knew two years ago is gone forever.
