There has been much talk of war in the last three weeks. Then, it quickly retreated. By “talk of war” we mean the Israeli war against Iran, which is also replaced by talk of an Israeli war against Lebanon, and specifically Hizbullah. In fact, talking about war – which does not mean that it will necessarily take place, since wars are not waged by political statements and announcements – involves several functions in the statements of the various concerned sides, about the possibility of it taking place. When this possibility is exaggerated, it might go as far as using this fear and having it dominate public opinion, or using it to cover political maneuvers that are very far from being the objective of the war itself. Here, the talk of war often becomes a means of political negotiation, and one of the covers for settlements and concessions, albeit temporary ones… instead of being a beating of the drums of fire and steel, and bloodshed and destruction. While this over-exaggeration does not discount the possibility of war, only a small examination of the givens at play will allow us to get things right. It has become obvious that the US has no ability or intention to wage war against Iran, under the slogan of its impending acquisition of a nuclear bomb. Washington has issued one deadline after another to Tehran, for it to respond to western offers of negotiating with it, based on a package of incentives in exchange for controlling the enrichment of uranium. This does not mean that war will take place automatically, when the deadline expires. It could mean the beginning of a new phase of pressure, to enhance a subsequent negotiating position. Moreover, one priority for Washington on the military front is to deal with the situation in Iraq, to ensure a safe withdrawal for US forces and not letting Iran fill more of the vacuum, as part of its bid to enhance its stature on the Arab stage. Another given is that Israel cannot wage war against Iran without a green light from the United States, and that the Netanyahu government's beating the drums of war has other functions. One of them is to flee US pressure to facilitate the peace process, and halt settlement construction and unilateral measures, through making the Iranian threat “bigger” than the negative consequences of not solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Netanyahu benefits from exaggerating the talk of war against Iran, to keep the domestic Israeli political scene open to the possibility of confusion, for various reasons (scandals concerning Avigdor Lieberman and the fragile coalition with Labor). The Iranians benefit from the talk of war and loudly threaten to strike Israel's nuclear facilities amid a domestic situation that has been seriously shaken. Repression at home is justified by the threat from abroad. As for talk of an “alternative war,” namely an Israeli attack against Lebanon, by striking at Hizbullah, in order to weaken Iran and one of its strong bargaining chips, the idea is being promoted more in circles that believe this to be a strong possibility. However, there are many dangers. There is the difficulty of Israel achieving its goal without being subject to serious harm, and it could hurt Lebanon and the party more than in 2006. However, at the same time, Israel will be subject to greater harm than last time. The givens also include repeating the notion that it is impossible for Israel to wage a war of this kind without an American green light. Why would Washington approve such an adventure, while the new administration has ushered in an era of settlements and openness, to Syria and Iran, and launched movement to renew negotiations over a peace settlement? Why would the Barack Obama administration retreat from all of this policy that it has adopted in Lebanon, based on “preserving stability” in cooperation with influential regional parties, to prevent instability in this country from threatening its efforts at a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, at least for the foreseeable future? The talk of war by the Lebanese is another story. It has modest functions, as big as the small country. The secretary general of Hizbullah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, is talking about the equation of “Tel Aviv for the southern suburbs of Beirut.” In other words, he is continuing his mobilization of his “people” against the Israeli threat, in the face of southern fear of the mistaken practice of storing weapons south of the Litani River, which was revealed by the explosion at such a facility, the mistake in clashing with United Nations peacekeeping troops, and the concessions that he will be forced to make to get through the coming period, in domestic terms. There has been a warning by the prime minister-designate, Saad al-Hariri, of the threat of Israeli policy stances vis-à-vis Lebanon, not to mention the prediction by the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, of a coming war with Israel, as the two are acceptable methods for the public in order to justify the new stances by the two leaders toward Damascus, and their providing cover for it, after a phase of hostility…and so on and so forth.
