A discussion has been prevailing in Lebanese and non-Lebanese circles about the impact of regional and international developments on Hizbullah's policy, and particularly the political ramifications of the opening toward Syria, and Hizbullah's relationship with it. Irrespective of the degree to which these circles are correct in perceiving confusion by Hizbullah, as a result of its anxiety that this openness will take place at the expense of its strong alliance with Syria, some are predicting that this anxiety is an expression of Iranian anxiety vis-à-vis western and Arab policies aimed at splitting Syria off from Iran, as a price for a rapprochement, and a bid to “return it to the Arab fold, in return for the treatment of some issues that concern Damascus' national interest and that of the ruling regime”. These predictions about Hizbullah's anxiety about Syria and its policies might not echo loudly in other circles; they believe that the “ceiling” on Syrian behavior does not justify it, and that Syria will not give up its cards easily, whatever the western and moderate Arab opening made to it, and that Hizbullah's leaders are completely aware of this fact. It is likely that under these conditions, Hizbullah is the most anxious about the developments in Iran, if they harm the stability of the current political regime, over the medium and long term. This assumes that the party is content with the situation of the regime for the foreseeable future. Thus, it must watch and wait what events in Tehran will lead to, which means it must maintain good ties with Damascus, to play for time. In fact, the relationship with Tehran will not be affected by the western openness to it, since this is also taking place in a long-range western context that is linked to the possibilities of a settlement in the region, with efforts for a comprehensive solution to its crises. Iran is one of these solutions. A total approach, in the eyes of the west (both the US and Europe) means that a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict will not take place without a settlement with Tehran, over specifying its regional role in Palestine. This brings along with it a discussion with it of its role in Iraq and Lebanon, and then its nuclear program. Hizbullah should not be anxious about the attempts to renew indirect negotiation, and even about moving to direct negotiation, between Syria and Israel over returning the Golan Heights, despite the difference between its leadership and the Syrian leadership on this point. As any observer (and Syria itself as well) can note, a settlement over the Golan is difficult because of Israel's intransigence and extremism. It is not on the horizon, and Hizbullah should be aware of the difficulty of such a settlement happening, and thus not feel any fear from the resumption of negotiations. Moreover, if it is true that the renewal of these negotiations could constitute a “way to tie Syria's hands,” allowing Israel to take advantage by carrying out a new aggression against Lebanon, primarily targeting Hizbullah as Syria refrains from providing weapons, rockets or ammunition, for various reasons, then the party has nothing to be anxious about here. In the worst case scenario, Syria will help Lebanon politically, while in terms of relief, it stands with Hizbullah, whose arsenal of rockets and weapons is sufficient to let it hold on and inflict fierce damage on Israel. If Israel decides to wage war and decides not to give up on the idea, then Syria will play a role in causing this policy's failure. Earlier, Syria helped Hizbullah gain what it wanted; the fierceness of the enemy will be a reason for doing this. As for Syria's policy in Lebanon, the party has nothing to worry about, due to the west's openness to Syria and its monitoring of the situation in Lebanon, in parallel. Some assumed that Damascus would return to playing an influential role in Lebanese policy, as in the past. However, its influence over past decades was wielded through its relations with a number of leaders, who then turned against it, such as the late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt and some independent Christian figures. However much the relationship improves with these individuals, after the Arabs' opening up to Syria, the rivalry of the last four years will not restore the relationship between them to its past condition, whether for Syria, or the group of people mentioned above. This will mean that Syria's alliance with Hizbullah will remain fundamental, even if based on additional elements (i.e. groups other than the party) to play its role, as with the presidency of the Republic, and elsewhere. Therefore, there will not be a fundamental change toward the party, irrespective of the items being arranged by western and Arab openness to Syria. If some have found Hizbullah's anxiety about Syria to be a reason for its recent hard-line stances, the factors mentioned above will prompt Hizbullah to abandon its condition of veto power in the next Cabinet.
