The international decision to “remove” Colonel Muammar Gaddafi is not new. It was quickly produced - early on - with the birth of the opposition National Transitional Council and seemed decisive and unwavering following the adoption of Resolution 1973 by the Security Council to protect the civilians and allow NATO to handle the undermining of the regime's military machine. But what was new was the announcement “heralded” by the members of the Contact Group who held their third meeting in Abu Dhabi last week, as they said: “Gaddafi's days are numbered.” This determination and consensus over his toppling have become a certainty because it places the credibility of all the powers that rallied against him at stake, just as it places their capabilities before a difficult test the longer the Jamahiriya remains. The Contact Group is aware of the fact that the extension of the Libyan tragedy without a solution will only complicate the situation inside the country and in the neighboring states, and will render it more difficult to get rid of the regime. At the level of the neighbors, Tunisia cannot deploy a lot of efforts to bear the consequences of the ongoing conflict between the revolutionaries and the regime's brigades, just as it has no energy to assume the burdens of additional refugees while it is suffering – in terms of its transitory authority, forces and partisan and unionist dignitaries – from a lack of stability during this transitional phase. Moreover, it is fearful that the mounting crisis and anarchy on its border will encourage the extremist groups to infiltrate it and implicate it in a highly complex situation which it cannot confront. The same goes for Algeria, which is being blamed by the Libyan opposition for supporting the regime of the Jamahiriya and supplying it with logistic aid. It definitely does not need to deepen the crisis with the powers preparing to succeed Gaddafi, considering it will have to deal with them in the future. And although it adopted a series of measures to implement the requirements of the international resolutions to sanction Tripoli, the extension of the current stage will harm its critical domestic situation. The same also goes for Egypt, which distanced itself from Tripoli because it is preoccupied with the repercussions of the revolution and the management of the crises generated by the fall of Hosni Mubarak's regime, and Chad which constitutes the buffer zone between the Arab African East, the Sahara states and the Central African states. It is also known that around half a million Chadians were living in the Jamahiriya or residing in it before heading to Europe, while the consequences of their return to their country along with thousands of other Africans who were working in the Libyan coastal cities or residing in them while waiting to cross to Europe are no secret. At this level, there is no need to mention the Libyan investments in all the neighboring states, as well as the burdens that were created by the incoming labor to Libya and are being created now following these workers' return to their countries. On the domestic level, there seems to be no chance for a peaceful settlement, as Gaddafi wants a ceasefire before engaging in any discussions and dialogue, and his opponents want him to step down before launching dialogue. Therefore, the military solution must proceed. But at the beginning of the crisis, there was a prevailing belief that Gaddafi would be willing to accept a settlement based on which he would vacate the rule when he informed the Turks he was not a president to step down and that he was consequently not governing. Those who know him say he could have accepted a settlement involving a transitional phase in which one of his sons would play a role, provided that he and his family members are not prosecuted. Moreover, his history does not point to his blind insistence on his positions, while a series of crises which faced his regime proved it was “pragmatic” to the bone - in the Western meaning of pragmatism - whenever a threat is lurking. Indeed, Gaddafi succumbed to the American and British pressures and ended the Lockerbie crisis by resorting to the state's treasury. He also succumbed to the pressures of the French and handled the repercussions of the UTA plane incident over the Niger desert. And when the Americans entered Baghdad and seized Saddam, the Colonel willingly rushed to present his credentials to George Bush's administration and arranged the relinquishing of the WMDs. He also presented all the necessary files related to the movements he was supporting in the East and the West, which helped uncover “the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb” among other issues which concerned many governments. There was a prevailing belief that Gaddafi might have been willing to surrender power through a settlement that would save face, just as he did when he covered up his defeat in the war with Chad. However, this solution was prevented by the lack of confidence of his oppositionists on the domestic arena and his opponents abroad. Consequently, he was left with no other option but to fight until the last breath, i.e. until death, at a time when those managing NATO's operations did not conceal their wish to kill him and said more than once that this was a legitimate goal for their military operations. But what will happen during the “numbered days”? Gaddafi tried to work with the Africans while wagering on his numerous friends among them. And since the beginning, the latter tried to distance themselves from the actions of the Americans and Europeans, thus abstaining – along with the Arab League - from providing a cover to resolution 1973 at the Security Council. Moreover, they engaged in futile attempts to find a settlement between the regime in Tripoli and its opponents, but eventually, the states of the continent joined the international consensus calling on the Colonel to step down under American, French and British pressures. The last figure to do so was his friend, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade who asked him to relinquish power from Benghazi. At this point, there is no need to recall the Russian, Chinese and Turkish positions among others which also joined those who recognized the Transitional Council as the representative of the Libyan people. However, the Colonel's loss on the African level – following his loss on the American, European and Arab levels – did not prompt him to change his mind and step down as he watched what has happened and is still happening to those who left the palace before him, while the developments that are unfolding every day do not appear to have changed this stand. His forces lost a great deal of efficiency in the absence of any air cover for his battalions and the destruction by the NATO raids of many vehicles and tanks belonging to his armored brigade. In the meantime, the regime has lost and continues to lose many of its symbols on a daily basis, while the quasi-consensual international recognition over the legitimacy of the Transitional Council as the representative of the Libyan people is expanding. In light of this balance of power, the main question revolves around the ways NATO and the Transitional Council will hasten the settlement of the battle on the field, so that the Colonel's days are truly numbered. The Libyan internal map is more complicated than foreign opponents might perceive it. Indeed, the opposition council includes national and liberal forces, competencies and technocrats among the immigrants and Islamic groups ranging between the Muslim Brotherhood, the Sufi movements, moderate Islam and even the Islamic Fighting Group, which is classified by the United States and Europe as being a “terrorist group.” At this level, there is talk about its possible merger with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to facilitate its elimination by the Westerners from the terrorism lists and facilitate its participation in the upcoming political experience to contribute to the future of the country. Still, the Libyan eastern populations are strongly present in the Transitional Council, while the insistence of the Islamic forces on remaining in the backstage allowed the international community to easily deal with it. It also allowed the council to announce – in its political paper – its commitment to all the international laws and measures related to the fight against terrorism, as well as its commitment to democracy, political freedoms, elections and the transition of power. And while the forces that have come together underneath the Council's cloak have abstained from showing their contradictions, made sure to take into account the tribal and regional structure and neutralized the cities they believed should be neutralized to maintain national unity, the picture on the other side is completely different. Indeed, there is nothing so far pointing to the fact that the Libyan Western and Southern tribes relinquished their support of the Colonel, whether due to fears or out of conviction. Gaddafi thus assigned them to protect their regions and cities, while he and his brigades started preparing for the decisive battle in Tripoli, considering that this battle will undoubtedly take place to remove the regime as it is being pledged by the international community. Therefore, the main question continues to revolve around the ways the Transitional Council will build bridges with the supporters of the Colonel among the different forces and tribes, and the ways it will reassure them about the future and their role in it. This is due to the fact that the continuation of the current situation threatens and undermines national unity, and will sooner or later lead the country toward civil-tribal war that will trigger all the regional sensitivities and consecrate the current fait accompli between the East and the West and the lost South between the two. This would take Libya back to its Ottoman and then its colonial divisions which prevailed before the unity that linked the coastal cities in the East and the West to the “land of vacuum” in the South. So, will “Gaddafi's numbered days” be similar to the days of the Arabs and their “days-long” wars which extended for years?
