The military coup planned against democratic legitimacy in Algeria in the mid-1980s differs from the approach seen in Egypt, whether at the level of the historical context or the distinctiveness that further separates them. The goal was the same, i.e. prevent Islamic movements from unilaterally controlling power. However, the reasons are different, and so is the experience. The exclusion of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria was due to a decision by the military institution, which did not appreciate the Front's monopolization of the political scene during the municipal elections, in light of circumstances that prevented Algeria from assimilating the risks of openness, political diversity and market economy. And while late Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid – who was not elected - was wagering on openness, the army hawks, allied with the Liberation Front hardliners, were warning against submission to the overwhelming movement. They were assisted in this by the fact that the West in general was not about to tolerate the Islamists' control over the country of gas and oil. At the time, the impact of the Iranian revolution was still felt and France – the economic and commercial partner – had not yet recovered from the terrorist attacks which targeted its streets and major stores. The similarity is that before the situation evolved and provoked the formation of armed groups, the Islamists of the Salvation Front were warning against Algeria's slide towards a sea of blood. For their part, the military commanders were cautioning about the same threats. Today, the violence seen in Egypt emulates the first scenes that followed the annulment of the Algerian elections, before exclusion reached the point of banning the Islamic group's legitimate presence. The difference is that so far, no one in Egypt is demanding the banning of the Freedom and Justice Party, while the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is probably well aware by now that there is no reason for it to resume its underground work. The leader of the Algerian Salvation Front, Sheikh Abbassi Madani eventually took refuge in Qatar, while the deposed Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, encountered a fate he would have never imagined. The difference between the two experiences is that the arrival of Egypt's Islamists to power, especially the Freedom and Justice Party, was secured by an angry revolution on the street to topple the image of tyranny that was linked to former President Hosni Mubarak. The Salvation Front on the other hand benefitted from the system of partisan plurality and the erosion of the Liberation Front's influence. Eventually, Chadli Bendjedid was forced to pull out from the confrontation via a resignation which he was forced to submit to the military institution, i.e. the one that had carried him from the Oran base to the Mouradia Palace. Between Egypt's Islamists who reached power and monopolized the political, economic and even cultural decisions, and Algeria's Islamists who were excluded after they were on the brink of reaching the legislative and executive positions of responsibility, the image is different. Indeed, the military institution in Algeria turned against the legitimacy of the ballot boxes and practiced exclusion to the point of eradication, while the Egyptian army succumbed to the calls of the street to avoid seeing the eruption of civil war. What is constant at this level is that while a coup was staged against the democratic experience, its causes appear different between the Algerian and Egyptian situations. The likely mistake of the Islamists in Egypt is that they neither drew the lessons from the Algerian experience, nor grasped the priorities of the stage. And just like the military institution in the land of the one-million martyrs feared the dismantlement of the state's structure, the Egyptian street shared those same fears while detecting the signs of constitutional, judicial and economic monopolization. Those fears might not be as great as they were depicted, but any form of threat can point to the collapse of the democratic convictions, especially regarding the fact that the desired change does not necessarily go in line with the underlying wishes to reshape the state's structure. There are democratic means that could be used to bring down the old structures deemed to be left behind by the tyrannical regimes. And had Mohamed Morsi not practiced exclusion towards a large part of the street, these crowds would not have rallied against his very short rule. At this level, it would be impossible for all those angry voices to come together and face his authority by mistake. Beyond the comparison between the Algerian and Egyptian situations, the wager in Algeria settled on concord and stability after the power struggle led to the fall of tens of thousands of victims. In the meantime, Egypt is getting ready to begin a new round of the conflict, knowing that the management of the action inside the state of institutions – based on legitimate political work that does not annul the other – is better than seeing agitated sentiments unleashed. The insistence on constitutional legitimacy and democracy remains acceptable and required, unless it violates the rules of the game and affects the provisions of legitimacy that ensure the peaceful transition of power, and does not turn it into a ladder which some climb then break to prevent anyone else from climbing it. In the end, the defeat of a party and the rise of another do not mean that the door has been closed. And had this been this the case, no opposition faction would have ever been able to find its place in the sun.
