The conflict in Egypt is no longer over the presidency. Indeed, prior to the second round of the presidential elections, the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces came to belittle that post, which is why the President-elect Mohamed Morsi will change neither the new reality that emerged during the last few days, nor the new political map. Moreover, he will not alleviate the impact and depth of division, after polarization extended beyond the partisan forces and the military institution to reach all factions of society. At this level, the close figures earned by Field Marshal Ahmed Shafik and Dr. Morsi, constitute the biggest proof for the severity of the predicament faced by the Egyptians. The latter feared the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) monopolization of power and its running of all the authorities through its control over the People's Assembly, the Shura Council, the Constituent Assembly, the government, judiciary and finally the presidency. But during the last few days, the decision-making powers in all the authorities and institutions went back to the military council. The revolution is no longer between the Egyptians – the common people – and the former regime. It is now between the army and the Islamic forces, at the head of which is the MB, as though the revolution has not yet erupted or is witnessing its first days. What was dodged by the revolution a year and a half ago has resurfaced, and the next stage will see a bitter conflict over power. First of all, one must recognize that the two strong sides played an essential role in toppling the head of the regime. This is due to the fact that if the army had stood behind President Hosni Mubarak, his National Party and his entourage, Egypt would have drowned in a quagmire similar to the one that currently exists in Syria. And had the MB not participated with all its weight, organization and cadres, the squares would not have seen the presence of the millions of people who pushed the military institution to avoid any clashes. The generals thus preferred to sacrifice the head of the regime, while the people on the squares had no choice but to surrender the management of the transitional phase to them, in order to allow a smooth change far away from anarchy and total collapse. The outcome of the coup witnessed in the last few days can be attributed to the lies, respite, maneuvers and deceit policy practiced by the two sides that are now engaged in confrontations on the squares throughout Egypt. During the transitional phase, the military council used to move one or two steps forward, then take a step back as though suffering confusion. For its part, the MB maneuvered by giving the army the impression it was different from the youth on the squares and was ready to make a deal, and by giving the youth the impression that it was at the heart of the revolution. Both sides were trying to achieve one goal, i.e. control the situation on the ground after gaining control over the decision-making positions. This ambiguous phase, or the one in which the two sides adopted a policy of ambiguity and witnessed confusion, setbacks, attacks and retreats, has been turned. Now, the conflict is exposed and utterly clear. More importantly, the political scene is much different than what it used to be on the eve of January 25 of last year. For its part, the military council issued positions and promises to surrender power to civilians to avoid direct confrontations on the squares, thus wasting time amid an overall situation which served its interests, from the escalation of insecurity and instability to the heightening of the economic crisis, and the impact of this situation on the Egyptians, half of whom live below poverty line. It was thus waiting for the altering of the circumstances and the ordinary citizens' relinquishing of the revolution and its forces. The MB also issued positions and promises it did not respect, thus deepening the lack of confidence in its programs within the circles that triggered the first spark. It rushed to reach the ballot boxes to reap the fruits of change, without knowing how to ensure the participation of the others – all the others – in the positions it occupied and pushed it toward the forefront of the events. Moreover, it humored the military at the level of the first Constitutional Declaration last year, without taking into account the wish of the youth to postpone the elections until they organize their ranks within parties and formations, allowing a minimum level of equal opportunities. By doing so, it provoked suspicions among them, which served the army and pushed marginalized factions to rally around it. The MB monopolized the two councils, then the Constituent Assembly, and engaged in the presidential elections as though refusing to leave any post to anyone else. These new facts were exposed by the second round of the presidential elections, and they are clearly dangerous. Egypt is now divided between two forces that are able to engage in lengthy and bloody conflict. This acute political conflict has extended to all factions of society. Hence, the winner Morsi can no longer ignore the fact that half the Egyptian society did not choose him to this post, and the two strong sides are forced to recognize one another to spare the country a destructive clash, and even hasten truce before the economic crisis explodes in everyone's face. The MB cannot annul what Field Marshal Shafik has come to represent, and will not be able to use the pressure means it enjoyed at the beginning. Indeed, the generals now enjoy a popular legitimacy revealed by the campaign of General Shafik, and they can rely on it in the confrontation. Moreover, they control all aspects of the military, security, executive, legislative and even judicial powers and institutions, seeing how the division has started to affect the judiciary itself. They are also relying on the revised Constitutional Declaration which will be the headline of the conflict during this stage. In the meantime, the citizens' fear over the ongoing deterioration affecting all the sectors will push them closer to the military institution, as the latter has learned how to present itself as a necessary refuge for all the fearful since the fall of the head of the former regime, whether those fearing the Islamists, economic collapse, security mayhem or the winds of sectarianism. But despite all these legitimacies it enjoys, the military will not be able to disregard the strength of its opponents among the revolutionary blocs and Islamic parties, or the change that has affected the Egyptian general mood following the January 25 revolution and is seen every day on Tahrir Square and in all the cities. Consequently, the weapon of intimidation and threats to use power can no longer silence the crowds or turn the clock backwards. The Egyptians have the right to fear a slide toward the Algerian experience or a shift towards the Syrian one, as though the revolution had only erupted yesterday. The situation could have been better and some sort of balance could have been established, had the powers of change that detonated the revolution unified in one entity and formed a third force with its own bases. Had this taken place, the situation would have been different and would have taken another turn, while all the forces could have reached a formula preventing the country from falling between the jaws of monopolization of the decision and positions by one party. It is not too late to stop the slide toward confrontation, but the two strong parties must agree over a formula taking into account all the developments that were seen during the last 16 months and in which the policy of exclusion would no longer exist. The Yemeni model could be adopted at this level, or a purely Egyptian formula could be created, starting with the relinquishing by both the military and the MB of the policy of maneuvers, hegemony and authoritarianism. An agreement could be reached over a new transitional phase, in which all the authorities are distributed between the powers to reassure the people about Egypt's future, instead of the mobilization seen on the squares and the barricading seen in caserns and institutions which originally belong to the civilians! It would no longer possible for any side to annul another, and the two strong parties would no longer annul the remaining parties to avoid the deepening of division. Moreover, no side would be able to draft the new constitution alone, and no new constitution would ever be written unless with the approval of all the parties and through an imperative consensus between all the popular components. There must be a Sana'a, even if Cairo's nights are extended! Did the military and the MB seal a new transitional deal through which Morsi would assume the presidency, provided that the MB accepts the last decisions related to the disbandment of parliament and to the possible disbandment of the Constituent Assembly, while awaiting a new round of the conflict?
