Egypt is returning to the forefront, influenced by its street and influencing its surroundings, while the international reactions do not seem to be up to the level of the developments in the countries affected by the Arab spring. The Egyptian street is believed to have seized the opportunity produced by its Tunisian counterpart during the spring's wave, but to correct the course of the revolution. The first time, this action was motivated by political tyranny which monopolized power and wealth. This time however, it was pushed by intellectual tyranny, of which the most dangerous facet is the fact that it hid behind a democratic cloak. Ballot boxes are not just about integrity and transparency, but also about the renewal of ideas and the elite. The democratic West was the first to discover the flaws of its systems which allowed extremism, racism, inequality, and tolerance. Hence, democratic practices were linked to plurality, diversity, the acceptance and non-exclusion of others, except when they exclude themselves ideologically and intellectually and consequently have to bear the repercussions of their actions and choices. In that sense, the uprising of the Egyptian street against the regime of ousted President Mohamed Morsi was primarily intellectual, as it linked the flaws in the Muslim Brotherhood's authority to the wish to impose monopolization, hegemony, and the annulment of the other. As for the controversy surrounding constitutional legitimacy, it only means the existence of a wish to use this principle for goals extending beyond the peaceful transition of power. Indeed, the ballot boxes are not a constant factor, but rather a mutating one based on the street's inclinations. Had this not been the case, no party or political bloc would have accepted the defeat that made it leave power and move to the opposition seats. In reality, accepting this defeat allows the reassessment of the ideas, roles, mechanisms and the political elite without resorting to the street, while the winner in electoral competitions does not perceive this victory as being eternal. Elections are a source of legitimacy and an expression of the will, far away from any pressures or threats. And the crowds that filled the squares in Egypt were doing so to express their will. However, the question that was not asked in regard about this legitimacy is the following: Why did all these crowds rebel at once? No wise rule can achieve such a high level of rejection unless its practices are undemocratic, recognizing the fact that Egypt's revolution became a goal and not a means. The difference at this level resides between using the ballot boxes to respond to the aspirations which the people want to see on the ground, and between them being a mere means to impose the influence of a party, of money or power. Morsi did not offer enough concessions to protect the democratic course, thus acting as the leader of the group rather than the head of the state, and provoking doubts surrounding his democratic commitments. In reality, the battles he waged against the judiciary, the imposition of the constitutional declaration and the attempts to tame culture and art, were done in the wrong place and were understood and interpreted as being reflective of a wish to monopolize power and not to draw up the project of the revolution in which all the Egyptian people participated. Such mistakes increased the suspicions surrounding what he truly wanted, at a time when his time in power did not feature any economic or social measures to instate trust. At this level, it was not a coincidence that the stock market transactions peaked following the announcement of his exclusion, meaning that social and economic indicators were added to political hegemony, and led to the collapse of the democratic pact. And because he only listened to his own voice, the street had no other option but to rebel, considering that protests are usually staged after the negotiations between the political, economic and social partners reach a dead end. The problem is that dialogue was a recipe he refused to try under whichever form. The spontaneity of the revolution heralded the end of certain partisan and political practices. But instead of contemplating its backdrop and the facts it featured, Morsi chose the reproduction of the spirit of retaliation that does not make states. More importantly, what is happening in Egypt reveals two constant facts: the first is that the Arab spring is not over and that the failure to ensure its materialization will only fuel the action; the second is that the democratic face of a spring rallying everyone underneath its flowers and not its blood, is the only thing that can increase hope in the transitional phase. The Egyptian lesson was strong and inspiring due to its position and influence, and it will be even stronger if the slide towards violence, infighting and the use of force is averted. And while the situation is different from the one seen in Algeria at the end of the 1980s – in terms of the repercussions of the coup on legitimacy – one should consider the outcome of that bloody conflict which thwarted Algeria's dreams of instating peace and stability. But the Egyptian army had its say and it will not be part of the conflict, except when the issue is related to the protection of unity, peace and security. The second chapter of the spring will undoubtedly depend on the seeds which might be applied to the soil, and if it does not rain, nature has granted Egypt its flowing Nile in compensation. Still, ideas and initiatives may have to flow as smoothly as this great river.
