Between rejecting political reform and clinging to solving all problems militarily, Yemen is steadily moving forward on the path towards chaos and the disintegration of its state institutions. The triangle of the Houthi rebels, the Al-Qaeda organization and the Southern Movement, which the authorities in Sanaa are complaining of and accusing of carrying the seeds of the collapse of central rule, has in fact four corners, as one should add to its components these very authorities which bear a responsibility that cannot be ignored or underestimated in the course of events, a course nearing the point of consecrating Yemen as a failed state and an arena for settling regional and international accounts. Calls for adopting dialogue between the government and the forces opposed to it are encountering the problem of the dire lack of legitimacy of the ruling regime, which has become simply another party whose position outside of factional and sectarian conflicts is not recognized by segments of the Yemeni population who hold evidence and testimonies of the practices of officials who have dealt with citizens as if they were foreigners. Meanwhile in Saada, government forces found no flaw in resorting to the help of the armed fighters of Sunni tribes in confronting the Zaydi supporters of Al-Houthi, which in effect amounts to driving toward a deepening of sectarian divisions, and to the state departing from its position as a body that transcends the sectarian and factional spectrum and joining in the civil conflict. Some of the confessions of prisoners that were broadcast by the media about coordination that took place during previous rounds of fighting between the Houthi rebels and Al-Qaeda fighters indicate not just that two constituents of the “satanic triangle” (as per a Yemeni official's appellation of the opposing forces) are able to find common grounds between them despite their doctrinal disagreements and to coordinate attacks and funding against government forces, but might in fact indicate – with some exaggeration – that the conflict is taking the form of a civil war in which immediate political and military necessities seal off ideological differences in order to gather forces in the war against a common enemy, represented in the case of Yemen by the central government. This government, which insists on classifying all the problems it suffers from as foreign conspiracies, dubious relations and similar expressions, all part of the well-known Arab lexicon used in times of civil infighting, refrains on the other hand from putting forth real reform initiatives, preferring to resort to the language of warnings, conditions and portents of total destruction. It would be superfluous to say that growing weak in confronting an armed rebellion of the caliber of the Houthi rebellion will deprive the state of an essential part of the marks of its sovereignty on its soil. But it would be fair to say that the delay in dealing with the problem of the Houthi rebels, which is identical to ignoring the worsening situation in the South for years, has deprived the authorities of the right to pretend to rise above factional and sectarian conflicts and be concerned with the problems of citizens as individuals and groups from the position of one sharing in the concern and in seeking solutions, rather than that of one creating disturbances, as per the accusations leveled by the Houthi rebels and the Southerners. If Sanaa realizes that the vacuum caused by the civil war in Saada in terms of the existence of the state and its presence in the various regions of Yemen can be exploited by the Al-Qaeda organization to realize their old plans of establishing fixed bases South of the Arabian Peninsula, relying on the complexity of the tribal structure and on the natural topography being appropriate to their activity, in addition to other factors, there are in the news issuing from Yemen indications of attempts being made by parties in power to bring factions from those opposed to the government into conflict with each other. It is clear that a game of this kind involves grave dangers, and it is also clear that the government, which refuses to comply with the need for serious reform, is in fact choosing to stand in the ranks of the warring factions and relinquishing its role of arbiter, thereby becoming the fourth corner of the triangle.
