Al-Hayat 26-12-2009 The three-faceted crisis in Yemen featuring the Houthi rebellion, Al-Qaeda and the Southern Movement, each of which is due to different reasons and motives, started emerging years ago while heralding the possibility of turning into violent clashes. A lot could be said about the Yemeni authorities' inability to contain these crises and a lot was said about their attempts at times to capitalize on one problem to face another. A lot could also be said about these authorities' failure to achieve the required development in certain unprivileged areas of the country, as well as about the spread of administrative and political corruption to the point where depravation reached an unprecedented high. Moreover, a lot could be said about the refusal of these authorities to expand the base of the rule and open political participation, as well as about the monopolization of positions in the state and the military and security institutions by the authorities, which increased the demands, objections and tensions. However, the problems which seemed to enjoy their own course only a few years ago have now started converging toward unification and identification, not only to exploit any action that could weaken the central authority, but also because the battles of the rebellion imposed rapprochement at the level of political slogans and field tactics. It is in that sense that the armed confrontation which is quasi-general in the majority of the Yemeni provinces, has taken the character of a fight against one enemy instead of many which are divided between the Houthis, Al-Qaeda and the Southern Movement. This reality thus prompts a political reassessment of the ongoing war, as well as its meaning. Today, Yemen as a country and a state is threatened at the level of its very existence after the different regions in it have become safe bases for Islamic fundamentalism with its two branches: Al-Qaeda and the Houthis. This fundamentalism is not concealing its wish to expand the battles to the neighboring areas and in whichever direction. Moreover, both branches might be allied today due to field and political necessities, but they will soon resume the infighting based on the success each will achieve on the ground. This will pave the way for a stage of sectarian infighting which will not lack motives in the region. Although this reality does not absolve the responsibility of the Yemeni authorities for what has happened in their country, it cannot be handled with mere gloating, slander and finding justifications for the rebels in Yemeni politics. The method used by Al-Qaeda and the Houthis features elements to destroy the Yemeni state or any other, while the Southern Movement turned a cause - which may be righteous - into one of occupation and secession which has gradually started taking a violent turn of armed confrontations and is growing closer to the fundamentalism of Al-Qaeda. In light of these developments, the Yemeni rule - and regardless of its nature - is not left with many choices to face this challenge. It is thus fighting to defend its existence, while it is clear that the armed confrontation inside Yemen will continue to expand if the Yemeni authorities are unable to secure a swift military settlement, which does not look imminent. Therefore, it has become necessary to pair up the military settlement in the face of the armed rebels with a major political and developmental initiative which will polarize the widest Yemeni factions constituting a fertile soil for the expansion of the rebellion. Such an initiative, which must be launched by the Yemeni authorities, should also involve all the states threatened by fundamentalist terrorism, especially the Yemeni neighboring states and the Gulf states - at least in terms of the developmental and security aspects.
