The situation in Egypt is prone to witness further tensions and violence, at a time when it should have been heading towards stability following the completion of the steps to instate a new authority instead of the one which was toppled with the old regime. One can even say that the first among these steps, i.e. the presidential elections, was the one which triggered instability, tensions and violence. Indeed, Muslim Brotherhood candidate Dr. Muhammad Morsi's earning of the highest number of votes, which allowed him to become president of the republic, was linked to a series of conflicts which prevailed over the Egyptian arena at the time, not to the support granted to the group and its program. In addition, Morsi's candidacy that was presented by coincidence to replace that of Khairat al-Shater, in light of fears that the latter would be prevented from running for legal and constitutional reasons, meant that the man did not enjoy his own program and was rather implementing the orders of his group. In that sense, the MB, which supported succession prior to the revolution, was prepared neither at the level of its programs nor that of its candidate to assume power in a country with so many problems and new and inherited troubles. This is why it dealt with Morsi's election as an opportunity that cannot be missed to hold on to power, just like all the putschists who come to power by force. This putschist policy that was adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood and that keeps condemning the former regime, targeted the situation which emerged following this regime's collapse, along with all the rising political powers during that same stage. In the context of that targeting, Morsi issued a series of decisions, whether those related to the appointment of Islamists in governmental and administrative positions or the ones being dubbed in Egypt the state's transformation into the state of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is where the root of the violence in Egypt resides. The MB assumed that the stage required the hasty ratification of a series of laws and measures, providing it alone with the ability to control the authority and preventing the others from approaching it, which somewhat cloned the experience of the former regime and its party. But the Muslim Brotherhood forgot that those who rebelled against the former regime, did so exactly because it monopolized power, and to prevent it from cloning the existing authority through succession. Due to this cloning, the MB has placed itself outside the context of the revolution's goals, represented by the establishment of a civil and pluralistic state ensuring equal rights and obligations. In the meantime, the forces that are still calling for change are very influential on the street and at the level of the action, and the group has not yet been able to address a lethal blow to contain them. Moreover, the group failed to understand that the foreign support – and especially the Western one – offered to the electoral process in Egypt, does not guarantee the domestic support it desires. Indeed, the former regime – until a few hours before it collapsed – was still considered to be among the pillars of stability in the region. But foreign support did not do it any good when the people took to the streets with all their powers to demand its toppling. The group thus neglected the internal public opinion and dealt with it lightly, even with disdain at times, especially through this presidential dialogue that keeps repeating the National Front formula in which the forces in power converse with each other. It now seems that the counterrevolution description attributed by the group to its oppositionists, applies to it, its behavior and management of the country more than it does to them. So far, it has not even recognized the necessity of politically dealing with the mounting crisis in the country with the participation of all the forces, in order to reach the establishment of the civil, pluralistic and democratic state. Morsi, and the Muslim Brotherhood group from behind him, are not likely to accept that, which will push towards the continuation of the forces' experience on the street with the cloned version of the former regime.
