As usual, the Syrian regime received Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations – Arab League envoy, with horrific massacres in the village of Helfaya in Hama as well as the towns of Aleppo, Raqqa and Deir al-Zor, and areas surrounding Damascus. The regime also responded with even more methodical destruction, to inform whoever required notification that the regime will not budge an inch. This is irrespective of the regime's announced readiness to discuss ideas that are proposed to it, by referring them to a committee of the regime's top leadership for study. The regime wants to cling to power at whatever cost, and argues that the advances by its opponents on the ground do not mean that it is incapable of hanging on and inflicting considerable harm on them, as well as the people whom they control, such that the country will become a land of destruction, watered with the blood of innocent people in order to push them toward sectarian reactions. The regime bid farewell to Brahimi in the manner it received him. As he visits Moscow this weekend, he will be accompanied by the news of horrific massacres and the bogeyman of civil war. Over the last 21 months, the regime has succeeded in cementing the basis for this scenario on the ground. These will be responses to the idea of a transitional government "with full power," which was proposed to Damascus on Tuesday, based on an American-Russian agreement on a practical formula for the Working Group for Syria plan, which was adopted in Geneva on 30 June. This plan has not been implemented because Assad refuses to translate it into action, and this led to the resignation of the former envoy, Kofi Annan, in July. It also led to the withdrawal of international observers, who had been harassed by regime forces even though the Geneva Plan calls for securing their safety and cooperating with them. The western-Russian agreement on a formula for translating the Geneva Plan failed six months ago, but the progress made by the opposition has served as an element of pressure this time around with Brahimi, to search for the international common ground that the veteran diplomat has insisted on, in order to continue in his mission. Defenders of the regime have begun to talk about the inability of either side in the conflict to settle things militarily, after they had earlier said the regime would be able to win the battle. Even Tehran has begun to say that "military clashes have reached a dead end," after it and its supporters, especially Hezbollah, had expected the end of warfare, with Assad's army and militias emerging victorious. The wager on the regime's superiority prevented the translation of the Geneva Plan with the appearance of a transitional government without Assad. This was because Moscow, like Tehran, supported a transitional phase with Assad remaining in power until 2014. There has been a fallback in counting on the superiority of Assad's forces to those of the opposition, and on his ability to recover territory, which allowed the proposal of ideas like the one that Brahimi put to Assad. This involved seeing Assad agree to a transitional government with full state power taking office, meaning he would remain president for a few months, but without any authority. This formula combines Moscow's earlier position, that the solution lay in Assad's remaining on the scene, and the west's stance, that the solution involves his stepping down. The solution resembles the Yemeni case. There is considerable maneuvering going on, as Brahimi's mission reaches a critical stage; the possibility of reviving the Geneva Plan rests on these actions, or the acknowledgment that the plan will not work. The first option renews the minimum level of international agreement, which Moscow and Washington are keen to see. The second embodies moving the struggle between them to a new phase, and the Great Powers do not appear to favor this option. This is why one can say that Brahimi's proposals are a means of reviving the Geneva Plan, which has been in a coma for the last six months. Brahimi's statement that the Geneva Plan has enough (positive) elements can only be an attempt to say that the plan can be the basis of proposing solutions. The second item in the plan stipulates the establishment of a "transitional governing body (that) would exercise full executive powers. It could include members of the present government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent." Brahimi's statement this week that his ideas included the dispatching of peacekeeping forces to Syria reminds us that the Geneva Plan itself, in part four, spoke of an international working group that would provide support for the implementation of an agreement among (Syrian) parties, and "this may include an international assistance presence under a United Nations mandate if requested." When Brahimi says that the Geneva Plan could require modification, it could involve this point in particular, so that it is clearer in terms of how these forces will be dispatched, without this being requested (by the Syrian authorities), since Brahimi said the alternative to rejecting his ideas was the issuing of a Security Council resolution that is binding on the sides in Syria. Brahimi is approaching some difficult days, as he seeks to translate his ideas into a basket that will receive international approval, especially since Tehran has openly said that no solution can be put forward outside the framework of the Iranian initiative. This plan proposes dialogue that leads to a reconciliation committee, which will lay the groundwork for a transitional government – Iran's plan appears to be in third place when compared to what Brahimi is proposing, in coordination with Moscow and Washington. Does Iran's opposition mean that getting involved in a new phase of crisis management requires a qualitative leap in terms of conditions on the ground, and particularly Damascus, thus implying new massacre and horrific destruction?
