Lakhdar Brahimi, the seasoned, veteran Algerian diplomat, has accepted the mission of being the United Nations secretary-general's new envoy to Syria. The only thing that could justify such a move is that Brahimi has received signals, or has come to believe, based on his own reading, that the crisis is on its way to being solved. He certainly does not want to be a hostage to political formulas that blocked the work of his predecessor, Kofi Annan, which led to his resignation. If there are obstacles, objective reasons, deficient approaches or ineffective mechanisms in dealing with the Syrian crisis, it is natural for Brahimi to want to avoid such things. In July, Annan announced his desire to not extend his mandate, which expired at the first of August, while Brahimi's mandate officially commences at the beginning of September. In the interim, there have been significant developments and perhaps this helped convince the new envoy to accept the post, after hesitating for a few days, in light of his knowledge of the difficulties faced by his predecessor. In terms of the situation at the regional and international levels, and domestically in Syria, there have been no radical changes between Annan's resignation and Brahimi's decision to take over. However, the political climate in which Brahimi will be acting has seen some new moves, such as: 1-The third Russian-Chinese veto in the Security Council, against any resolution calling on President Bashar Assad to resign and condemning the regime's continuing use of violence. This has led Arab and western states into a new phase of action, outside the Security Council. Therefore, the UN General Assembly, supported by 133 states and opposed by Moscow and Beijing, issued a resolution to focus efforts on a "political transition" in Syria instead of using the phrase "political process," which appeared in the previous General Assembly resolution, in the spring, based upon which Annan's mission was launched. Action outside the Security Council covers offering various types of aid to the Syrian opposition, limited though this aid may be. This includes seeing the opposition being armed some Arab states, even if partially, while western states are providing "non-lethal" military assistance such as advanced communications and night vision equipment, etc. It also covers the suspension of Syria's membership in the Islamic Cooperation Organization at the recent summit in Mecca, in addition to more sanctions against figures and entities affiliated with the Syrian regime. 2-Annan tried to convince western countries that Iran should be part of the solution in Syria, but these states rejected this option because they believe Tehran to be the first – and last – protector of the Assad regime. Meanwhile, there has been less and less talk about involving Tehran in the bazaar of any settlement in Syria. In fact, the Iranians faced near isolation at the Mecca summit, while being unable to mobilize any countries in support of their rejection of suspending Syria's membership. This included Lebanon (and Iraq), which were unable to exit the principle of being in harmony with the Arab world's consensus. While the quest to involve Iran in the efforts being made to find a solution in Syria was one of the reasons behind the dispute between Annan and the Great Powers, the scene now changes with Brahimi taking up the job when it comes to Iran's role. 3-There have been significant transformations in the climate in which the new UN-Arab League envoy will be operating. Most importantly, there have been developments on the ground in Syria itself. A bomb attack targeted the crisis management cell at the National Security building in Damascus, killing four pillars of the regime. Before that, Assad's friend, General Manaf Tlas, defected, followed by Prime Minister Riad Hijab and a number of high-ranking officers in the army. There is also the mysterious fate of Vice-President Farouq Sharra, and a number of defections by diplomats. Then, battles erupted in Damascus and Aleppo and these are ongoing, with rising levels of brutality and blood on the part of the regime and its supporters. It is no longer possible to focus on "neutral diplomacy," which required both the regime and the opposition to halt military operations. The international community's loss of hope in the possibility of convincing Assad to stop the killing required a decision to end the mission of UN military observers. It is true that Annan's six-point plan to launch a "political process" assumed that Assad would eventually step down, as mentioned in the former's article in The Financial Times, as he prepared to leave. But it is also true that Assad has not been responsive to Brahimi's attempts to achieve a political transition to a democratic regime that means only turning power over to the opposition, despite the customary maneuvers in terms of welcoming Brahimi's appointment. More likely, this is leading toward lowering expectations about Brahimi's mission, which were cautious to begin with, and he prefers to work in a low-key style amid "hot" conditions. But building on the changes of recent weeks, if they continue to evolve, could give Brahimi the chance to focus, along with the Great Powers that were unanimous on selecting him, on re-building the political regime in Syria in a post-Assad era when the time comes for him to leave.
