The daily positions of the Russian officials in regard to the Syrian issue cannot tolerate more than one explanation. Indeed, this issue is a top priority for Moscow, unlike the case in the United States which seems to have pushed Britain to handle this file on behalf of it and the European Union. What is new at this level is Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's announcement of the fact that his country and China will not be able to convince President Bashar al-Assad to step down. The significant importance of this position stems from the fact that it was issued prior to Lakhdar Brahimi's arrival to Damascus to meet the president, while carrying – as expected – a roadmap for the implementation of the Geneva Accord, firstly stipulating the establishment of a transitional government enjoying full executive prerogatives. In a presidential system, this means it will take these prerogatives from the head of the regime, in order to contain his authority then discuss his departure from power and the timing of this departure. On the other hand, for Lavrov to expect that none of the sides involved in the conflict will win is not new, considering that the insistence on military settlement simply means the loss of all the parties in Syria. And unlike what many expect, the map on the field does not herald the imminence of the settlement. True, the opposition forces control wide areas of the country, but they cannot claim to enjoy full control over the main cities in which hit and run operations are being conducted, from Aleppo to Damascus, going through Edlib, Hama and Homs, and reaching Daraa and Deir ez-Zor among others. On the political front, both the regime and the opposition are rejecting dialogue and seeking a political solution. The regime is likely finding itself the hostage of the group which is leading the battle on the ground and which will not disarm because the price will definitely be its head, at a time when the head of the regime might enjoy the necessary guarantees. As for the political opposition inside and outside the Coalition, it is unable to escape the accommodation of many fighting factions that are rejecting any talks before the collapse of the regime and all its symbols. On the international level, it is clear that the major players are unable to stop the fighting, while UN circles are talking about a civil war and warning against retaliation operations affecting the Alawite sect and other minorities in case the state and military institution were to collapse. Moreover, the Kremlin is repeatedly expressing its fears over anarchy in Syria, and the negative repercussions that such a situation will have on the area close to Russia's Southern border. It is also warning against the arrival of the Islamists to power, as this would revive the cause in Chechnya among other Central Asian states, in which the Islamic action demanding power has not appeased. At this level, there is no point in recalling the acute regional alignment being translated from time to time into initiatives to reach a solution, whether by Ankara, Tehran, Cairo or this or that Gulf capital. Indeed, all these capitals are finding themselves in the midst of the ongoing turmoil, whether publically or from behind the “self-abstinence" slogan." In the meantime, there is no point in imposing a blackout on or covering up the sectarian character of the conflict on the Syrian domestic arena and throughout the region, considering that the tensions between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and a number of Arab states on one hand, and Iran on the other, are no secret to anyone. In that same context, one cannot disregard the state of mobilization between Turkey and Iran, and being translated on a daily basis in further tensions between Ankara and Baghdad by proxy. But the situation is not limited to these extensions of the Syrian arena, as the Kurdish cause remains at the heart of the events along the course of Kurdish presence in the region, not to mention the sparks heralding the detonation of Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, provoking high temperatures at the level of the Turkish social fabric, and generating acute sensitivity between the Alawites on the outskirts and the Syrian refugees. Around six months have gone by since the Geneva Agreement, and this period should be enough to convince all the players that their wager on military settlement is misplaced, in order to return to the table and discuss a political solution that would spare Syria and its neighbors from total chaos. And the question is: Will Brahimi be able to promote a roadmap that would please the international and regional sides, as well as the two parties involved in the domestic conflict? When a UN official warns against the possibility of seeing the Alawite sect and other minorities being subjected to retaliation operations if the army and the regime collapse, his warning is a clear call for the provision of clear guarantees to those standing alongside the regime, in order for them to consider relinquishing it. Since the end of last year and before the fighting escalated and reached its current state, there were talks over the stage which will follow the departure of the regime emulating the situation in Lebanon and Iraq, i.e. based on quotas that do not strip the minorities of their positions in the decision-making circles, administrations and institutions. Nonetheless, the brutality of the fighting and the methodic destruction machine toppled these efforts, which no longer have any place amidst the thunderous combat jets, tanks and missiles. And it is no secret that the hardliners in the opposition ranks are providing the entourage of the head of the regime with reasons to insist on the current authority. Hence, the goal behind the launching of the political process is to find a governance formula that would include all the components of Syrian society in the post-Assad phase. Without an agreement over that phase, it will be difficult to convince those rallying around the regime to give up on it. Hence, the inability of the regular forces and the opposition fighters to ensure military settlement, should push both sides to seek a political exit, and while there are powers and components still standing by the regime, it is the responsibility of the opposition Coalition and the military council of the Free Army to cleanse the fighting groups of the elements constituting a source of concern to the minorities. They must also prove their ability to control the situation on the ground, as this could help launch the political process and direct the pressures toward President Al-Assad, to push him to evacuate his position along with the close group that does not favor any solution which will definitely be at its expense. Washington has paved the way before an understanding in which there is no role for the extremists who have committed or could commit war crimes and terrorist acts, thus placing the Al-Nusra Front on its terrorism list. Moscow also expressed disinterest in the head of the regime, stressing that the main concern was the future of the country. The two capitals are insisting that Syria should not drown in total anarchy, as this would constitute a major threat against which the international community keeps warning, which means that Brahimi does not have much time left. Indeed, from now on, he will no longer be able to show patience regardless of President Al-Assad's response to his plan, while the entire international community will be responsible for the repercussions, not just Russia and America. The responsibility will also be shared by the regime and its people, as well as by the opposition with all its factions. Brahimi's task at this point is to put forward his plan as a test for the truthfulness and seriousness of the states standing behind the Geneva Accord, so as not to say a test for what is being circulated in regard to a Russian-American understanding over the solution. Naturally, the plan will not be accepted by all the sides fighting on the ground. However, the establishment of a transitional government including national figures and a unified military council for the combat groups, and their provision with a reasonable budget, could lead to the isolation of the extremists on both ends and push towards a transitional phase that would pave the way before elections. This would consequently allow the emergence of an authority that would draft a new constitution protecting all the country's components and institutions, considering that anything else would mean the destruction of what is left of Syria. Brahimi does not need any explanation to convince Al-Assad that military settlement is impossible, after this was clearly recognized by Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa a few days ago. And although some considered that Al-Sharaa's breaking of his silence was an Iranian step to respond to the recent Russian position, it is impossible that the president himself was far away from these positions. They were probably a test balloon launched by the president to see the reactions, although the head of the regime is completely aware of the fact that he cannot stay in power as a result of any political settlement since not one party in the opposition can accept such a solution. This is where the predicament faced by the Russians resides, pushing them to change their position which was linked to the opposition's acceptance to sit around the dialogue table to firstly discuss the “following day," although uncertain of the ability to convince Al-Assad to relinquish power! So, will this active diplomatic action and the conflicting, confused and ambiguous positions end up convincing the special UN-Arab envoy of the necessity for him to step down and relinquish his mission, or will they convince Al-Assad? This is the last opportunity before Syria's fall – and that of the entire region – in a comprehensive state of anarchy.
