Far from the preoccupations of the Lebanese and those tending to their affairs with the international tribunal and whether or not the desired settlement should precede or follow the indictment, a notion emerged during Saad al-Hariri's visit to Tehran. This notion was previously alluded to but was conveyed to him this time around in an official way similar to a “fatwa” issued by Iranian Guide Khamenei who “reassured” him that “the resistance will stay as long as Israel remains.” This link, which was previously established by Hezbollah, may not only be directed toward Al-Hariri and the Lebanese, but also toward Syria which - in its talk about the necessity of the Lebanese resistance – has so far been stopping at the limits of the Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shouba Hills. It assured that it was seeking peace based on the restitution of the occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people. However, it never talks about Israel's annihilation, although it desires it. Damascus, which is aware of the balance of power and the size of its capabilities, is thinking based on the logic of the state and knows that the conflict with Israel is long-termed and has so far lasted six decades, during which three major wars and some restricted ones limited to one front with Lebanon or Gaza were witnessed. We may be ahead of a similar period if not a longer one, before the Arabs are able to contain Israel's hostility and impose their conditions on it, which is why it has always said it will not be dragged into a war being planned by others and based on a timing that does not suit it. Syria previously showed hostility toward parties which it said tried to implicate it in uncalculated confrontations, especially during the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization troops in Lebanon in the seventies and early eighties of last century. Yasser Arafat returned to Lebanon after he was ousted from it in 1982 through an international settlement and regional guarantees in which Damascus took part. Syria itself handled his exit from Tripoli because - based on its estimations - his presence threatened to trigger a wide-scale war which could affect it and allow Israel to besiege it from the Lebanese North. While Syria always perceived Lebanon as the “loose waist” which could be exploited by Israel and crossed in any war with it due the country's modest defensive capabilities, it made sure to control the peace and war decision on the Lebanese front and maintain a high level of coordination with Lebanon, especially since it was indirectly present on its soil. Now however, there is a stronger party controlling a large part of this decision, although it is Damascus' trusted ally which enjoys strategic relations and ongoing coordination with it. The seriousness at this level resides in the fact that this duplicity may jeopardize Syrian security, just as it happened during the 2006 war when Israel conducted a landing in the Baalbek area, leading to a high level mobilization in the ranks of the Syrian army out of fear that this would mark the prelude for an attack on Syria itself. In politics, this means that the equation instated by Damascus throughout its relations with its small neighbor now requires reconsideration. Maybe this is the reason behind the talk - in Beirut - about the amendment of the Taif Accord, i.e. to introduce the “Iranian sponsor” as an efficient party in it and recognize “its share.”
