Perhaps the United Nations envoy to the Sahara, Christopher Ross, will put raise a pivotal question about what should be done to salvage the negotiations from the danger of total collapse. While he has succeeded in somewhat reanimating the negotiation option- for which there is no alternative-, he has failed to induce the concerned parties to agree about the ultimate aim of these talks: should it be autonomous rule, or should it be a referendum? Or should it even be a third scenario, one that combines the benefits of both proposals? Ross has succeeded, with rare wisdom, in reducing the level of tension to a minimum, by encouraging the parties to discuss among each other the possibility of implementing the various options. He is aware that a mere agreement upon a certain foundation means the beginning of movement in the right direction, and as this has been impossible up to now, then the least that can be done is to be openly committed to the continuation of negotiations, through official or non-official channels. But the most important issue is not the framework of the talks, but their actual content. No party will be able to claim that it did not have a responsible negotiating partner sitting before it. Otherwise, the international community might conclude that all parties involved prefer accepting the status quo over making mutual concessions that would revive hopes of moving toward a solution. Moreover, by avoiding posing difficult and embarrassing questions, Ross is trying to convince the parties that the solution that they have in their hands is better than any other formula, imposed by the force of events. This is not only because the recipe for a solution, as determined by United Nations resolutions, requires accord and mutual acceptance. But also because this type of solution will strengthen the belief in mutual understanding; no party would lose anything other than losing the continuation of the tension, which has only brought the region more calamities and difficulties. In truth, the cost of not reaching a solution is high. The arms race reproduces the conditions of the Cold War, and will not prompt any of the parties to concede to the dreams of military superiority at any rate, dreams which have only disrupted the integration of the Maghreb and delayed its political unity for years, in the absence of a breakthrough in the Algerian-Moroccan relations. In addition, the region faces an unknown future, amid the repercussions of what is taking place on the southern Saharan coast, in terms of the negative ramifications that threaten the stability of all of North Africa. Furthermore, this cost also involves the delaying of development projects and the deterioration of the conditions of life for many people in an unacceptable and unjustifiable manner. Meanwhile, the view of European and American partners has changed into a determination to see stability in the region in order to protect mutual interests. The debate about the commitments to human rights and offering complete cooperation with the efforts of the United Nations does not hide the fact that the Sahara issue can spiral out of control at any moment, as patience and wisdom are running out, and emotions are running high. These proposals are no more than an attempt to run away from the issue by running forward, since the issue, at its core, involves the ability to forget conflicts and work towards realistic and rational solutions that have yet to be tried. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that Ross, during his upcoming trip to the region, will do more than play the role of an arbitrator constrained by the requirement of getting all sides to agree. In other words, he will communicate the tenants of the negotiations to various decision-making centers, in order to derive a clear idea about what any future round of talks can achieve. Since being tasked with his mission, Ross has been keen to update the Security Council regarding the progress being made in the talks and the positions of the various parties concerned. This means that his second visit will be boosted by the political and moral authorization that he wields, which will help him expand the scope of his vision of both the conflict and its solution. Subsequently, his negotiations this time will not be a mere extension of previous ones. In a few weeks he will submit a new report to the Security Council, which is likely to be different than previous ones. There is no option other than the path of negotiations, but not negotiations without negotiators who know what they can achieve and what must be dismissed permanently. It is a big gamble, as Ross does not hesitate to say publicly. He has spent much time listening, and it is now time for him to talk, even if some refuse to hear his frankness. This frankness will be a test of intentions and political will, while not supporting any side against another. And it would be more useful to see this frankness among the various parties, with each other.
