Agreements with Israel to boost peace, stability: Bahrain Cabinet    Wall Street Closing    Players in Prince Muhammad Bin Salman Cup don jerseys with names written in Arabic script    MEWA, U.S. DOE Sign Landmark MOU on Cooperation in Field of Desalination Research, Technology    Inspirational women set to shine at the ODMC    Saudi Arabia to secure coronavirus vaccine only after ensuring safety: Health minister COVID-19 cases may rise if precautionary measures ignored: Al-Rabiah    Bahrain Raid Xtreme unleashes bespoke Dakar T1 vehicle at first test    France's new COVID-19 cases slow but deaths sharply up    KSrelief, IMC, Sign Memorandum of Cooperation    KSrelief Medical Clinics Continue Providing Its Treatment Services to Displaced People, in Hajjah, Yemen    HRH Crown Prince Congratulates New Zealand PM, on her Party's Elections Winning    It's an honor for Saudi women — Shoura Asst. President Dr. Hanan    Bidding adieu to Khubba Melibari — a beacon of knowledge    UAE, India seek food security cooperation    Bahrain Royal Guard team successfully scales Mt. Manaslu, to climb Mount Everest in 2021    5th Misk Global Forum Kicks Off    Bahrain Bourse Falls    Renault Samsung Resumes Plant Operations amid Pandemic    Abu Dhabi's ADQ pumps $1bn into LuLu's Egypt expansion    ‘Biocups', electric motorcycle taxis and recycling 500 billion bottles for a sustainable Thailand    Study finds ‘special connectivity mechanism' among coral reefs in Arabian Gulf    Historical importance of Khorfakkan Heritage Area Project stressed    Net international reserves up 1.1% to AED353.15bn in August    NEOM moves headquarters to northwest of the Kingdom Relocation signals next phase of project and will accelerate pace of development    Amman Stock Market Falls    Yemen: Combatants ‘have to find strength' to end fighting    Both sides obliged to ‘spare and protect civilians' over Nagorno-Karabakh fighting: Guterres    King Abdulaziz Complex for Manufacturing Kaaba Kiswa Resumes Receiving Visitors    Saudi Pavilion at Expo 2020 Dubai Launches Online Employment Platform    Weather Forecast for Monday    How to establish a proper sleep routine    Napoli blast four goals as they thumped Atlanta 4-1    VAR foils Liverpool in derby draw with Everton    Al Burj, ARM, Butt Sports, ICAD, Royal Jurana win Ace Travel Saudi Cup opener Ijaz (94), Arsalan (74), Bilal (57), M. Yasir (66), Rauf 3 for 8, Abdul Wasey 4 for 16 excel    Scientists uncover new clues about Parkinson's disease    Six-Week Nightly Virus Curfew for Paris and 8 other French Cities    MoH Calls on Groups of Patients to Postpone Umrah Performance    Ithra to Launch 3rd Creativity Season (Tanween)    Red Sea International Film Festival Announces a New Short Film Competition    Saudi Study on Hereditary Causes of Serious Coronavirus' Cases, Published in Recognized World Class Science Magazine    S. P. Bala, legendary Indian singer, dead at 74    Happy National Day 90    Every work has its fruits, so choose wisely    Mediation center contributes to 22% decrease in divorces    Eid Al-Adha Prayer Performed at the Grand Holy Mosque    Pilgrims Perform Dhuhr and Asr Prayers in Arafat Holy Site    Senior Scholars Council Issues Decision No. 246 Regarding Attendance of Friday Prayer and Prayers at Mosques in a Case of Spread of Epidemic or Fear of its Spread    Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Addresses Citizens and Muslims on Eid Al-Fitr    







Thank you for reporting!
This image will be automatically disabled when it gets reported by several people.





GCC bank capitalization remains strong Lending growth will remain in the mid-single digits
Published in The Saudi Gazette on 09 - 10 - 2019

Rated banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) should maintain stable financial profiles in 2020, barring any major increase in geopolitical risk or a sharp fall in oil prices, S&P Global Ratings said Wednesday on "GCC Banks 2020 Industry Outlook" report.
"Our base-case scenario continues to exclude a full-scale military intervention in the region or a disruption in oil
production or supply. However, we cannot completely exclude event risk related to geopolitical
developments, as demonstrated by the recent attack on Saudi Aramco facilities."
The report said GCC banks will successfully navigate a less-than-favorable macroeconomic
environment in 2020 supported by their solid financial profiles. Banks took the opportunity of the
transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 9 in 2018 to recognize the effect of
the softer economic cycle on their asset quality indicators in a relatively conservative manner.
"Therefore, we believe that the amount of problematic assets, which we define as IFRS 9 Stage 2
and 3 loans, will likely remain stable, but we do not exclude transition between the two categories.
We expect GCC economies to show modestly stronger economic growth in 2020 after a dip in 2019
primarily explained by the effect of the aforementioned event on Saudi Arabian growth."
GCC banks continue to display strong capitalization by international standards, with an
unweighted-average S&P Global Ratings risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio of 11.2% at year-end
2018.
"We note, however, that capitalization has dropped over the past four years, from an average
of 12.4% at year-end 2014, due to higher risk weights applied. This came following the revision of
our methodologies and a number of negative rating actions in the GCC and Turkey, primarily. The
average Tier 1 ratio for GCC banks increased by almost 100 bps between 2015 and 2019 due to
muted lending growth, the issuance of hybrids instruments, higher dividend payout ratios, and the
adoption of IFRS 9."
Most capital boosting initiatives have taken the form of hybrid issuances in the past few years and
this trend is continuing. This is because shareholders and other investors are less willing to inject
core capital into banks and more interested in a continuous and predefined income stream from
hybrid instruments. It is also because of the global and local liquidity environments, where yields
are low. We expect the quality of capital to continue weakening. However, this trend has yet to
have a negative effect on our assessment of capital quality.
Additional loss-absorbing capacity (ALAC) instruments and resolution regimes are absent in the
GCC (with the exception of Oman where a resolution framework is in place), but might develop in
the future. For the time being, we continue to see the governments of four out of the six GCC
countries as highly supportive of their banking systems, and we expect them to intervene to
prevent problems at systemically important banks. We assess the likelihood of government
support as uncertain in Bahrain and we view the authorities as supportive in Oman. In both
countries, we think that the government's capacity to extend support to its banking system has
diminished over time. Although in Oman the authorities have adopted a resolution regime, there were no requirements to build ALAC for domestic banks. We continue to believe that the preferred
solution of the authorities in a distress scenario will be to bail out the banks rather than bail in
some creditors. If and when resolution regimes are implemented in other GCC countries, we might
revise our view on government support depending on the authorities' approach.
The average long-term rating on banks in the GCC stood at 'BBB+' at Sept. 30, 2019, the same
level as last year. This is in keeping with our outlook distribution, where 88% of outlooks are
stable. The average stand-alone credit profile (SACP) is 'bbb-' indicating that our expectation of
sovereign support in case of need continues to be a significant factor underpinning our ratings in
the region.
At Sept. 30, 2019, 8% of our rated GCC banks had negative outlooks. This group comprises banks
whose creditworthiness is under pressure because of the local operating environment or their
international operations. We have one rated bank under CreditWatch with positive implications
due to the high likelihood of a merger with a more creditworthy entity. The recent announcement
of the final agreement on the exchange ratio is an additional step toward the completion of this
merger.
However, GCC countries' growth will remain below that seen during the era of triple-digit oil prices. Growth
will also likely be constrained against the backdrop of a broader global slowdown. We therefore
expect net lending expansion to remain flat, in the mid-single digits on average. At the same time,
we expect cost of risk will stabilize at about 1.0% of total loans, due in part to the stronger buffer
of provisions that GCC banks accumulated over the past few years and linked to IFRS 9.
Furthermore, we expect that GCC banks' profitability will deteriorate slightly or stabilize at best.
Profits will likely be negatively affected by the shift in global monetary policy toward lower interest
rates for longer. We think this is already triggering a closer look from banks' management toward
operating costs, including through higher digitalization and collaboration with fintech firms. We
still believe that Gulf banks' core business activities (lending to corporates and retail clients) will
be protected from fintech disruption. In the absence of credible alternatives for the financing of
their economies, authorities in the GCC will continue to protect their banking systems, while at the
same time supporting fintech companies through accelerators and sandboxes.
Banks in the GCC continue to display strong capitalization by global standards. Over the past year,
we have affirmed most of our ratings on banks in the GCC. We have taken a couple of positive
actions because of upcoming mergers or our view of higher systemic importance. We have also
taken a few negative rating actions, primarily because of a deterioration in the operating
environment (local or international). In addition, we have highlighted risks posed by the faster
accumulation of external debt by the Qatari banking system, especially in a volatile geopolitical
context. However, strong government capacity, willingness, and track record of support are
mitigating factors.
Compared with our initial expectations, the economic performance of the GCC countries in 2019
was negatively affected by the attack on Saudi Aramco facilities, which took a significant part of
Saudi Arabia's oil production offline for a few days. We understand that lost production capacity
was fully restored and therefore think that the dip in economic growth will be followed by a strong
recovery in 2020. For other countries in the region, 2020 will also be marked by a slight
improvement in their economic performance thanks to government spending and stable oil prices.
We forecast that oil prices will stabilize at about $60 per barrel in 2020 and anticipate unweighted
average economic growth for the six GCC countries of 2.5% in 2020, compared with 1.6% in 2019.
This is still significantly below their performance during the era of triple-digit oil prices. GCC
growth is constrained not only by a broader global slowdown but also specific factors. These
include real estate supply/demand imbalances, weaker consumer confidence, the extended Qatar
boycott, and policies that could be perceived as discouraging long-term immigration.
Growth in net lending recovered slightly, reaching an annualized 5.3% at mid-year 2019. We
expect a slight acceleration in 2020 barring any unexpected shock. Higher government spending,
supported by strategic government initiatives will support lending growth. In Saudi Arabia, we
expect mortgage lending to be the primary component of loan growth. A surge in geopolitical risk,
significant drop in oil prices--because of a higher-than-expected slowdown in the global
economy--causing delays to some of these initiatives, and a drop in overall consumer confidence
could severely affect our base-case scenario, however.
Paradoxically, the muted economic activity of the past four years did not result in a significant
increase in nonperforming loans (NPLs). At June 30, 2019, NPLs to total loans for the rated GCC
banks reached 2.8%, compared with 2.4% at year-end 2015. A combination of write-offs,
restructuring of exposures to adapt to the new economic reality, and tighter underwriting
standards explain this stability.
The amount of problematic loans (Stage 2 and Stage 3 loans under IFRS 9) averaged about 15% of
total loans at year-end 2018 for banks that reported these numbers. However, several top-tier
banks and a number banks with niche positions displayed stronger metrics. Kuwaiti banks did not
disclose their numbers since the regulator is still finalizing the guidelines for adoption. Therefore,
we have arrived at estimates for the banks that we rate and incorporated them in our calculated
average. Under our base-case scenario, we believe that the amount of problematic loans will
remain stable in 2020, barring any unexpected shock. We do not rule out some transition between
Stage 2 and Stage 3 loans in both directions, which would keep the cost of risk at about 100 basis
points (bps) of total loans.
On the vulnerability scale, we see Qatari banks, except Qatar National Bank, as the most
vulnerable from an asset quality perspective. The continued boycott on Qatar and ensuing real
estate price and hotel occupancy rate declines have resulted in significant pressure on some
Qatari banks. We see an important correlation between any potential escalation or de-escalation
of the boycott measures and deterioration or stabilization of Qatari banks' asset quality.
Second-tier United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi banks are also vulnerable. The significant
decline in real estate prices in the UAE, due to the mismatch in supply and demand, and the
declining health of the contracting sector and related supply chains in Saudi fueled Stage 2 loans in these countries. Top-tier Saudi and UAE banks fared relatively better than their smaller peers.
Positively, we expect UAE real estate prices to stabilize and an improvement in Saudi economic
performance in 2020. NPLs coverage increased mechanically, due to the adoption of IFRS 9,
reaching 175.8% at June 30, 2019. Given the intrinsic vulnerabilities of the GCC region, we expect
banks to continue increasing their provisioning levels.
The other source of latent risk is Gulf banks' international operations. Several banks have invested
internationally over the past few years, with Turkey among the most popular destinations. Given
Turkey's lackluster economic performance, exposed GCC banks will see some effect on their asset
quality indicators. However, this risk remains confined to only a few players, some of which have
the financial muscle to absorb it.
Growth in customer deposits continued to decline, reaching an annualized 3.1% in 2019,
compared with 7.1% in 2018. This drop is explained by lower government deposits, particularly in
Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. In Qatar, the reversal of foreign funding outflows led to a drop in
government deposits. In Saudi, the government used some of its excess funds to pay contractors,
carry its investment projects, and more generally inject liquidity into the local economy. In Oman,
the trend was led by the movements of some large government-related entity (GRE) deposits.
We view GCC banks' funding profiles as satisfactory. Funding is dominated by core customer
deposits, and the use of wholesale funding remains limited except for a few large and
sophisticated issuers. The GCC banking system's loan-to-deposit ratio averaged 93.6% at June
30, 2019, compared with 92.8% at year-end 2017.
The ratio of cash and money market instruments to total assets remained stable over the past 18
months due to muted loan growth, still-increasing deposits, and the deployment of excess
liquidity in government debt issuances. We think that government issuances will continue to
attract local and regional banking systems' and international investors' attention given the shift in
monetary policy in the U.S. and Europe. At June 30, 2019, the coverage of short-term (less than
one year) wholesale funding by broad liquid assets (by S&P Global Ratings' definition) stood at
about 4.8x on average for rated GCC banks, compared with 3.5x at year-end 2016. The slight
decline compared with last year was due to higher recourse to wholesale funding sources.
Only a sharp decline in oil prices could change our view on the funding and liquidity profile of GCC
banks. If governments start to burn their deposits at a more rapid pace, amid lower revenue
and/or a declining appetite for their issuances from foreign investors, we might see liquidity
decline at GCC banks. This is not our base-case scenario, however.
Three out of the six GCC banking systems remain in net external asset positions--Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, and Bahrain. However, with the change in global monetary policy stance, some of these
systems might be tempted to pursue cheaper global liquidity, chasing banking systems with a
good credit story. We are specifically concerned about the speed and the extent of the buildup of
Qatari Banks' external debt. Outflows, in the aftermath of the boycott have completely reversed
and a significant portion of external debt is still made of potentially volatile interbank deposits.
This increases Qatar's vulnerability to event risks. It also explains why, under our hypothetical
stress scenarios of an increase in geopolitical risks in the GCC, the country stood out as the most
vulnerable.
First-half 2019 saw a slight decline in rated GCC banks' profitability and we think this trend will
continue (see chart 6). The drop is underpinned by the compression of margins in the aftermath of
interest rates cuts by GCC central banks, which followed the U.S. Federal Reserve. Additional
upcoming cuts will pressure banks' margins.
As cost of risk is not likely to decline because of IFRS 9 implementation and the still uncertain
economic environment, banks are adopting a more-aggressive approach toward their cost
management. They will also try to leverage technology and redeploy staff or close branches. In the
UAE, the number of bank branches has been declining since December 2014 (see chart 7),
suggesting that banks have managed to migrate some transactions to alternative channels. We
think this trend will continue in the next 12-24 months, with a similar movement also starting to
emerge in Saudi Arabia.
Overall, we think that GCC banks' profitability will decline slightly because:
- Loan growth will remain in the mid-single digits. Banks will continue prioritizing quality over
quantity and shy away from lucrative but higher-risk exposures, especially since IFRS 9
requires lifetime provisioning for exposures with deteriorating credit quality or repayment
issues.
- The shift in global monetary policy is reducing banks' pricing, with potential additional cuts in
the next 12-18 months. Given the significant contribution of noninterest bearing deposits in
GCC banks funding profiles, their bottom line is negatively affected by this trend.
- The cost of risk will remain at higher levels of about 100 bps, compared with 80 bps in 2019
(annualized). Banks will have to continue building cushions to cover a relatively high amount of
Stage 2 loans.
- Cost control measures will help alleviate some of these pressures, but the transition toward
higher automation will take time and core lending activities will continue to require heavy
human involvement.
Consolidation is an avenue that some Gulf banks have decided to take. Although the first wave of
mergers was driven by banks with common shareholders, the second wave could be due to lower
financial performance. This would mean deals primarily spurred by banks' management teams
rather than shareholders, S&P Global said. — SG


Clic here to read the story from its source.