To visualize where Pakistan is now headed, or should be headed, one should analyze what Musharraf did right and what he did wrong. This would also provide a useful road map for the Government of the day. It is also important for the Gulf which needs a strong and stable Pakistan, and particularly true for Saudi Arabia which has always had a special relationship with Pakistan. Whether one likes it or not, Musharraf defined internationally what Pakistan stood for. To give him his due, he was an articulate advocate of Pakistan abroad, who took great pains in preparing himself for each encounter and each meeting, at home and abroad. However, this attention to detail led to micromanaging every aspect of Pakistan's governance. Musharraf's epitaph could be that he was a man of limited abilities, which is nothing to be ashamed about and is the lot of most people, but his greatest failing was his ignorance of this fact, which otherwise would have allowed him to compensate by choosing able advisers. His original sin was to overthrow the government by a military coup. However, some ineptitudes of the four previous governments gave him that opportunity. Hopefully the politicians have learnt from that bitter lesson. Certainly the formation of the coalition between the PPP and the PML(N) provides some evidence to that effect. As both parties are traditional rivals the general expectation is that alliance will not last, now that Musharraf has gone. But both Asif Zardari and Mian Nawaz Sharif are politically savvy and since further political instability will damage both parties, they may well surprise us by marching together in the medium term, despite divisive issues such as the restoration of the judges and Musharraf's future. In foreign relations, Musharraf's scorecard was mixed, although cumulatively it accelerated public disapproval and his departure. On Iraq, he took a stand in not supporting America in the Security Council when it wanted a resolution to invade Iraq, and he resisted repeated calls from America and the UK for troops for Iraq. On the nuclear issue the West, never comfortable with a Muslim nuclear power and with its double standard, which had ignored France giving nuclear capability to Israel, seized on the opportunity to criticize and to pressure Pakistan. Musharraf strongly resisted all pressures and supported his nuclear negotiators, following the precedent set by his predecessors. The OIC has always strongly supported the Kashmiri peoples' right to self determination. For his part, Musharraf was deeply committed, through his concept of enlightened moderation, criticized for not being sufficiently applied within Pakistan, to work with all other OIC countries to revitalize the Organization, through reconstituting its Charter and method of work, and most of all for the need to give the OIC and its secretary general the political support and funds to pull their weight on the word stage. While all these ambitious objectives have not been realized, this is due to a collective lack of political will, and he deserves credit for constantly emphasizing the need for Muslim World unity and a stronger and more effective OIC. On India and Kashmir, despite his legacy of Kargil, Musharraf persevered and together with his Indian interlocutors succeeded in reducing tension through the peace process, correctly assessing there was no alternative and no post 9/11 international acceptability of an armed insurrection in Indian Occupied Kashmir. However, his out of the box proposals on Kashmir, which could only have led to a settlement on Indian terms, perceptually eroded Pakistan's principled support for the UN Security Council sanctioned right of the Kashmiris for self determination, despite Foreign Office attempts to compensate. Probably he felt that resolving Kashmir would be his crowning achievement. He did not credit continuing indigenous Kashmiri resilience and resistance, which has now resurfaced even more vigorously than in 1989. While the broad lines of policy towards India will remain with expanding mutually beneficial trade relations, there should be a recognition that better relations do not have to be at the cost of the Kashmiri people and our principled stand. Cross LoC CBMs can still be increased political support for countering India's human rights violations and oppressive occupation remains a credible bilateral and international option as long as cross border infiltration continues to be countered. On Middle East issues, he incorrectly assumed that Pakistan had a role,as a result his iniatives remained still born. His tentative move towards Israel was disliked at home, and there was no advantage gained. His reaction to American demands after 9/11 defined Musharraf in Pakistani eyes. Admittedly his options were limited, but he surprised the Americans by accepting all their demands. There was no attempt to strike a better bargain. Yes, American economic assistance, backed by its Western allies and the IFIs, plus sizeable military assistance poured in. The cost was much higher. An old Punjabi proverb has it that he who has been fed by another, cannot look him in the eye. Whatever Pakistani officials may claim about the money given being for payment of military operations to support the coalition in Afghanistan, and that they will fight terrorism in their own way, the American response is that they gave the money and thus want results. Musharraf, despite having all powers, did not do enough for women's rights, and was not able to reverse the deteriorating law and order situation, let alone growing militant extremists activity. The rising unpopularity of the coalition's campaign in Afghanistan and consequent resistance fuelled not only sympathy and support from across the border, but when this was countered by Pakistani military action and American air strikes, it led to a blowback effect in Pakistan, and public lack of support for this pro-America policy. While there may now be some shift of nuance on the war on terror, to demonstrate some distance from American dictation, the fragile economy may not immediately permit much substantive change. Though terrorism has to be fought, a military campaign against one's own people in the critically underdeveloped tribal areas, similar to that of the coalition foreigners operating in Afghanistan in a manner inconceivable in their own countries, is not sustainable. No ordinary Pakistani soldier considers a tribesman sympathetic to fellow tribals under attack in Afghanistan an enemy. The freedom of maneuver of any government in Pakistan will depend crucially on its ability to balance the budget to free itself of external assistance. Improving governance, austerity, fiscal discipline, enhancing exports by value addition and concentrating on education and public infrastructure, all long ignored by the Musharraf and previous regimes, must be the priorities, to survive mounting public discontent at rising inflation, food and energy prices. Pakistan is a country with vast human and material potential crying out for able and consistent nation oriented leadership. An assertive civic society, coupled with a vigorous and investigative media, demanding accountability at all levels, has become the dominant characteristic of Pakistan's polity, which can only be ignored by the political parties, which need to institute democratic election procedures themselves, at their peril, and provides grounds for optimism for Pakistan's future. A future closely linked to the Gulf. * Ambassador Tariq Osman Hyder is a retired Pakistani diplomat. __
