When US President Barack Obama fails to force Israel to freeze the settlement activities in the West Bank, this does not change the picture in a way that makes us expect the White House to be able to do what goes beyond a verbal objection in the face of the extremist Israeli right wing's inauguration of the "battle of sovereignty of Al-Aqsa Mosque." This "battle" will be the most aggressive chapter in the project to consolidate the Jewish aspect of the Hebrew State which is still seizing the worst opportunities from the inter-Palestinian rift in order to burry the cause of a homeland and a nation. From Palestine and Iraq and Lebanon to Yemen and Sudan, where the crises tighten their grips on what has remained of the Arab regime to spread fears over the coming worse, the United States recognizes that the "victory" in Iraq is no longer certain and fears the increasing power of Al-Qaeda in the region. This raises questions over the ability of the Arabs to fill the gap if the United States withdraws. It seems clear that the more the losses are among the ranks of the US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the more the possibilities of the retreat are, as well as the fears over a "counter attack" staged by the Taliban coalition and Al-Qaeda in region that is the heart of the crises. Who would accept to coexist with a "mini state" or more for Al-Qaeda on its border? If we add the challenge pertaining to the Iranian infringements in Arab states in favor of certain political forces and parties at the expense of the legitimate powers to the "battle" of the Jewish aspect of Israel and the Judaization of all Jerusalem, in addition to the American slowdown in implementing the pledges of US Barack Obama, then the "confusion" of the region about looking whether or not the Arabs still have a chance to prevent the generalization of the Somali situation is no longer justified. In fact, the Israeli acknowledgement of the beginning of the "battle of sovereignty" over Al-Aqsa pushes the conflict with Israel and the dossier of the inter-Palestinian reconciliation to the forefront of the Saudi-Syrian summit's agenda. The summit, which groups the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz will go beyond the stage of rapprochement between Riyadh and Damascus to the stage of cooperation. It will deal with the means of continuing the Egyptian efforts or supporting them, in order to conclude a reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas at the end of this month. Syria can stress its role in encouraging Khaled Mishaal to accept Cairo's proposals, so as to dispel previous Egyptian doubts over Arab and (non-Arab) interferences that have obstructed these efforts for a long period, after obstructing the implementation the Mecca Agreement. Certainly, the Saudi-Syrian summit is an important milestone on the path of enhancing inter-Arab reconciliation. It will facilitate the efforts to improve the relations between Damascus and Cairo which did not only suffer coldness, but a silent tension for a long time. It is still early to expect a restoration of the warmth of the Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian cooperation on the basis of the triangle of the major Arab countries which preserves the unity of the Arab decision against infiltrations and protects it in the face of the Israeli threats and emergency crises and the projects of Somalization. And yet, the Damascus summit – after the visit of President Al-Assad to Jeddah – will contribute to redefining the Arab priorities, on the basis of the reconciliation initiative launched by King Abdullah in the Kuwait Summit. Among these priorities is how to thwart the racial project of Netanyahu's government, i.e. the Judaization of Eastern Jerusalem and dominating Al-Aqsa Mosque. This makes the Arab response to Obama's call for steps "that promote the peace process" unlikely, knowing that Saudi Arabia refused to make any concession for Israel as long as the latter rejects the Arab peace initiative, i.e. the reference for all international resolutions. The Syrian position is known, after Netanyahu closed the Turkish gate for indirect talks with Damascus. Among the constants that should help in redefining the priorities of the Arab move, and therefore revive the Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian coordination, is to prevent the disintegration of Iraq, and be prepared for all scenarios in the post-American withdrawal from this country. The worse scenario is when foreign sides ignite the fire of strife among the Iraqis once again, whereby Al-Qaeda manipulated their rift to establish a "mini state" that wreaks havoc in the region. As for Lebanon, which is always present in its crises and variance as an arena to vent regional conflicts, it will be among the dossiers of the Saudi-Syrian summit as one of the pressing constants to prevent a slide into a strife that cannot be contained. The S-S equation seems in a state of recovery thanks to the initiative of King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz. What remains to be done is to consolidate consensus over leaving the Lebanese address their conflicts via dialogue, and consolidate Syria's awareness that Lebanon is a country with an independent willpower and decision. This requires moving to demarcating the border, instead of linking this issue to the fate of the negotiations with Israel. All of these dossiers put a hefty burden on the agenda of the Saudi-Syrian summit, which will encourage more reconciliations among Arab states. Without these reconciliations, everyone will remain lost in the quagmire of the crises, while the regional forces are getting stronger by turning these crises to conflicts inside the Arab world, not over the border or the authority, and not with Israel to save Palestine.
