The Arab arena is witnessing broad political movements these days, namely among Riyadh, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, the Palestinian Authority, and the Hamas Movement. These movements have pushed many sides to anticipate the level of progress they will bring about in terms of organizing the Arab home, especially with regards to the inter-Palestinian and the Egyptian-Syrian reconciliations. No progress seems to have been achieved so far at the level of these two reconciliations, particularly the first one. The Rafah events between the Egyptian Government and Hamas imply that whenever efforts are close to soft-pedaling the position vis-à-vis the signature of the Egyptian platform for reconciliation, a certain development takes place and makes this goal more undoable. In this case, it is normal that the domestic Palestinian conflict rules out the possibility of the Egyptian-Syrian reconciliation as long as Cairo links improving its relations with Damascus to the latter extending efforts to push Hamas to sign the Egyptian platform (as long as Fatah has already signed it). In return, the Syrian Government suggests a solution that consolidates its role in the domestic Palestinian equation. According to this suggestion, the reconciliation takes place in Syria, based on the Egyptian initiative. The nominal conditions reveal that the decision of reconciliation has not been made and that the conflict over the Palestinian "platform" is still going on. It is the same dilemma since 2007, despite the changes that have occurred to the Arab reality, particularly in terms of the progress of the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation and its reflection as a Syrian-Lebanese reconciliation. This is the only positive development that resulted from the Kuwait and Qatar summits last year. The active Arab movements these days are perhaps attributed to the challenge posed by the imminence of the ordinary Arab Summit scheduled for March 27 and 28 in Libya. When it convenes, the Arab leaders should review the year, based on the reconciliations achieved by the ordinary Doha summit, including the Libyan-Saudi reconciliation. So in other words, the past year was a timeframe during which additional [reconciliations] should have been achieved, namely at the level of the inter-Palestinian relations, the Syrian-Egyptian relations, as well as the Egyptian-Qatari relations. If the situation between Hamas and Fatah, and between Cairo and Riyadh, remains unchanged, then the Arab flimsiness and weakness – for which King Abdullah Ben Abdul Aziz held the Arab leaders (including himself) responsible when he launched his initiative in the Kuwait summit to end the Arab conflict – will not turn into cohesion and power. While the gradual steps between Riyadh and Damascus, and later between Lebanon and Syria succeeded– upon the visit of Lebanese Prime Minister Sa'd al-Hariri to the Syrian capital – the Arab leaders' failure to continue mobilizing the minimal level of their power was coupled with a bleeding wound, i.e. the wound of Yemen. This wound is deepening with time and has started influencing the security of Saudi Arabia, not to mention the fact that it threatens the unity of Yemen and the repercussions of the open possibilities in this regard on its periphery. The Arab regime might have approximately two months before the Tripoli summit convenes to make additional efforts in order to reduce pessimism that overshadows the Arab body. This period, which separates us from the Arab meeting, might be too short to make achievements in the accumulated and thorny controversial issues. But there is a way to reach a minima level of Arab consensus during the remaining short period. This can only be done through stopping wagering on the American Administration after one year of its promises to push forward the peace process over which the Arabs disagree. This is because this wager did not only disappoint the American allies, but also its adversaries who wish to open up to it. While President Obama seems to have abandoned this priority in favor of other priorities, starting with Afghanistan to combating Al-Qaeda once again – as well as waiting for his country's economy to improve before embarking on any real initiative in the Middle East that curbs the Israeli extremism – then the Arabs should consider their priorities and stop wagering on Washington. This is one of the most essential means for pursuing inter-Arab reconciliations.
