The Americans are regressing, deliberately and openly, in the Middle East. This comes after decades of active and hegemonic presence, reaching its pinnacle in an American monopoly on the region's affairs following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such regression will not be compensated by cooperation agreements that seek to salvage a few economic interests, as well as a few military locations within the framework of the war on terror. There is a visible and increasingly clear outcome to such regression, regardless of the reasons for it, whether they spring from the impact of the tremendous economic burden borne by the United States in its recent wars, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, or from a decision made by the current administration, with its new approach to America's interests in the world. The outcome is the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the United States – a vacuum that is seeking sources to fill it, from outside the region and from within it, and is thus giving rise to a complex struggle and a new intertwinement of interests. Positions of traditional rivalry with the United States seem to be the ones most actively seeking to inherit its waning role. This is especially true as Europe, with the relations it has traditionally had in the region, no longer has the means to restore its past role, having lost it to American expansion after World War II – especially as its economic and military situation is suffering from a series of structural crises, even if it is trying to preserve a minimum of markets and economic interests, particularly in the field of energy supply. Russia makes no secret of its aspirations to fill some of the vacuum left by the United States, or even all of it, especially after the disappearance of the ideological factor, which had prevented the spread of Soviet influence during the Cold War. Putin's Russia believes itself to have the ability and the right to have such aspirations, in view of its geopolitical position and economic capabilities, especially in the fields of energy and military industries. While Turkey has begun receding as well, after a phase of expansion, Iran is renewing its diplomatic assault with its new government lineup headed by President Hassan Rohani. Even more, Tehran sees an irreplaceable opportunity for it to benefit from America's regression. On the one hand, it considers itself to be responsible for this regression, as a result of the role it has played in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, and on the other is prepared to negotiate with Washington, in order to facilitate the process of regression, as it did with the military withdrawal from Iraq. There is another party that also seeks to ascribe to itself forcing the United States to withdraw from the region, and that is Al-Qaeda and its various branches spread across the region from Pakistan to Morocco. And with increased American regression in the region, the group will turn increasingly towards the interior, making it less of a threat to the United States, which is in turn restructuring its policy on combating terrorism on the basis of this new factor. On the background of such a struggle, as it witnesses a heated race to fill the vacuum left by the Americans, the Arabs seem to be most prominently absent. Indeed, the Arabs have no solid core with a clear strategy for self-preservation, nor is there a regional Arab force with a serious political project that could form a polarizing element, despite the presence of elements similar to such a force at both the economic and human levels. The fate of filling the space left by America's regression thus remains connected to the limits of the simultaneous negotiations between the United States and Russia and between the United States and Iran – the former having resulted in preparing for Geneva II in order to reach a solution in Syria, and the latter being aimed at resolving the crisis between Iran and the West. In other words, it is a matter of attempting to reach an understanding on resolving the issues in the region that are most pressing and of the greatest interest. Thus, if the Arabs are concerned about such negotiations, their concerns are justified, even if these negotiations are tortuous and their results unguaranteed in any one direction. But it would be more useful to wonder about the reasons why the Arabs have been excluded from them – in other words, to wonder about the weaknesses of the Arabs and how they can be addressed, instead of lamenting about friends stabbing each other in the back. And if a regional Arab force and a new Arab order, with the ability to take action and to fill some of the vacuum left by America's regression, fail to take shape, the debate will remain restricted between Iran's diplomatic and field assault and its counterpart from Al-Qaeda. The two may clash at times and collaborate at others, but the trend towards fundamentalism remains dominant.
