Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) researcher David Pollock advises the US Administration to “sever the lifeline” of the Syrian regime – a lifeline that “supports the regime economically, politically and at the security level. It represents the link between Tehran and Damascus – and through it Lebanon and Palestine. For those who are not familiar with this institute, it is a research institution established by the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in 1985, and its studies often turn into government policies. The fact is that a large part of the worsening crisis in Syria is connected to the regime's strategy, maintained since Assad Senior took the decision to ally with Iran, ever since the Islamic Revolution and the overthrow of the Shah. This strategy was maintained by his son and deepened at various levels, economic, political and military. Needless to say that American and Arab efforts, ever since Bashar Al-Assad came to power, have been aimed mainly at breaking this alliance. Pressure on Damascus in this direction increased after Iraq was invaded and dismantled. Political parties and groups that had been embraced by Tehran before the great American foolishness, as they continue to be, rose to power, and Baghdad turned into an arena for the struggle between the United States and Iran, on the one hand, and between the United States and Syria on the other. This struggle took a more violent direction after the Hariri assassination in 2005, and the Syrian regime was forced to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. Yet the Syrian regime was able to absorb this shock, with its people gathering around it in a noteworthy manner, and to strengthen its strategic relations with Iran and Turkey. And then came the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006, with the hope of crushing Hezbollah and depriving Syria and Iran of such an advanced position in the conflict over the region. But the war failed, and the Iranian-Syrian axis emerged from it stronger than it was before. Its influence also became more entrenched in Iraq, especially after Ayad Allawi failed to reach the position of Prime Minister, and Maliki, with whom and what he represents, assumed the post. In other words, Syria and Iran have become ready to fill the security and political vacuum in Iraq after the withdrawal of US troops at the end of the year, and it was thus imperative to do something to change this reality. Thus Washington began to exploit the Arab “Spring” and the events in Syria to turn the equation around. In this it met with the makers of the “Spring” and those who support them from among the Arabs, who view Iran as an enemy that would pose a threat to them in the Gulf, if it were to become more deeply entrenched in Iraq and preserve its alliance with Damascus. Pollock's advice to the US Administration to sever the lifeline of the Syrian regime came within the framework of a study completely devoid of any references to the democracy and freedom being demanded by the Syrian people. What matters to it is the preservation of Washington's interests and influence. Indeed, even the fig leaf with which the United States covers its policies and its wars no longer means anything to it. Breaking the alliance between Syria and Iran is what matters, whatever the cost of such a goal in the blood of Syrians. Martyrs have heaven while earth is for the strong.
