In the American (“cowboy”) way of personalizing the international conflict and demonizing the enemy, things are moving forward with regard to the Syrian regime. The issue had begun with demanding that President Bashar Al-Assad quickly implement reforms, while knowing full well that he would be unable to do so at the required speed, especially as it does not mean turning Syria into a democracy and letting the democratic game produce its domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, what is required of Assad is changing his geopolitical positioning and joining a regional and international camp that seeks to fill the vacuum left by the US withdrawal from Iraq, as well as confronting Tehran, which considered the withdrawal to be a victory for Iran, one that has brought it closer to fulfilling its dream of turning into a major regional power. Assad, who considers himself to have been a partner in forcing the Americans to withdraw from Iraq, with several officials in Damascus boasting of helping the Iraqi resistance and embracing over a million Iraqi refugees, saw in Washington's retreat an opportunity to strengthen relations with Tehran and Baghdad. He thus rejected every offer made to him by the Arabs (Qatar) and the Turks, and insisted on his stance, considering himself to be far from the winds of change blowing over the Arab World (in his famous interview with the Wall Street Journal). Such rejection was translated in Lebanon when his allies contributed to removing Saad Hariri from the post of Prime Minister, rejecting the mediation of Erdoğan and Hamad Bin Jassim, who visited Beirut and Damascus as mediators for Hariri. When they both realized that the Syrian President would not alter his stance, a new phase of the conflict started, to which took part other countries, Arab and non-Arab, that adopted the foreign opposition and embraced it – an opposition without a unified working program, the constituents of which are brought together only by their hatred of the regime and their readiness to take revenge for long years of marginalization and repression. Today the conflict over Syria has entered the phase of danger, especially after it has become clear to the regime's rivals and enemies that it would not fall by political and economic pressure, and after they have lost their wager on major defections taking place within the political and military institutions, in addition to the failure of their many attempts to convince Russia and China to alter their stance. The countries of the Arab League, the European Union and the United States no longer have any choice but to work outside of the framework of the Security Council. Those who call for moving against the regime outside the framework of the “international community” consider themselves to have reached the point of no return and burned all bridges with Damascus as it is today, in the hope of shaping its new image after the overthrow of the regime. It no longer matters to them for Assad to offer any concessions (the Americans described his call for a referendum on the constitution as laughable). They have thus come together to form a group they have named the “Friends of Syria”, so as to legitimize their support of the Syrian rebels by all means, political and material (read: arming them), as per the decisions issued by the Arab League, without having to wage an impossible military campaign from the outside. In other words, we will be witnessing the militarization of what remains of a peaceful opposition, which had sought to get rid of the regime while preserving the state. Arming and training the rebels, and supporting them politically as well, will increase confessional and sectarian division in Syrian society. The war will be inter-Syrian by name – a war without a plan for what comes after it. And the experiences of Iraq and Libya have taught us that not planning for the day after means bringing down both the regime and the state, and dividing power among ethnic, sectarian and tribal groups – each with its own different historical frame of reference, and its own foreign authority of reference willing to support it, so that it may remain backward and loyal to it.
