The files of the conflict in Syria and the nuclear program in Iran have become two facets of the same issue, related to the share of the resistance and rejectionism axis led by the regime in Tehran in the redistribution of power in the region. This axis has clearly started to embody political Shiism. And consequently, based on the role it has set for itself, its share includes all those who belong to this Shiism that has spread across the Arab and Gulf map. On a deeper level, this means that the efforts and negotiations over the Iranian file and the Syrian conflict practically feature the determination of Tehran's share throughout the region and the limits of its influence. At the very least, this organic correlation is seen in the Iranian behavior on the ground, not only in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, but also in Yemen and Bahrain among other Gulf countries. It is also seen in the Iranian negotiation methodology over the Syrian file and the Geneva 2 talks, as well as in the P5+1 negotiations over the nuclear program. The extent of the direct Iranian military and intelligence intervention in the region through the Qods Brigade and its branches, especially Hezbollah, is well known. And although this intervention is sometimes justified by the protection of the "rights" of Shiite citizens in this or that country, it has taken an acute sectarian dimension in Syria. In the negotiations surrounding its nuclear program, Tehran considered it enjoyed vital interests in the region, ones which the P5+1 should recognize and allow it to achieve. Tehran is thus insisting on the recognition of these interests, along with what it dubs its right to enrich uranium, which constitutes a negotiation methodology that is provoking wide concerns among the Gulf states because the issue is directly related to them and their own interests. And in the negotiations to settle the conflict in Syria, Tehran considered that its vital interests in this country imposed the recognition of its right to participate in Geneva 2, not because it has troops fighting on the ground and an agreement should be reached over the way to pull them out, but because the nature of these interests should be preserved in any future formula related to the nature of the regime. Therefore, Iran is defending one political cause, even if it is taking different shapes from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. It is thus drowning its negotiators with numerous technical details here and there, in order to conceal the common factor they share. So far, it seems to have managed to impose this negotiation methodology, as seen in the way the last round of the Geneva negotiations ended with the P5+1. Indeed, it is no longer clear what Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif agreed to at the level of the nuclear file to get his American counterpart John Kerry to show such optimism, just as it is not clear what he turned down to get his French counterpart Laurent Fabius to express reservations, although they were all sitting around the same table. We will probably never know exactly the limits of the Iranian concessions and stringency in light of this technical methodology. At the level of the other facet, i.e. the Syrian file, Tehran and Damascus are also trying to drown the preliminary negotiations in technical details, without this axis undertaking whichever political step to facilitate the organization of Geneva 2. So far, and despite all the Russian and American optimism and the shuttle visits conducted by Lakhdar Brahimi and his talks in the influential capitals, Tehran and Damascus have not issued anything revealing their approval of the principles of the Geneva 1 declaration, which – according to the sponsors of dialogue, i.e. Washington and Moscow – should constitute the foundation of Geneva 2. It is the methodology of drowning in technical details, in order to conceal the real political facet of the issue. Tehran, along with its axis, has managed to gain time and offer a few pawns, at least for now.
