There will be no relinquishing of power and no imminent conference to negotiate with the opposition. These are the two no's issued by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, albeit in a different form. And if one were to add to them the five no's of the Head of the opposition National Coalition Ahmad Jarba to avoid a "humiliating settlement agreement," the chances of seeing the staging of the Geneva 2 meeting become null. It was clear early on that the regime in Damascus would try to exploit the certificates of "positive cooperation" granted to it by international sides for the destruction of its chemical arsenal. And it is definitely using them to erase the memory of the catastrophic chemical attack against Ghouta and re-boost its morale to destroy whatever cohesion is left in the ranks of the opposition fighters. This raises a question about who will represent the opposition in Geneva 2, thus shifting the issue away from the illegitimacy of the regime to the search for an opposition dubbed by Lakhdar Brahimi as "reasonable," to claim to be the legitimate representative of the other side. At this level, the aggressive statements of the Syrian president, which undermined the chances of seeing the organization of the Geneva 2 conference and instated further doubts and mistrust between the Syrian National Coalition and the decision-making capitals in the West, were not meaningless. Indeed, Bashar al-Assad's talk about the fact that nothing prevents him from running for presidency once again next year increased the oppositionists' concerns about the possible "selling" of the revolution by the major capitals, in exchange for the dismantlement of the chemical arsenal. Based on that theory, the regime would be allowed to re-impose its hegemony over the domestic arena and seize more regions which had fallen under the fighters' control, while the opposition would be left to its miserable fate between the jaws of a regime that does not care about the cost of the fight – even if this amounts to tens of thousands of new lives – and Islamic brigades armed with extremism and accusations of infidelity, and causing the minorities or what is left of them to turn against the revolution. While Arab-UN Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi has had a few slips of the tongue emanating from good intentions, at a time when he is unwelcomed by the opposition and when the regime thinks that his mediation lacks integrity, Arab League Secretary General Nabil Larbi – who announced the date of the Geneva 2 conference in Brahimi's presence – appeared to believe he is heralding the imminent end of the Syrian people's tragedy. But the events of the Syria's Friends conference in London and the demands of Jarba and the Coalition to attend Geneva 2 probably reveal once again that the impossible will never become possible, neither for the regime nor for its opponents. Logically and based on good intentions, there is nothing wrong with the Syrians' belief in American Secretary of State John Kerry, who made sure to inform the Coalition that Washington will not settle for the chemical file to turn the page of the ongoing slaughter. There is also no harm in them believing that there is no military solution, at a time when the oppositionists proved unable to settle the battle or tilt the balance of power. But can the Coalition prevent the regime from resorting to the war machine? And who will convince Moscow and Tehran for example that no one believes their claims about their insistence on a peaceful solution through dialogue, while their ally – the Syrian regime – wants to monopolize the selection of the "valid" oppositionist to negotiate in Geneva? Killing is ongoing in Syria. But in light of the good intentions of Brahimi, Kerry and even leader of Kremlin Vladimir Putin who is optimistic about the successful preparations for Geneva 2, what is left other than to check the intentions of the regime, the goals of Al-Nusra Front and the mini-state of Al-Qaeda? In reality, although the consensus over the statement of the London conference boosted the Coalition's credit and morale following consecutive setbacks and dissidence in the ranks of the Free Army in favor of brigades which chose Al-Qaeda, it got the Coalition's approval to come to Geneva and seek the formation of a transitional government which would assume all the prerogatives of President Al-Assad in his absence. Naturally, the statement does not answer the most important question, i.e. who will convince Al-Assad to relinquish his prerogatives, so that any symbol of his regime dares to negotiate on his behalf in Geneva 2? Will it be his ally Khamenei or his protector Putin inside the Security Council? And if Jarba will not accept a "humiliating" settlement, what will force the Syrian regime to do so after the American military scenario has become a virtual chapter of the past and after Damascus regained its margin of maneuver, using the expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and its attacks against the regions and popular bases of the Free Army? Let us believe – in good faith – that a regime which has not yet realized the scope of the disaster provoked by its attempts to crush the revolution, will believe that the time has come for it to leave.
