The Geneva 2 conference to discuss the resolution of the conflict in Syria appears to be a Russian (Iranian) – American (Western) need, more than a need for the Syrian parties themselves. And it seems that the diplomacy deployed in the preparation of this conference allowed Russian-American rapprochement over the issues of dispute, especially the Iranian nuclear file, at a time when both sides confirmed their insistence on Israel's strategic security interest. This is reviving Russian and American interests, based on the exclusion of military action – whether directly or through local mediators – following power tests over more than one file and in more than one region around the world. This explains why President Barack Obama's administration relinquished the military strike against the Syrian regime's troops, in exchange for Russian guarantees to dismantle this regime's chemical arsenal. In that sense, the Russian-American understanding over the resumption of the Geneva 2 diplomacy constituted the mechanism that allowed Moscow and Washington to communicate directly, then agree over the approach governing their relationship. This is the new approach that will replace the unipolar one adopted by Washington, and to which Moscow succumbed following the collapse and dismantlement of the Soviet Union. This approach intersected with the interests of the Syrian regime, at least in the short term, as it provided it with a golden opportunity to catch its breath and move on the field, after its chemical weapons – which were behind the international rise against it – became off the table. This was expressed by President Bashar al-Assad through two ideas. The first is his stay in power following the end of his current term and the second is that the right circumstances for the staging of the Geneva 2 conference are not available, considering that it will debate – at least in theory –the transitional power with full prerogatives. On the other hand, the Syrian opposition with its various factions seems unable to even adopt a position vis-à-vis this conference, regardless of its agenda. And in addition to the controversy provoked by the National Council's announcement of its boycotting of the conference and the conflicting positions issued by components inside the Coalition but from outside the Council, there are also the opposition military forces on the ground, some of which are strongly opposing the conference and threatening those who participate in it, while others are questioning the commitment to the announced schedule or setting conditions to agree to participate in it. At this level, it is unlikely to see the Russian-American pressures – especially through the Syrian People's Friends meetings – pushing towards the unification of the Syrian opposition's position, let alone convincing the majority in it to attend Geneva 2, regardless of the promises and guarantees. Indeed, the opposition's situation is not due to diverging viewpoints over the political process represented by the Geneva conference, but rather to its composition, influence on the ground, the clarity of its political project, its ability to translate that successfully in the face of the regime on the field and politically, and its ability to impose a transitional authority with full prerogatives as stipulated by Geneva 1. In that sense, the circumstances of the Syrian opposition have not yet ripened to allow it to enter a complex political process such as the one imposed by Geneva 2, in case the conference is held with whoever attends it under American-Russian pressures. Therefore, putting the blame and the responsibility on the neighboring states that are supporting the opposition is a mere misleading attempt to elude any accountability, i.e. the real requirement of a political process to end the conflict in Syria. Hence, all that is left of Geneva 2 are the tours conducted by UN-Arab Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and his statements that reflect his non-belief in its usefulness. Thus, he says that there is no set date for the conference, and he wants the Syrian opposition to convince him that it is an opposition so that its presence in the conference is valuable, or that he wants to see all those who have an interest in ending the conflict attending it regardless of who they are, and so on. Also, all that is left of Geneva 2 is the fact that it is an occasion and an opportunity to proceed with the meetings of the Russian officials with their American counterpart, in the hope of arranging coexistence between them.
