The revolution, any revolution, assumes that by toppling the existing regime, it can topple the entire status quo. To be sure, the regime is often the source, architect, and executor of the status quo. And the more tyrannical a regime is, and the more it is integrating and controlling of the various levels of social existence, the broader and deeper the status quo needing change is. In this sense, the Syrian revolution did not deviate from that general principle, while fighting against a quasi-totalitarian regime that has forcibly seized most of the aspects of life and of its regeneration in Syria. But now, or rather, for a few months now, the situation has started to change. For several reasons, both internal and external, analyzed by many Syrian and non-Syrian writers and analysts, the situation in Syria did not evolve into a revolutionary form that gradually gains power and territory versus a regime that gradually loses power and territory. By contrast, the situation evolved into a place where there is multiplicity and conflict in the centers of power and sovereignty over territory, among the regime, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the radical Islamic groups, which are many and often conflicting, and the Kurdish factions. Thus, the revolution now faces, all at once, the regime's security force inherited from yesteryear, and its societal, political, and security weakness emerging at present. One might say, within these parameters, that the revolution became no longer a revolution when the regime became no longer a regime that alone had control over making reality and facts. An image like this radically and fundamentally changes the nature of the revolution and the tasks before it, because it places it at odds with all the forces that share power and territory, and not just the regime. Even if the task of toppling the regime were accomplished, a sine qua non for any change, the revolution, if the situation remains the same, would still be fighting other enemies controlling key parts of power and territory. Since most of these have their own religious, sectarian, or ethnic lines, it is now settled that the "civil war" has overtaken the "revolution" inside the component of violence shared between them. Needless to say, even in pure military and technical calculations, it is extremely unlikely that the revolution will triumph. Indeed, the revolution could not settle the military conflict with the regime alone, albeit it is certain that the support of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah for Bashar al-Assad has played a role in bringing about this outcome, complementing the role played by the measly assistance given to the revolution. But it remains that these two factors cannot conceal the fact that the regime has demonstrated real abilities, whether in terms of its reliance on the support of a certain communal bond, or in terms of its ability to maintain the unity of the basic body of its oppressive apparatuses. If this pans out, then it would be correct to say that defeating the regime, and at the same time the Islamic forces, especially that they have now been allowed to grow and boost their ranks with foreign fighters, is now almost impossible. This is the tragedy of Syria and our tragedy in the Arab Levant. Yassin Haj Saleh posted a message on his Facebook page, bidding Syria farewell "temporarily," and announcing he would be leaving. Haj Saleh is not only one of the brightest Syrian and Arab writers, but is also the closest to being the ideologue of the Syrian revolution, who follows its developments and critiques its failures, and is one of the conscientious voices in conveying the suffering and desires of the Syrians. The victory of the revolution is what would have put the best of Syria's sons and daughters, including Saleh of course, in the positions of deciding the future of their country and their people. But when Haj Saleh is forced to leave, then this means, regrettably, that Syria will not be a place fit to live in. Therefore, it is very doubtful that the farewell will remain temporary.
