The Tunisian Ennahda Movement succumbed to the pressures of the street and accepted to step down from the troika government when it no longer had many options and all there was left to do was face the anger on the street or contain it with the least amount of losses. It realized that the virus of rebellion was able to infiltrate the Tunisian scene and that its treatment required a strong dosage of self-criticism. In light of the Egyptian experience, half a loss is better when it is impossible to offer mutual concessions at the right time. And just like the spring started in Tunisia and provoked an earthquake that shook the forts, its aftershocks came from Egypt through the same channels that spread the infection. In political chemistry, the interaction is the same in nature, considering it is affected by any tremor that occurs along the same fault line and at the same time. But going to a dentist to remove an aching tooth without anesthesia is much better than coexisting with a chronic headache that could expand to other parts of the body. There is a common point between the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences, i.e. the fact that the gains achieved by the Islamic movements while in the opposition ranks through protests and polarization, were not preserved when these same movements reached a position of responsibility. This is not only due to the size of the problems or the constraints imposed by the economic and social situations, but also to the mix-up between the wager on meeting urgent expectations directly related to the people's lives, and the presumption surrounding the building of societies with different values and moral standards, which could be used to impact the people when facing the disappointments of the revolting economic and social reality. But the culture of protests, which paved the way before the Islamic movements' assumption to power, is now being prohibited to others. It is just like someone who climbs up the stairs of the authority's hierarchy, then throws it away to prevent others from using it. The reason behind the predicament of the Islamic movements is that they do not welcome protests, thus describing them as being opposed to the revolution and reform. Hence, the oppression with which tyrannical regimes faced the crowds of demonstrators becomes permissible, even wanted, under the pretext of protecting the revolution, although the shape and nature of this oppression is one and the same in the face of peaceful protests. For example, the price rise that triggered blasts in many Arab countries is not dealt with as a mere urgent measure dictated by economic and financial circumstances, but as an order that should be respected because the government which ratified it has Islamic tendencies. The same applies to other similar cases related to freedom, creativity, and the limits of criticism, considering that in the state of the Islamists, there are red lines that cannot be approached. The Tunisian Ennahda movement realized that time was not in favor of its stay in power without popular support, and that the protests demanding the ousting of the executive power and the formation of a technocratic government of competencies that would supervise the upcoming elections could expand beyond the governmental ceiling and snowball in light of the open confrontations. And although it wanted to resign while preserving the Constituent Assembly assigned to draw up the constitution, an exit maintaining equal opportunities between all the partners in the next elections would be better than taking a risk to hold on to power. What is new at the level of the troika's resignation is the fact that it was partly provoked by the pressures of international financial institutions, which asked that the requirements of stability be secured. This situation might have also been linked to the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, without seeing the overwhelming wave of anger which erupted in Sudan against a government considered to be affiliated with the Islamic movements. Among the positive consequences of the Arab spring is that it eliminated the culture of surrender and submission to the fait accompli. On the other hand, it placed a high ceiling before the governments and the competing parties. And what is seen today in terms of angry reactions towards the Islamists' management of the state affairs has become an example for what awaits others. The difference might be related to the ideological references or tendencies favoring monopolization and absolute control, outside the context of the political game demarcated by the rules of plurality. But more importantly, a major change has occurred at the level of the Arab societies' structures, after they discovered the enchantment of the street but have not yet tasted the rational management of public affairs. Against the backdrop of the Arab spring, the results of the ballot boxes tilted in favor the Islamic movements, just as it happens when testing headache medications. However, they can be impacted by any new development, and legitimate administration might be enhanced by the assessment of the various experiences. In old democracies, protesting enjoys a voluntary dimension, seeing how electoral votes have an impact, through acclaim, sanctioning, or rejection. This is how the maturity and viability of experiences can be measured in the context of normal power transition, just like the laws of life are based on competition and freedom of choice.
