What if we wake up to the news of American or Western missiles raining down on sensitive installations of the Syrian regime? How would the regime respond, after it warned yesterday that any American attack would lead to a "ball of fire that would inflame the Middle East?" What options does Damascus have in this regard? Will it fire rockets on Israel? What if the Jewish state then responded by targeting the backbone of the regime, namely, the Republican Guard and the fourth armored division? Will Damascus respond by expanding the conflict, for example by launching rockets towards NATO-member Turkey or Jordan? Can Damascus cope with the repercussions of such actions? What would Iran do if American missiles start raining down on Syrian targets? Will Hezbollah, who is implicated in the Syrian fire, launch rockets against Israel, and can it currently fight a battle of this kind? Will an unknown-yet-known organization suddenly come to life, and target the UN forces operating in south Lebanon? Can Russia do more than denounce and warn against the ‘historical mistake,' and obstruct it at the UN Security Council? Just days before, such questions were not on the table; nor were they allowed to be asked. But the Syrian crisis has no doubt entered a new, different phase. It is no exaggeration to say that what comes after the chemical attack will not be like what prevailed before it. Any observer following up this crisis realizes that the images of children's corpses in Ghouta, which made the world's TV and newspaper headlines, have opened the most dangerous and terrifying page yet of the Syrian crisis. The best evidence of the crucial nature of the current phase is that Syria has agreed to allow UN inspectors to go to the stricken area, sparing Minister Walid al-Moallem, after the telephone conversation with his U.S. counterpart, John Kerry, from committing the same mistake of Tariq Aziz, on the orders of Saddam Hussein, during his famous meeting with James Baker. Before the chemical attack, the world coexisted with the open-ended massacre in Syria. The capitals of the West coexisted with scenes of destruction, mobile massacres, and falling explosive barrels. These capitals found reasons to justify their reluctance and aversion to becoming implicated in the Syrian fire. Owing to the regime's cunningness, the revolution was transformed into a quasi-civil war. The Nusra Front then gave Barack Obama and Western leaders a precious gift, as they could now say: "We do not want to topple Assad to hand Syria over to the students of al-Qaeda." Western capitals would not even deliver on what they promised, arguing that the weapons may fall into the wrong hands. Let us leave aside the Russian-Chinese solid wall at the Security Council. Western public opinion was not ready to accept for Western governments to become involved in military action on Syrian territory, especially as it was impossible to get approval for this at the Security Council. But when pictures of the so-called ‘chemical massacre' were published, the Syrian crisis returned once more to the forefront, after events from Egypt had stolen the limelight. An event occurred that Western leaders could not tolerate. Obama could not consider the use of chemical weapons a non-event, especially as it took place exactly one year after he spoke about ‘red lines.' The same goes for Cameron, Hollande, and many other leaders. The announcement by Doctors Without Borders reverberated strongly around the world. The organization confirmed that 355 people had died, after showing symptoms of poisoning by ‘nerve agents,' and spoke about thousands others hurt. That chemical weapons had been used was no longer in doubt. Even Iranian President Hassan Rohani expressed his regret for the death of innocents from ‘chemical agents.' Washington, London, and Paris are acting on the grounds that "the Syrian regime has something to hide," and that it is "almost certain" that the regime had used chemical weapons. These capitals did not take the regime's claims that the opposition had used the chemical weapons seriously. If the inspectors' findings corroborate these capitals' suspicions and reports, the Syrian regime will find itself in a similar position as that of the regime of Saddam Hussein previously. The question of its chemical weapons arsenal will be out in the open, and there will be calls for it to be subjected to inspection. The regime will be forced to begin a series of concessions or face military strikes. The position of the Syrian regime after the massacre in Ghouta cannot be like its position before it. Russia itself cannot act as though the massacre did not happen. Israel near the theatre of events will have to revise its calculations. Nothing indicates that we are on our way to witness a ground-based military intervention in Syria. But what is certain is that the world will move in to put its hands on this issue. Punishment will be certain if it is proven that the regime had used its chemical arsenal. Most likely, the goal of the punishment will be to drag the regime to the negotiating table, to agree to what it hitherto refused merely the hint of. It is for this reason that the Kosovo option and the Dayton Agreement are being recalled. It will be difficult for Russia to behave after the chemical attack in the manner it behaved before it, unless it does not object to the creation of a ‘state for minorities' over a part of Syria, something that Putin alluded to and warned against during his meeting with a high-level Arab official.
