Let's leave politeness aside for a moment. Let us not cover wounds with handkerchiefs, or stabs with wishful thinking. The Syrian tragedy has severed the Lebanese equation, from vein to vein. We have not seen a rupture of this depth since the birth of independent Lebanon. The previous punctures were different, and less severe and dangerous. Stable Syria had the ability to rein in suicidal tendencies in Lebanon, even if it fueled them at times to charge exorbitant fees to curb them later. Today, we are witnessing an unprecedented internal fragmentation compounded by the Syrian fragmentation that is open to all sorts of hazards. It did not happen before that the two major communities of Lebanon sailed in completely opposite directions to the extent that we see today, amid a complete absence of internal and regional safety valves. These days, Sunnis and Shiites live on the verge of strife to the tune of conflicts beyond Lebanon's border, unfolding over a theater that spans the entire region, which is also seeing a collapse in coexistence and national borders. The divide is real and profound. One can easily learn the sect of the speaker when the topic is Yemen, Bahrain, or Iraq. If the topic is Syria, it is impossible for the speaker to control his feelings and conceal his justifications, no matter how hard he tries to portray himself as an observer or analyst. Moreover, it is not a healthy sign for a country to possess this massive arsenal of strategic analysts, especially those who sanction massacres, whether by the regime or its opponents. Let's leave politeness aside. When fire broke out in Syria, each sect sailed in a different direction, regardless of the course of events. Sunnis in Sidon felt closer to Sunnis in Homs than to Shiites living in Haret Saida a few hundred meters away. The residents of Haret Saida felt closer to Alawites in Syria than to their Sunni neighbors in the city where they were born and grew up. The residents of Tariq al-Jdideh in Beirut felt they are closer to the residents of Rastan in Syria than to the residents of Beirut's southern suburbs several hundred meters away. Sunnis felt that the revolution in Syria was their own, and Shiites felt the regime there was their own. Each side felt that the war was their war, and that its outcome would determine their position, and affect their safety and security. Passions washed away the lines delineating the Lebanese-Syrian border. The Lebanese institutions appeared weak and obsolete. This climate was further compounded by the presence of a government that the majority of Sunnis deemed to be the others' government, because it was established after excluding their foremost leader, Saad Hariri. The majority of Sunnis deemed this government to be the government of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the foremost leader of his community. Lebanon is paying the price of the exclusion of its moderate Sunni leadership. It is in such a climate that a young man from north Lebanon crossed into Syria to fight in the revolution, and it is in this climate that a young man from the Bekaa went to Syria to fight against the conspiracy. Things went even further when Hezbollah officially acknowledged its involvement in the war on Syrian territory. This came as no surprise to those who knew the depth of the ties between Hezbollah and the Syrian regime, and the role Nasrallah played in solidifying the Syrian-Iranian alliance, especially in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. As the actors bided their time, waiting for the outcome of the war in Syria – which is a protracted conflict different from what has happened in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, because of the actual focal point of the regime in Syria – what was left of the Lebanese state crumbled, sending institutions and the lives of the Lebanese into the hands of impotence, fragmentation, and vacuum. Thus, Lebanon started ticking off the conditions for ‘Iraqization' one by one, making terrifyingly astounding progress in recent days. This happened with the brutal terrorist crime that targeted the southern suburbs of Beirut; with Hezbollah's response, vowing to wage open-ended war with the takfiris and merging the Lebanese arena with the Syrian arena, after the borders collapsed; with the meager amount of cards held by the Lebanese president and the meager capabilities of the Lebanese army, in a country whose equations and institutions have been shred to pieces; and with the prevalence of fear brought about by car bombs. In light of all this, it becomes the right of the Lebanese to fear that Beirut may be following in Baghdad's footsteps. This is of course while bearing in mind that those who delude themselves into thinking that they will emerge victorious from the Lebanese season of ‘Iraqization' are making a grave mistake. Indeed, the Iraqization of Lebanon only begets losers. Pity Lebanon; a strong Syria vexes it, and a Syria blooded by reprisals kills it. Its equations have been torn asunder, and divorce between Sunnis and Shiites is looming. Pity the Christians in Lebanon. Iraqization may speed up their uprooting. The waves in the region are mighty, and their leaders are only trained on swimming in local ponds. If they had an exceptional leader with vision and credibility outside his sect, he would have at least been able to object to or delay Iraqization. I advise the man who will be upset by these words to fire his advisers.
