Moroccan Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane could breach the ranks of the opposition, or at least draw one or more political parties into what is left of the government coalition, in order to secure a parliamentary majority and compensate for the withdrawal of the Istiqlal Party. He could also, with a certain amount of understanding and concession, ensure the normal continued activity of a minority government, in the case where it would be supported by one or more political parties, without the need for the latter to hold any ministerial portfolios. This is especially since he has some experience in this respect, as his Justice and Development Party (PJD) has supported the government of former Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi without participating in it. Because politics always copies itself, the Islamist party led by Benkirane today had recognized the opposition to Youssoufi's government, without this resulting in any discontent or complaints. Thus its stance following the withdrawal of the Istiqlal Party is a baffling one, except within the framework of having caused the collapse of the majority without giving its leader the opportunity to catch his breath, having to look for a new ally from among political parties with which he never thought a time would come when he would be forced to become allies. Indeed, he has no option but to yield in order to emerge from his predicament, or hand in his resignation and call for anticipated elections. The root of the predicament is that the formation of this government coalition, which had included the PJD, the Istiqlal Party, the People's Movement and the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), had been dictated by certain considerations. The most prominent among these was the fact that no individual political party or coalition had won an absolute majority in the last legislative elections, while the constitution makes the selection of the Prime Minister contingent on affiliation to the political party in the lead, leaving to the latter the freedom to choose its allies in such a way as to secure a majority that would approve of the program it intends to implement. Yet those basic principles clash with a certain political reality in terms of theory and practice. And when an ally like the Istiqlal Party complains that this government's experience has been characterized by attempts to impose the hegemony of one party in particular, regardless of how true this might be, it reflects on the kind of fears that would arise if any one party were to manage to win the majority. Giving the issue a sense of urgency is the fact that the blame directed at Morocco's PJD has coincided with unrest in the Arab street regarding the rule of Islamists in the countries of the so-called Arab Spring. In other words, the problem goes beyond the framework of monopolizing the management of the state, which is the prerogative of any government, to that of imposing partisan views which go against the practices of pluralism that allow for differences without exclusion. Yet the Prime Minister frames the problem in a different way, considering lobbies opposed to plans of a war on corruption and the consecration of change to be moving behind the scenes to place obstacles before the experience of the current government. Inasmuch as political parties that were long part of the opposition refuse to be characterized in such a way, Benkirane has made sure to obtain a stance supporting him from his party's National Council, so as for it not to be said that he would give preference to maintaining the government over his party's commitments and stances, or at least so as to base himself on political support that would spare him from being characterized as monopolizing decision-making. There is yet another development that involves the participation of the PJD's two allies, the People's Movement and the PPS, in the course of expected negotiations, so that they may fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Istiqlal Party. In fact, had the Prime Minister resorted to such an approach before having reached this dead-end predicament, it would have been possible for him to contain or absorb the emerging crisis with the Istiqlal Party. Indeed, he had never responded to the memo in which the latter had demanded modifications to the government cabinet, and the few attempts at mediation had failed to bridge the gap between the two parties, both of which share the same general frame of reference. Indeed, the Istiqlal Party had, before the growth of the phenomenon of political Islam, long claimed to have an Islamic frame of reference. In fact, some of the similarities in their roles and bases may well have had an impact on inflaming the disputes that have led to this state of rupture. Yet more importantly, the Prime Minister, who had turned a deaf ear to demands for a cabinet modification that would have been much more focused on the ministers of the Istiqlal Party than on others, seems today forced to engage in a much greater modification. And it would be out of the question for any political party to accept to compensate for the Istiqlal Party within the government coalition with a lesser share than it had been asking for. Indeed, the ceiling has been raised in proportion to the size of the crisis. Thus, after the Prime Minister had held sway over the field in terms of formulating the mechanisms of supply and demand, he is today forced to emerge from this dark tunnel whatever the losses. And after developments had been playing out in his party's favor, with the backdrop of the repercussions of the Arab Spring, the control of partners with the same frame of reference on government, and a phenomenon of amazement that left no opportunity to catch one's breath, the equation has now changed. It is quite certain that if Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi had not been deposed, the withdrawal of the Istiqlal Party would not have resulted in doing away with its commitments within the Benkirane government. Indeed, there is a connection in the way the rule of Islamists is viewed. Thus, despite the difference between the experiences of Egypt and Morocco, seeing as the former had sought to build the state while the latter had wagered on developing existing state structures, contagion always takes the direction of phenomena with excessive sensitivity, most prominently all those connected to interpretations about religion and state. But politics does not always leave one the freedom to decide, especially when it is a matter of seeking one's own survival.
