Israel's rush to link the explosion crime in the Southern Suburb of Beirut to what it dubbed "the Sunni-Shiite conflict" sets off suspicions regarding the Hebrew state's wish to fuel the sectarian tensions in Lebanon and raises doubts about its desire to "Iraqize" this country. Moreover, the promotion of the Israeli concerns over the possible collapse of the Jordanian regime could reveal the horrific scenarios of anarchy being concocted for the region. Is Israel innocent from what happened in Bi'r al-Abed? It is worried about Sinai and Jordan and mobilized in the Golan, but in light of all the killing waves in the region, it is reassured about its border and watching – after it tackled the possibility of seeing wide-scale war with the Islamists – the new leaders produced by the Arab spring. Would it harm Israel if Hezbollah were to drown in the Syrian blood swamp and if the conflict between the regime in Damascus and the Takfiri groups accused of following Al-Qaeda's ideology were to extend for a longer period of time? Would it harm Israel if the party's involvement triggers sectarian strife in Lebanon and transfers the war with the Takfiris to it, thus forcing Hezbollah to focus on this fight and stop supporting President Bashar al-Assad's regime, consequently causing its collapse after all this destruction? Would it bother Israel to seize what it perceives as being a golden opportunity represented by the Jordanian option, thus promoting the faltering of the Hashemite Kingdom after having completely undermined the two-state solution with Palestine? Would its high morals and commitment to the Camp David Accords prevent it from attacking Sinai that is suffering from the mayhem caused by the gangs and Jihadists and the inability of the Egyptian army to eradicate them? The explosion crime in the Southern Suburb of Beirut is not the only one provoking numerous questions which may generate fear. But at the end of the day, it might shed light on the allocation of the roles between Israel and the West, in parallel to the massive earthquake sweeping the region, the instigation through statements and the planting of mines of mutual suspicions between the parties fighting on the arenas of the Arab spring. And while Lebanon has become an arena prone to host the excess rounds of the confrontation with the Takfiris, it is also the loose element on the outskirts of the destructive war in Syria. And as soon as Hezbollah recognized its intervention in it, the talk about the dissociation policy dissipated and all the Lebanese became besieged by the unknown. What is constant however is that while they all agree over the rejection of the targeting of whichever Lebanese region with Grad missiles or booby-trapped cars, they are aware that Hezbollah alone holds the keys of salvation from Lebanon's possible dissolution, after the country was tied to the course of war to enhance Al-Assad's regime steadfastness. In reality, the core of the chronic predicament affecting the Lebanese is still the rescuing of their remaining state institutions, at a time when the speculations surrounding Syria's division are provoking other presumptions related to another Lebanon whose map is not yet drawn and whose collapse into the abyss of strife is yet to be determined. It is strife because the Syrian war has removed all the windows and doors of the neighbor, and because the defense of Al-Assad's regime under the headline of the Alawites' interests and rights has deepened division in Lebanon. Indeed, the "rifle of the resistance has shifted," as it was stated by head of the National Struggle Front Deputy Walid Jumblatt, who also harshly criticized the March 14 camp after it raised the ceiling of escalation extremely high. Following the series of warnings against vacuum inside the institutions and the mourning of these institutions, the nightmare of security mayhem and mobile clashes is emerging. Nevertheless, if the booby-trapped car in the Southern Suburb was the last alarm bell placing Lebanon before the costly possibilities of the bloody Syrian and Iraqi scenes, what is certain is that a small window is still available for Hezbollah to resume a dialogue extending beyond the complications of the governmental shares, appointments and even the system of governance, and solely focusing on the salvation of the entity from the flames of the Syrian war and the conflicts of the superpowers. And regardless of the divergence affecting the calculations of the March 8 and March 14 forces – or their remnants – most of them are likely aware of the fact that the post-July war and post-May 7 calculations have collapsed to the beat of the earthquakes in the region, and that all the fundamental tendencies will merely shorten the distance towards the fire of strife. If this happens, rounding the corners to get a big share in the government and practicing outsmarting while linking Lebanon's fate to the epic cosmic confrontation between the major projects will not do any good. But will Hezbollah manage to undertake the salvation task if it wants to?
