During the era of the great Arab turmoil, a number of writers are looking for the starting point of an Arab intellectual and cultural renaissance project, which they are hoping would accompany the deep political change witnessed in our countries. Some are drawing their references from Arab-Islamic heritage, whether religious, philosophical, or literary. But others believe that this heritage has already fulfilled its purpose, and was understood and surpassed by Western ideological schools that should be adopted and followed. And there are others who believe there should be a consensual solution – as it is customary in such cases – to take from the West what goes in line with our values and civilization, and use it to produce a cognitive baggage suitable for our environment and circumstances. Oftentimes, the discussion seems to be without a context and without a clear goal. And ever since the central question of Arab renaissance was put forward in the 19th Century, i.e. “why did the West move forward while the Arabs headed backward?" the answers have been revolving in a vicious circle. At this point, rationalism emerges as a readymade recipe to exit the predicament of Arab political thought, far away from its limitations and historical introductions – especially based on the European-Western model and the complicated course of Western political philosophy, its ties with the social and economic conflicts, and the transition from one era to another and from one trend to another. Names from our heritage are thus thrown on the table, such as that of Ibn Rushd, in order to show that Arab-Islamic thought can draw solutions from our culture. And from time to time, someone affirms that rationalism which leads to democracy is the best way to end the ongoing Arab backwardness. But there is a great flaw affecting the latter proposal, as rationalism requires the minimum level of consideration of the current circumstances of Arab societies, their material and spiritual needs, their hopes and aspirations, and the extent of the compatibility of capabilities with major plans and rosy dreams. The experiences in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, i.e. the states which accomplished palpable steps to get rid of tyranny, reveal that reality is much more complicated than ideals, while the arrival of the forces of political Islam to power in Egypt and Tunisia for example confirms that history prefers to adopt devious paths. It is as though there was no escaping Muhammad Morsi's arrival to the presidency and seeing the Tunisian Ennahda Movement control power. But these cases, and despite all the media commotion accompanying them, are similar to huge statues on a base of clay. At this level, the fierce resistance with which the Egyptian and Tunisian societies are countering the attempts to impose a certain behavior and culture on them reveals that political Islam represented by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) did not carry the solution which was heralded for a long time and that the flaw is not limited to the presence of remnants trying to sabotage the Brotherhood's arrival to power. Indeed, the issue is much deeper than that and involves the MB's inability to convince wide Egyptian and Tunisian factions of its ability to represent them, achieve their interests and defend their rights. In any case, the MB is a mere version of the “vanguard party" in a system where the identity of the community replaces the pluralistic community. This reality leads us back to square one, which is lost in reform projects. The current constant principles of Arab culture and the attempts to explore the Arab social structures with traditional ideological tools are useless, just as it is pointless to replace an ideological certainty with a metaphysical one. Hence, the road leading towards an awareness, a discourse and a culture that are in line with the reality of Arab societies might be long, but as it was clearly revealed by the Arab revolutions, the action of the people precedes the movement of the ideas they carry.
