The fact that Egypt enjoys a special geopolitical position is a constant principle in regional and international calculations. But for it to play the role reflecting that position, it involves numerous other calculations. And no matter how hard President Muhammad Morsi tries – at the level of his speeches, positions and statements – to give the impression that his country is reinstating its leading role in the Middle East and Africa, he has a long way ahead of him, in which calm or hard-line statements and speeches are not enough. Ever since his stand before the conference of Non-Aligned States until his last speech in New York, many speculations and opinions anticipated Cairo's regaining of its role, which became gradually non-existent during the last three decades. Nonetheless, it would be illogical to go far back in recollecting ancient history. It would even be wrong to push the controversy surrounding Egypt's so-called “regaining" of its traditional role in the Middle East and Africa– especially the northern part of the continent – to its Islamic circle, and then to the wider circle in the context of international order. What would be more logical would be to seek a new role it could play, in a way going in line with its Arab and African position and its status on the international political arena. Indeed, its known historical role is long gone, as it was imposed by times and a regional and international order that are falling into oblivion by the day. The map, circumstances, relations and interests have now changed, and the states are no longer setting their pace to the beat of the fight between the superpowers, and certainly not in accordance with the position of the Movement of Non-Aligned States. New concepts have thus emerged on the rubble of the Cold War on the political, security and economic levels, while the principles of sovereignty, the laws of trade, the movement of individuals and capitals have changed in light of globalization, free trade, the information revolution and the evolution of the principle of international justice among many other things which did not exist at the end of the twentieth century. Before looking at the wider picture around the world and tackling general issues, it would be enough for President Morsi to check the new map of the region and the circumstances on the Egyptian domestic arena. Based on that, he should seek a new role taking into account a roadmap featuring an intricate network of interests, relations and alliances that is induced by the new political climate, and is further complicated by the repercussions of the Arab spring and what it imposed in terms of drastic change at the level of the strategies of near and distant powers. In light of this map, it would not be easy for Cairo – for example – to play the role it used to play in the region and which is now being undertaken by Turkey and Iran. Today, Egypt will not be able to rely on a strategy to lead the region extending from northern Africa to the Iraqi border. Indeed, it was preceded by Turkey, which built a wide network of commercial and economic relations with most of its neighbors and did not leave one crisis without interfering in it, from Somalia to Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and certainly Palestine. This did not come from vacuum, as Turkey relied on many years of development, which allowed its economy to occupy an advanced position among the economies of the world. Moreover, it enhanced its democratic experience, adopted legal and constitutional amendments that were also imposed by its candidacy to access the European Union, and carried out wide-scale modernization in all sectors. Consequently, Ankara became involved in all the affairs of the region, instead of its permanent isolation and preoccupation with domestic conflicts and troubles. Despite this expansion, and especially in light of the Syrian crisis and the regional and international “skirmishes" surrounding it, Turkey appears to be unable to move forward in proving its ability to exploit all this credit it built throughout the past years. At this level, its relations with Iran are not as friendly as depicted by the rosy pictures. On the other hand, Ankara's relations with Baghdad and Damascus need not be described, as well as its relations with Tel Aviv following the attack on Marmara. If this is the status of Turkey, which enjoys all the requirements to play such a regional role, how will President Morsi be able to accomplish what Recep Tayyip Erdogan failed to do? As for the talk about Iran, it is a completely different story, as it is not enough for President Morsi to sit between Guide Ali Khameni and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during the Tehran non-alignment summit, and it is not enough for him to announce that he and his administration want normal relations with the entire region, including the Islamic Republic. True, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood flirted with Tehran for a long time under President Hosni Mubarak's regime, while the two parties had a common stand in supporting Hamas in Gaza. Still, there are facts and calculations that cannot be neglected when heading towards normal relations between Cairo and Tehran, the first and most important of which being the completely opposite positions of the two capitals vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis. Indeed, one is supporting the regime with money and elements and holding on to President Al-Assad, while the second cannot disregard what the regime's oppositionists are facing, at the head of whom are the MB elements and the Sunnis in general. The second reality is that Egypt is concerned about Arab security, namely the security of the Gulf and its states, as it needs the aid provided to it via the oil revenues offered by states in the Gulf Cooperation Council and a large Egyptian Diaspora working within their various circles and sectors. In light of this reality, it cannot stand idle at the level of the ongoing conflict between these states and Iran, and cannot – no matter how long this situation lasts – ignore Tehran's annexation of Baghdad to it and the flaw this is causing to the principle of Gulf security and Arab security in general. Moreover, it cannot disregard the role played by its tyrant ally Hezbollah in Lebanon, or remain silent vis-à-vis the “playing" seen on the Yemeni arena, in both the north and the south. In light of these facts, it would be difficult to talk about normalcy and parity at the level of the relations, or about the emergence of an alliance or an understanding between the two countries in the absence of any power balance. And while the Islamic Republic invested in a wide network of relations within the Arab region and accumulated a large capital of alliances and ties throughout thirty years, how will Egypt be able to compete with it within record time? The third reality is that Egypt, which practiced its leading role in the Arab world throughout the past years, relied on a trio that included – in addition to it – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Syria. At this level, there is no need to recall what happened to this trio, from the fall of Iraq and then Syria in the Iranian axis, to the attempts of the Kingdom and its sisters in the GCC to fill the vacuum caused by the Arab absence from the new regional map. As for the talk about the relations with Israel and the peace agreement, it does not require any explanation, while it would be useless to say that the conflict inside and on Syria is giving the superpowers the upper hand over the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Turkey, as well as over the Islamic Republic! If Cairo's attempts to seek a new role in the region - going in line with its status and position - are facing this complex map of powers and interests, then the internal map in Egypt is causing challenges that are no less important in determining the new role of the regime. Naturally, and before relying on President Morsi's speeches, one should ask him about his vision for his country's new role and about the tools which will help achieve that vision, especially on the political, military and economic levels. This question is also asked to his group, knowing that a quick look at the Brotherhood's policy since the beginning of the revolution and until this day would be enough to deduce there is no such vision. Moreover, asking a few questions would suffice to reach that same conclusion. They are questions prompted by the recent developments, and include: What happened to the slogan “Islam is the solution"? What “Islam" is the solution? Is it the Islam of the extremist forces in the Sinai desert, those who baffled the Muslim Brotherhood when they decided to express their anger in front of the American embassy among other Western institutions, or the Jihadists, Takfiris and Salafi groups without the alliance with whom President Morsi knows he would never have come to power? All of this leads to the following question: Can his regime fight all the latter as his “brothers" are doing in Libya and Tunisia? What about the position of the military institution, the cornerstone of any strategy or vision? Since the days of the revolution and until not too long ago, a lot was said about understandings to divide power between the new president and the military council. But eventually, Morsi ousted the head of the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces, the defense minister and the chief of staff, thus eliminating more than half a century of military role at the level of the domestic and external decision-making process. As for the conflict over the constitution, it is now witnessing its most difficult days, ever since the callers for a civil state lost the “constitution first" battle before the elections for which the Muslim Brotherhood pushed in agreement with the military council, to the battle over the constitutional principles, the collapse of Al-Selmi's document and the last constitutional committee in which the Brotherhood wishes to monopolize the drafting of the new constitution. This happened at a time when prior to the changes which affected the army, the Brotherhood kept repeating that the constitution will reflect national consensus, far away from the prevalence of any party or power. This dual rhetoric on the domestic arena was accompanied by confusion at the level of foreign policy, one which was revealed by the wrath expressed by the Egyptian street against the offensive film. Consequently, the Americans and the Europeans learned from this wrath and the battle over the constitution that Cairo's approach differed from what it had pledged at the beginning, that the promises it made were similar to the ones it made to its partners in the revolution, and that it will eventually succumb to the pressures of the Salafis. Following this political and security confusion, how could Congress not obstruct the aid offered to Cairo? How can the World Bank alleviate its conditions? Who will encourage the investors to come to the country? The economic situation is growing increasingly complicated and the unemployment rates are on the rise. Moreover, day after day, the number of people taking to the squares to call on the group to implement its promises is increasing. Economy is the primary implementation tool for any vision and defines any role played by Egypt today. The economy is the first and last voter, so will Morsi and his group persist for long?
