Today, the region is coping with the aftereffects of two violent quakes that have toppled regimes and upset balances of power, unleashing winds for freedom and change, but also fragmentation and internal strife. The first quake took place when the U.S. military machine, ten years ago, overpowered the regime of Saddam Hussein. The second was brought about by the “Arab Spring," which affected a number of countries in the region. The two quakes have eroded the foundations of security and stability that existed before. They pushed the region into a transitional phase where dreams combine with illusions, and where competition is fierce between the advocates of the secular state and those of the religious state. In March, one decade ago, the administration of George W. Bush took on the risk of invading Iraq, which led to seismic changes in the region. Washington was not able to manage the process of change in the theater of its operations, or the consequences of removing the Iraqi section of the Arab security wall. Observers can note a number of changes: - The occupation's dismantlement of Iraqi state institutions, especially the military and security services, led to the escalation of resistance amid regional desires to derail the invasion, for fear of a democratic pro-Western Iraq that could influence neighboring countries in that direction. The political process that followed the invasion led to the emergence of a federal Iraq, which laid the constitutional and legal foundations for the Iraqi Kurdistan region. This move has had effects that went beyond the Kurdish minorities scattered in the region, to tickle the fancies of other minorities there. The political process also led to a sectarian power-sharing system, where the imbalance has contributed to inflaming Sunni-Shia strife and facilitated the return of al-Qaeda to areas it had been driven out of. - The invasion realized an old Iranian dream that Iran could not achieve during its long war with Iraq, which is the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the infiltration of decision-making positions in Baghdad. Iran dealt very cunningly with the invasion even before it occurred, and secretly took the decision to thwart it. Yet Iranian support for the militias fighting against the Americans did not prevent Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from visiting the “Green Zone," a symbol of the U.S. occupation. The ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime upset the balance of power in Iran's favor, and granted it what could be termed the golden years that also saw the July War in Lebanon and the Gaza War. One can say that these golden years suffered a huge setback when the Muslim Brotherhood flavor of the “Arab Spring" became all the more palpable, and Sunni-Shia tension escalated further – especially following the eruption of the Syrian revolution, and the Iranian position on it which inflamed Sunni hostility, becoming a solid wall that stood in the way of Iran's plans in the region. - Syria panicked when it saw the U.S. Army stationed at its border, after uprooting the rival Baath branch and the statutes of its president. Syria, in agreement with Iran, resolved to thwart the U.S. invasion, and facilitated the passage of jihadists and al-Qaeda fighters to Iraq. This alliance between Damascus and Tehran on the field grew deeper and stronger, after Syria was forced to pull out its troops from Lebanon in the wake of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, while Syrian influence in this country now passed via Hezbollah. The July War in 2006 muddied the waters, and gave Iran decisive advantage within its alliance with Syria. This alliance prevented all non-subservient governments in Lebanon from finding stability. The same war introduced Iranian missiles into the Israel security equation, and reminded the U.S. and Western powers that Iran was now able to influence the two most important issues in the region, namely, the security of oil supplies and the security of Israel. The fierce and open-ended confrontation in Syria has become the equivalent of a quake that threatens the Syrian regime, and also the gains made by Iran as a result of the first quake, in terms of its presence along the Mediterranean, not to mention the possible repercussions on the situation in Iraq itself. The second quake is threatening the gains of the golden years for Iran, which cannot afford to lose its role at a time when the world is constantly reminding the Islamic Republic that the nuclear bomb is a red line. Iran is living between the aftereffects of two quakes. But one can also say that the entire region is nearly in the same situation.
