In the region between Egypt and Iraq, there are several revolutions unfolding, but within which many layers can be identified. There is yearning for freedom, justice and for getting rid of tyrannical regimes, most notably the Syrian regime. On the sidelines of these revolutions, there are demands for democracy and catching up with modernity, and at their core, aspirations for a vindictive tyranny that is meant to put its proponents at the helm of alternative regimes, and perhaps even civil wars that would subjugate others and those who are different. Yet there is also, in addition to all this, what one can call a Sunni revolution taking place, in conjunction with these revolutions and sometimes acting as their voice. We see this in Iraq, against a regime accused of being Shia-dominated and subservient to Iran, overlapping with legitimate demands and desperately pining for Saddam's era. We also see it in Syria, with the revolution inevitably taking on a sectarian identity in confronting an Alawi-dominated regime. Here, too, there is clear confusion between justice and rights, and a sectarian color that is becoming starker and starker, and ever more dangerous. We see the same also in Lebanon, with the desire to end the marginalization that has been inflicted on the Sunnis, in some cases taking on the form of physical liquidation. But we also see it as an unjust desire to unleash Salafis, who would destabilize Lebanon and unsettle its fragile configuration. And we see it in a special way in the Gaza Strip, where Sunnism has taken a detour away from the previous deviations [i.e. the alliance with Syria and Hezbollah], in order to realign itself with the “Brothers" in the same sect. Then in some sense, we see it in Jordan as well, where the clout of the Muslim Brotherhood is growing, under the slogan of reforming the electoral system, as well as the Islamists' pressure on a regime that has stumbled in its response so far. What is happening in the small Levant is encouraged by what is happening in Egypt, the country that has pushed the Muslim Brotherhood to the apex of power, without shortage of moral support from Tunisia (and Libya and Morocco.) This Sunni revolution has some of its roots also in the 1970s and 1980s, when Hafez al-Assad ascended to the presidency, the Iranian revolution triumphed, and Hezbollah was established. This was an overlapping Shiite revolution as well, with many currents and layers within its folds. What enhanced its image as a Shiite revolution was the accompanying decline of the Sunni centers of influence: Egypt was cast aside because of Camp David. Iraq was swallowed up by the Gulf War which Saddam Hussein had initiated with his usual stupidity. And the Palestinian revolution was deported by the Israeli invasion of 1982 to Tunisia. It is bad enough that the sectarian dimension is overshadowing all other dimensions of social and political existence, but this how things are in this part of the world. Yet the final verdict on the Sunni revolution, which is in reality many revolutions with varying national characteristics, will be determined by the political newborn that it will deliver. This raises possibilities that evocate an earlier historical period: When Europe made contact with the region, two Sunni voices emerged: One whose symbols extend from Khedive Ismail to Rafik Hariri through Nouri al-Saeed, and another that begins with Ahmed Orabi onto Gamal Abdel Nasser and then Saddam Hussein. It was the second voice that was louder in the 1950s and onwards, dashing the only possibility for stability in the nation-states that were the gift given to us by that contact with Europe. Back then, the curse came through Sunni hands that put “causes" ahead of countries, before that curse persisted, at least in the Asian Levant, with military officers from a minority community. Today, the final verdict on the Sunni revolution depends on its ability to resume what has been interrupted with the symbols of the first voice. So will its slogan be: March to the nation states; and will its conduct match this slogan?
