Lakhdar Brahimi's patience has extended much longer than the wait for the solution. He was subjected to fierce criticism for his delay in launching the promised initiative, and he waited for a long time while trying to convince those who should be convinced of what he recently and blatantly uncovered, thus provoking the disgruntlement of the regime in Damascus following campaigns which have been targeting him by many parties in the opposition's ranks. What is important is for him not to show patience at the level of Washington's and Moscow's support, one which was reiterated two days ago by William Burns and Gennadi Bogdanov in Geneva. Indeed, unless this support is translated into a clear backing for his vision or plan to stop the violence and build a transitional phase, his mission will be undermined and turned into a mere cover for the international inability or failure to stop the war madness and impose a settlement. Is this what he wants? Or will he ask to be relieved of his mission when he addresses the Security Council soon, unless there is some sort of a miracle and the big actors agree over a binding decision for the sides of the conflict? The United Nations-Arab envoy does not need to explain what has become known by the Americans, the Russians and all the other players, i.e. that it would be impossible for the two sides involved in the conflict to sit around the dialogue table. Indeed, not one political party from the domestic or external opposition movements dares engage in such an experience with the regime or accept a role by the president and his officials in the transitional phase. As for the regime, it is refusing to recognize the existence of the opposition to begin with, thus giving it all sorts of descriptions and attributes. But Brahimi, who clearly expressed the necessity of seeing the establishment of a government with full prerogatives, is not convinced that military settlement is the solution, even if the armed groups on the ground are making progress. He is not the only one aware of the fact that President Bashar al-Assad's regime is part of the crisis, or is even at its core, and cannot consequently be part of the solution. So far, the regional actors have been hiding behind the political initiatives and UN and Arab envoys, in order to conceal their inability to stop the war machine which has been ongoing for 22 months, or their reluctance to engage in a conflict while knowing in advance it involves two other major regional players, and that its outcome will determine not only the new balance of powers in Syria, but also throughout the region. This is at least what was and is still being expressed at the level of their concerns. The first among these concerns is the threatening of the frail stability in some neighboring states – from Turkey to Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq – and the repercussions this will have on the Gulf countries, along with Israel's northern border. The second concern is over the fate of the chemical weapons, so as not to tackle the uranium stocks if the Western media reports are true. As for the third concern, it is over Syria's possible fall in the hands of the extremist Islamic groups and the challenges this will raise at the level of the fate of the religious and ethnic minorities in Syria, as well as at the level of their future role and presence. This is the main concern voiced by the United States, Russia and many European and Arab countries. It has also become a common denominator in the positions of all the foreign players and the sides involved in the internal conflict, while it would not be an exaggeration to say that the delay in imposing a solution which would end the fight not only enhances the Al-Nusra Front influence, but also that of many extremist groups. As for the pictures and reports coming from the Taftanaz Airport, they are the best expression of the weight of these powers, as opposed to the attempts of some to downplay the importance of their influence and size. Moreover, these groups are not just passing by. When former American Secretary of State Colin Powell met with President al-Assad following the invasion of Iraq, he carried with him a series of known demands. At the time, Damascus was fearful about the arrival of the American troops to its border, and the Syrian president did not close the door in the face of those demands. He rather shut down what Damascus dubbed the media offices of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. During that visit, the American secretary asked the Syrian president why his government facilitated and was still facilitating the passage of large numbers of mujahedeen from northern Syria into Iraq to fight the American troops. Al-Assad said back then that these groups constituted a challenge and provoked concerns for his troops and security apparatuses. In addition, he was not required to block their entry into the territories of the “eastern brother", and the American troops consequently had to kill and liquidate the latter! And naturally, there is no need to recall what the Syrian security bodies did later on, in terms of the organization of the move of most mujahedeen from the Arab Maghreb, the Arabian Peninsula and the entire region into Iraq, in order to fight the Americans and fuel sectarian war in the country. This reached the point where Nouri al-Maliki himself complained about Damascus to the Security Council, calling for a special tribunal to investigate the crimes being committed by the Jihadists with Syria's support. Today, American Ambassador Robert Ford who was assigned to follow up on the Syrian crisis, is undoubtedly monitoring the transformation of the Syrian North into a base for the latter extremist groups, and does not need any lessons into how they operate and move. Indeed, he experienced this in the Algerian war in the 1990s, back when he was his country's ambassador, but also in Iraq where he was an active member of the American machine which fought Al-Qaeda during the past century in the Land of the Two Rivers. This is why the Americans are not rushing to intervene in Syria, do not even wish to, and are thus assigning this mission to Britain and the United Nations-Arab envoy. But even the concerned circles at the British Foreign Ministry, which are engaged in daily consultations with their American counterparts, are not expressing any willingness to engage in an adventure, unlike the enthusiasm that is sometimes shown by Prime Minister David Cameron or his foreign minister. In any case, no one in Washington or in any other European capital has the courage to adopt a decision to carry out an intervention which will be costly on the military and economic levels, at a time when they are gathering their remaining soldiers from Afghanistan among other locations. Is it not enough that they are unable to save some European states that are suffering from frail economic conditions and heralding troubles and social problems which will have repercussions throughout the continent and on the future of its union? In light of the absence of any efficient action to stop the war in Syria, none among the international and regional players, let alone those fighting on the domestic arena, expect the crisis to end with a winner and loser. This is due to the fact that whoever looks into the American questions about the day that will follow Al-Assad's collapse, can see how compatible they are with the Russian questions. None of the two states is finding an answer, except by throwing the ball in the opposition's court, as though what is required is for the armed opposition groups to engage in an anticipated sideline conflict with the Al-Nusra Front and the Jihadists who are contributing to the fight against the regime. In the meantime, the signs of this conflict have started to emerge through mutual liquidations between Al-Nusra and the groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Is it possible that the superpowers are unaware of the fact that the abstinence to carry out an efficient intervention is further complicating the Syrian crisis and enhancing these groups' role? Unless what is required is to open the Syrian arenas for them to fight among each other, just as was the case in Iraq which turned into a place of pilgrimage for Al-Qaeda and its sisters following the American invasion! Even Iran, which is not hesitating to provide Al-Assad's regime with all the support it needs, can detect the regime's weakness and is preparing for its possible eventual defeat. If this is not the case, then why is it holding on to President Muhammad Morsi's proposal to have the Quartet group (Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran) handle the settlement of the crisis, while knowing that the three other parties reject Al-Assad's stay in power? True, it is aware of the size of the challenges and troubles caused for it by the crisis in Syria, the possible loss of its status in this country and the undermining of its positions in Iraq and Lebanon after the Bahraini arena was closed in its face and the Palestinian cause exited its cloak. Still, any exaggeration in expecting or wagering on its full loss of these positions might be off the mark, in case the war ends with Syria's transformation into another Somalia or Afghanistan as Brahimi is cautioning. If the opposition is able to defeat the regime in Damascus and Aleppo, it will find a safe haven on the western coast, and if the regional and international circumstances are not ripe for Syria's division, Al-Assad will continue to maintain legitimacy unless the holders of the veto power change their positions. In the meantime, the opposition groups are fighting over power and the signs of the bloody conflict have started to emerge between some of its groups. This is not to mention the fighting which will erupt between these groups and the population along the Alawite coast for God knows how long, or the burden of managing cities that have been turned to rubble and an economy which requires billions of dollars to rise from the gutter. Will the latter, who are involved in infighting, have the energy to tend to regional issues by contributing for example to the suffocation of Hezbollah or supporting the Sunnis in Iraq? Unless it is the fate of the Lebanese and the Iraqis to venture once again in new civil wars! As for Turkey, which stood alongside the opposition early on, it fears for stability in its southern regions in light of the open border before the refugees and the fighters who are provoking the disgruntlement of a large sect in Antakya. In the meantime, the resumption of the activities of the Kurdish groups is increasing its concerns, along with the talk about a Alawite mini-state or Syria's and Iraq's division, as this could lead to the establishment of a Kurdish state. And while the crisis placed it in a clear confrontation with Tehran and Baghdad, it is also trying to contain its losses and compensate for them through exceptional relations with Kurdistan and attempts to settle the situation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party. At this level, there is no need to recall Jordan's fears towards what is happening in Syria today and the possible changes it might cause! In light of this situation, will Brahimi continue to provide a cover for the inability of all the parties fighting inside and over Syria? Or have the losses of all the latter parties not yet become equal or not yet reached their ultimate high by directly threatening their interests? And what about Syria? Is there anything it has not yet lost?
