The detractors of the Arab spring were joined by French far-right leader Marine Le Pen and Salafi brother Muhammad al-Kilani, i.e. the Libyan deputy who became mad in the post-revolution parliament, not due to the security mayhem or the prevalence of the arms mafia, but because female deputies wearing make-up were mixing with deputies at the council! Al-Kilani expressed sorrow over what has become with Libya with these immodest deputies, while Le Pen expressed sorrow over the fact that an Islamic winter emerged following the Arab spring, due to the blindness which affected the West. Before them, the ruling group in Baghdad – which acted as the opposition abroad during Saddam Hussein's days – was bragging at the beginning of the spring that its first sign was the toppling of Saddam, even if through an American invasion. And when the "plague" reached Iraq a few months ago, Nouri al-Maliki's government was able to contain the street's anger over poverty and corruption, as well as over unprecedented symbols of swindling in the country. With the State of Law Coalition in Iraq, the calculations oscillated between the support of the spring from afar and its opposition in Syria. And when President Jalal Talabani abstained from rounding the corners to keep Al-Maliki's government afloat whenever it falls in the crises swamp, it seemed that the expectations pertaining to a difficult predicament facing the prime minister were not exaggerated. Indeed, the sick president of the republic was a guarantee for the non-transformation of the political tensions into sectarian ones, and the prevention of the collapse of truce between Al-Maliki and his opponents, and even the collapse of the project of a sick state. Still, this does not deny the fact that the prime minister, who is accused of monopolizing the executive power and the armed forces' decisions, was able to score many points in the face of President of the Kurdistan Province Massoud Barzani and leader of the Iraqi List Iyad Allawi, although Al-Maliki was unable to eliminate his classification as "Iran's man and hands" in Iraq. The bashing party in the Iraqi parliament two days ago was not due to the presence of immodest women or people suspected of supporting the dictatorship of corruption which is swallowing up billions of the wealth in the Land of the Two Rivers, leaving the poor to Al-Maliki's promises to a heaven of quotas. The torture scandals inside the prisons unleashed anger throughout the provinces with a Sunni majority. The response on the Shiite street was in defense of the government and its policy, at a time when Al-Maliki and his supporters are convinced that something, which they are dubbing "strife" in the spring, is being concocted to topple him in Talabani's absence. The latter also believe that the demands to annul the anti-terrorism law is a mere cover for strife, and that the opponents, including Allawi and Barzani, are hiding behind the president's sickness, and Syria's sickness which is undermining Iran's influence, i.e. the first ally of the ruling group in Baghdad. Hence, the sit-ins and protests are continuing in the Sunni cities, while the oppositionists are pushing for Al-Maliki's interrogation in parliament to withdraw confidence from his government. What is the alternative? There is a street facing another, Sunni cities facing Shiite cities, division over the state institutions, suspects of smuggling the country's wealth, people accused of using power to settle external scores, officials pursuing others with the anti-terrorism sword, Kurds accused of collaborating with Turkey, Sunnis accused of collaborating with Arabs, a rebellion in Erbil against Baghdad and Al-Anbar following in its footsteps. As for Muktada al-Sadr's calculations at the level of the support he is offering, they are not odd, years after a political process accompanied by fluctuating alliances and hundreds of explosions to keep the violent sectarian divide ablaze. The Arab spring infection and threats are thus striking Iraq. Is the rebellion against the ruler not a revolution? Is the sit-in in Al-Ramadi not a rebellion? What about the closing of the border with Jordan due to concerns over the border of the marches? What is certain is that Al-Maliki based his governance strategy on Iran's ability to control the beat of the political game in Ira, unaware of the fact that the times of the spring have other calculations. Indeed, neither Damascus – which suddenly supported his stay at the head of the government – is still the same one bargaining over regional cards, nor is Tehran under the siege capable of tending to Al-Maliki's rescue, at a time when its regional alliance is breaking up, and at a high cost. But what is the price to pay to get rid of Al-Maliki's government? And will the Iraqis draw the lessons of the winter which follows the spring, or will they be defeated once again by the slide towards sectarian wars? The problem of the State of Law Coalition in Iraq resides in the blind confusion between the notion of companies and stocks, and the obligations of a citizenship beyond sects.
