If one can talk about a “winner" in the political sense of the word in the last war waged by Israel against the Hamas movement in Gaza, it would definitely be the new Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt. Indeed, under this regime, Cairo was able to become the main contact center among all the negotiators inside and outside the region, in order to put an end to the Israeli aggression and arrange the conditions of the settlement between Israel and Hamas. And it was not simple – or meaningless – for the Israeli government to announce it had decided to postpone the land invasion with which it had threatened the Strip to give a chance to the Egyptian-led truce efforts, then for President Muhammad Morsi to announce in person the end of the hostilities on Tuesday night. Cairo played the latter role based on two factors. Firstly, it is nowadays considered the actual godfather of the Islamic resistance movement, considering that the Muslim Brotherhood is heading the regime in Cairo and consequently has the final say in regard to Hamas's options and decisions. Secondly, Cairo – in light of the Arab spring – acquired a certain level of flexibility and realism, and learned how to maintain all the traditional contact channels with Israel despite the aggression, thus abstaining from responding to the escalation calls demanding the severance of the relations, the closing of the embassies, the mobilization of the troops and the ending of the peace accord. Due to that position, President Muhammad Morsi's name gained momentum among the parties concerned by the settlement, namely the American president, the European leaders, the Israeli prime minister and Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Meshaal. Consequently, his leading role gained a legitimacy which is still lacking inside of Egypt itself, due to the existing disputes with the civil movements on one hand and the Salafi ones on the other, over the new constitution of the state and the inclinations of the authority in Egypt during the next stage. The importance of the Egyptian role towards the Gaza issue resides in the fact that it will be the actual guarantor of the settlement which will be reached between Israel and the fighting factions in the Strip. Naturally, the conditions of this settlement will tackle the launching of rockets, the monitoring of the introduction of weapons via the Rafah crossing and the infiltration of fighters to Sinai and from there into Gaza, especially since the Sinai Peninsula has recently turned into a starting point for the Salafi movements that are threatening stability in Egypt. In that sense, the Egyptian regime will become a direct party in the new truce between Israel and Hamas, with all the responsibilities and future consequences this will induce. Such a situation is bound to enhance Hamas's authority and position in the next Palestinian equation, whether at the level of its relationship with the Islamic Jihad or its relationship with Fatah. Hence, one should keep an eye on the nature of the upcoming relations between the two resistance movements in the Gaza Strip, i.e. Hamas and the Jihad, in light of the existing dispute between Hamas and the Iranian regime that is maintaining its old ties – whether politically or through the provision of weapons – with Ramadan Shalah and his movement. It is also important to monitor the impact of the new influence acquired by Hamas on its relations with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the obstructed reconciliation process between the two largest Palestinian factions. Indeed, after Abu Mazen lost the Egyptian cover which was provided to him by Hosni Mubarak's regime, his presence at the head of the Palestinian command has grown weaker than ever. And it was not a coincidence that Azzam al-Ahmad, the head of Fatah's delegation to the reconciliation talks, launched his last attack against the Egyptian regime - and consequently against Hamas - assuring that reconciliation had become extremely difficult in light of the position adopted by Cairo, which he accused of seeking an exit for Israel from its current crisis. The Arab spring governments rallied around Hamas in its confrontation against the Israeli aggression, and Israel's approval of the Egyptian role to ensure truce came to confirm its recognition of that rallying. This was tackled by Khaled Meshaal in Cairo when he said: “Netanyahu wanted to test Egypt and the Egyptian answer was loud and clear. He wanted to test the Arab spring, and saw the extent to which this spring's populations have rallied around Gaza and its people." It is likely that modesty was the only thing which prevented Abu al-Walid from saying that this rallying was around Hamas and “its people."
