So far, a positive aspect has been prevailing at the level of the conflict over power between the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood, namely that both have refrained from using collective violence to settle the conflict on the street. Also so far, it seems that both sides, each for its own reasons, does not wish to see a violent clash; it seems that radicals have not had any impact on the decisions so far. Hence, the situation has maintained its peaceful nature despite the high tone featured in the verbal war. But for how long can the ceiling of peaceful action be respected in light of the prevailing uncertainties? And when might an incident detonate the confrontation? Such a possibility cannot be ruled out, and was expressed by numerous Egyptian politicians. Indeed, the confrontation could have been prevented so far by the realization that a clash would serve neither side. Still, the possibility of seeing a confrontation is on the table and factors conducive to it are increasing in light of the constitutional-legal complications provoked by the presence of two authorities, i.e. the military council and the presidency of the republic. These complications had accumulated during the stage that followed President Mubarak's resignation, with the military council's assumption of the country's administration and its insistence on sustaining that role. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood feels that the arrival to the presidency should unleash the president's hands to restructure the regime in accordance with its wishes. The controversy surrounding the dissolution and then the reinstatement of parliament falls in this context, which renders the constitutional and legal arguments presented to justify this position purely political. While the supporters of the dissolution are relying on the decision of the Supreme Court, this decision should be implemented and the military council should rush to publish it in the Official Gazette so that the immediate application becomes an obligation. For their part, the supporters of the reinstatement of parliament are relying on President Morsi's right to determine the date of the implementation, and not the military. Hence, it is a battle over the demarcation of the influence and the decision-making powers, regardless of the two constitutional declarations in light of which the parliamentary and presidential elections were held and were accepted by the MB as the regulators of political life during the transitional phase. One might note at this level that the reinstatement of parliament, whose main task will be to legislate, strips the military council of that role as defined by the revised Constitutional Declaration. Consequently, the president's move entails an implicit rejection of these two declarations and a return to the stage which preceded them, i.e. to the presidential system which was always rejected by the MB, which called for a parliamentary system. From behind the decree to reinstate the dissolved parliament, it seems that the MB has tactical goals related to its control over important decision-making institutions. Indeed, the revival of parliament means – in advance – a non-commitment to the decision of the Constitutional Court which is looking into the fate of the Shura Council that might be similar to the fate of the People's Assembly. In reality, the MB's wish to keep the current Shura Council might be much stronger than its wish to reinstate parliament, considering that the first is the one that chooses the state media officials which the group wishes to control, in order to transfer its loyalty from the official administration to the MB administration. At this level, many journalists among the candidates to occupy leading posts are complaining about the nepotism which is causing the exclusion of certain files in favor of members or supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. Clearly, in the context of its battle, the MB is giving a lot of attention to the official media, whose fate is to be determined at the Shura Council. In parallel, it is clear there is no understanding between the military council and Morsi over the formation of the government through which the MB can control the administration. Prior to the presidential elections and the dissolution of parliament, the group considered that as a majority, it was entitled to name the head and members of the government, waged a fierce campaign against Kamal al-Ganzouri's government and repeatedly called for its resignation. Today, Al-Ganzouri's appearance to the right side of Field Marshal Tantawi in official celebrations seems to extend beyond protocol considerations and feature a political meaning, namely that the military council was the one managing the government - which might remain a caretaker government for an unlimited period of time while awaiting the outcome of the conflict. Therefore, the conflict is related to the two main issues in any regime, i.e. the right to legislate and the right to execute, i.e. the leadership of the legislative and executive powers. Any other talk merely aims at embellishing the positions and holding the other side responsible, while the wager remains on the ability to contain the beat of this battle and prevent it from heading toward escalation or taking a dangerous turn.
