It is difficult for the armed sectarian groups to recognize their menace. But it is even more difficult for them to recognize their nature that threatens the very entity which they claim to represent, protect and belong to, before threatening the opposing groups or the outside enemy. And before all that, these groups are denying the fact that they are standing against all forms of interactions leading to the creation of a national fabric. There is a mixture of tribal-clannish structures and totalitarian ideologies, preventing the sects and their powers that are eager to defend them from seeing anything beyond their ever-threatened interests by the similar-competing factions. Hence, persecution and superiority complexes – along with immortal messages – are governing the behavior of these distressed groups that have resorted to the fabrication of fictive enemies and dates to build a solid cocoon protecting those within them against any change. On the one hand, some are saying that Hezbollah's weapons aim at defending the country in the face of the Israeli aggression, but that the weapons in the hands of Tripoli's Islamists are weapons of strife, to provoke sectarian feud and transfer terrorism to Syria. On the other, the weapons of Tripoli's youth have no other purpose nowadays but to deter Persian hegemony over their city and defend the dignity of the Sunnis against the Syrian threat to occupy it again. As to Hezbollah's weapons, they are ones of deceit which invaded the capital Beirut and were soiled with the killing of the Sunnis in clashes that have become too many to count. Naturally, there is no room for comparison between Hezbollah's sophisticated military equipment – whether at the level of the quantity or quality – and the light and primitive weapons in the hands of the Tripoli armed groups. Indeed, the first became available under regional sponsorship to serve goals extending beyond the defense of Lebanon, and are related to the roles wished to be maintained by the leaders in Syria and Iran. Nonetheless, this does not deny the fact that the two weapons and rhetoric surrounding them emerged for similar reasons. The first and most blatant among those reasons is the lack of trust in the state and its institutions as a side guaranteeing internal security and security in the face of the external enemy. The process by which the sectarian state in Lebanon was produced toppled once and for all the mission of building a powerful national army from its agenda. In that sense, the blames that were addressed to justify the first republic, i.e. prior to the Taif Agreement, revolved around tending to and arming the military institution. They were then reproduced during the Syrian regime's tutelage and following the withdrawal of its army, for reasons converging with what prevailed during the previous stages, and saying that the frail Lebanese concord did not allow the building of a strong army. Hence, each group should ensure its own security. The Taif agreement renewed this formula after it implicitly excluded the surrender of the weapons of the resistance to the authority. And because Syria limited the resistance against the Israeli occupation after 1990 to one party that is loyal to it and with a regional and allied reference – i.e. in the hands of Hezbollah – the party became the only armed popular actor in the country. However, this formula was difficult to uphold in the absence of the Syrian oppression machine, and it was normal for the sects to perceive the weapons of the other sect as a real source of threat. This is especially true in light of the party's repetitive use of its weapons on the domestic arena, one which was constant and stable throughout its history and since the first years of its conflict with Amal, the leftist powers and others, despite Hezbollah's attempts to depict itself as a party distant from any domestic violations. In reality, the accusations being made by Hezbollah's supporters against the armed men in Tripoli stem from the great similarity between the two groups, and not the discrepancy. Indeed, both sides are raising the banner of the group that is threatened at the level of its security, is deprived of the necessary means to lead a decent life and is persecuted by a strong foreign power. It is thus one weapon in different hands.
