Washington's announcement of having captured an “invisible bomb” built by the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula organization, the leadership of which is based in Southern Yemen, and intended to blow up an American civilian airliner, paves the way for numerous possibilities, among them in particular that of the US carrying out broad military action in this divided and exposed country, especially as the US announcement coincided with the Pentagon's decision to return its team of military trainers to assist Yemeni counter-terrorism forces, after they had been withdrawn following the wounding of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in an explosion at the Presidential Mosque in early June of last year. The wording of the US announcement stressed the danger involved in the nature of the explosive, which is difficult for security equipment at airports to detect, and which the double agent was able to leave Yemen with without being discovered, before turning it in to US intelligence officers. Only a few days ago, coinciding with the first commemoration of the killing of Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, US President Barack Obama declared from Kabul that his country had succeeded to drive the terrorist organization out of Afghanistan and to prevent it from reforming its leadership and troops in that country. Yet stressing the increasing danger Al-Qaeda's Yemeni branch has come to represent for US national security suggests that US troops in Afghanistan, whose mission is nearing its end, may find another target in a place not so far away, especially on the background of Yemeni authorities being unable to stop the expansion of Al-Qaeda in Southern and Eastern provinces, and the latter repeatedly directing painful blows against the army and threatening the city of Aden, Yemen's second largest city and economic capital. Indeed, the Yemeni army seems to constantly be “surprised” by coordinated attacks from the terrorists, who have found an environment that embraces them and allows them to strengthen their capabilities by having local extremist forces join them, just as took place in Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban. Yet this is not only the result of a lack of resources, both in terms of troops and equipment, but also the obvious result of the political divisions and multiple loyalties that still devastate its leaderships and weaken its cohesion and preparedness, as well as the result of the delay in implementing the political and military decision to reunify it due to the complications of the crisis that paralyzed the country for over a year and did not end with changing the president or the positions of a few top officers. So far, the task of confronting Al-Qaeda is still entrusted to locally deployed troops, while highly equipped elite forces, such as the First Armored Division and the Republican Guard, have been deployed in and around the capital within the framework of the political tug-of-war, with each side hoping to drive the other to the battle in the South in order to weaken it, just as took place with the wars against the Houthis. And there are no indications that the reunification of state institutions will come out of the slow lane any time soon. This is why the Americans are increasingly relying on air strikes directed by unmanned drones to take out Al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen. But these alone are not sufficient if they are not coupled with military action on the ground which the Yemeni army is unable to carry out. And although the Obama Administration currently excludes any new foreign military involvement after the two exorbitantly costly wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, the growing danger coming from Southern Yemen may drive it to think seriously of the possibility of direct intervention over the coming months, especially if it proves successful in the presidential elections.
