What the Egyptian military council is committing and what the Syrian army is practicing both reveal a crisis deepened by a pure lust for power. This reached the heart of the relationship between society and the state and the perception of their rights and roles by the factions controlling the state's apparatuses. Indeed, the unleashing of the thugs to kill the protesters in front of the Defense Ministry in Cairo is considered to be the most recent chapter in a series of bloody acts for which the Egyptian military council is directly responsible, ever since the attack on demonstrators who tried to stay on Tahrir Square during the first days that followed Hosni Mubarak's departure. These acts had reached their peak during the Maspero massacre, the Muhammad Mahmoud Street incidents and the premiership headquarters incident, which claimed the lives of dozens of Egyptians who never imagined they would be killed with live ammunition during the days of the revolution they staged against tyranny. The same is being done by the Syrian troops vis-à-vis the peaceful demonstrators, who were pushed by the horrific killings and the insanity of the killers to defend themselves after around ten thousand people fell with the bullets of the regular army, the security forces and the thugs supporting them prior to the formation of the first opposition armed groups. The extremely modest performance of the Arab armies in the face of foreign powers is known, while the army commanders and those responsible for its defeats justify the chronic failure by either the great superiority of the enemy or by lies such as “we awaited them from the East, they came from the West” and “we reserve the right to respond at the right time and place.” But these justifications remain unapplied. Throughout Arab modern history, the success in the military confrontations is - with almost no exceptions - due to society's arming of itself and assumption of its responsibilities wherever the armies failed. This is often accompanied by hefty prices and the deepening of the popular rift, as it was seen in Algeria following the liberation war and in Lebanon following the Israeli withdrawal. This is due to the fact that whenever it is facing foreign powers, the Arab armies seem to be made of salt and only turn into rocks when confronting the peaceful local population. What can be deduced from last year's experiences is that the Egyptian army's command is willing to slaughter uncountable numbers of citizens in order to maintain its numerous privileges and its wealth, which includes between 20% and 30% of Egyptian economy. As to the Syrian army, which intersects with the security apparatuses (for example the military security and air force intelligence apparatuses which are affiliated with the army and carry out “security” operations, mainly against the civilians), and its command that includes the most loyal factions – through familial and blood ties - to the ruling family, they have become accustomed to power throughout four decades. This is why this command is fighting to maintain power, with all its facets and meanings, in the hands of the familial-beneficiaries group that has been imposing its grip over it since 1970 (knowing that this group does not belong to one sect although it is mostly composed of Alawis). Among the tools to achieve that is the denial of the legitimacy of the oppositionists' demands, while accusing them of foreign collaboration, debasing their social origins and instigating the urban population against the “rural strangers.” This demeaning vision is much similar to that of the Egyptian military council's spokesmen toward civil society activists who were pursued and accused of receiving foreign funds. Indeed, in both cases, the oppositionists are not considered to be at the heart of the country and part of its people, rather part of the marginalized rural population that sold itself to foreign parties. In reality, the social structure from which the Arab armies emerged has not changed much, ever since it was exposed by Sadiq Jalal al-Azm in his book Self-Criticism After the Defeat, and in Yassin al-Hafez' Defeat and Defeated Ideology and the Historical Vietnamese Experience. In parallel, the “mind” which led to the Arabs' great defeat is now violently trying – while using the misleading it masters – to remain standing in the face of the populations which took to the street and will not go back home any time soon.
